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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines crowds and resistance politics in Pietermaritzburg, focusing particularly on
the 1950s and the 1980s. These two decades were characterised by heightened anti-apartheid
political activity in South Africa. It is against that background that this thesis explores mass
mobilisation and resistance in Pietermaritzburg. The 1960s and the 1970s have not been ignored,
however, in this comparative analysis. It appears that there was not so much overt mass
mobilisation that was taking place in South Africa during this period, on the same scale as that of
the 1950s and the- 1980s. This thesis analyses selected case studies of events such as protest
marches, popular riots and stayaways. It examines the similarities and differences in the socio-
economic and political contexts in which such events occurred.
The key aspect is that of resistance crowds. This thesis examines how, when and why resistance
crowds formed in Pietermaritzburg during the two periods. It begins with a literature survey,
which sets out the framework for comparison. Aspects such as the kinds of constituencies~ the
roles of political organisations, trade unions, church groups, youth organisations, government
policies and the nature of the campaigns are raised in the literature. Drawing from that framework
this study explores the socio-economic contexts in which the selected case studies took place. The
way in which the changes in the socio-economic and political contexts influenced mass
mobilisation forms a central theme of this dissertation. The four case studies explore crowd
events in anti-apartheid politics in Pietermaritzburg. The thesis concludes with a comparative
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Preface
'Perhaps no historical phenomenon has been so thoroughly neglected by historians as the crowd. Few
would deny that the crowd has, in a rich variety of guises, played a significant part in history. Yet it has.
over many years, been considered a subject to be studied by the psychologist or the sociologist rather
than by the historian.' (G. Rude', The Crowd in History, 1730-1848: A Study o/Popular Disturbances in
France and England (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1981), p. 3).1
The main focus of this dissertation will be to explore and compare the mobilisation of anti-
apartheid resistance crowds in Pietermaritzburg during the 1950s and the 1980s, two decades
that have attracted particular attention in South African resistance historiography. This study is
not intended t~ Qe a general history of resistance in Pietermaritzburg, although aspects of this
history do shape my particular interest in crowd events. The events that are studied in this
research include public demonstrations, riots, stayaways and protest marches. The focus will be
on African resistance politics but cases where there was multi-racial co-operation will also
feature. The bias towards Africans does not imply that other racial groups did not participate,
but Africans were worst hit by apartheid and many of the events of mass mobilisation studied in
this dissertation involved Africans and occurred in African residential areas.
The comparative framework will evaluate similarities and differences in resistance politics
during the two periods, and will investigate the sizes of crowds, the nature of organisations,
crowd behaviour, the composition of the crowds, types of leadership, and the targets which
were mobilised against. In examining these aspects the socio-economic and political contexts in
which those events occurred will be analysed as well. One of the aims is to find out if
Pietermaritzburg experienced intense mass mobilisation during the 1950s like other major
I Besides Rude' others are D. Crummey, Banditry, Rebellion and Social Proiestin Africa (London,
Currey, 1986); M. Harrison, Crowds and History: Mass Phenomena in English Towns, 1790-1835
(Cambridge, Cambridge University press, 1988); E. 1. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic
Forms ofSocial Movement in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Manchester, Manchester
university Press, 1978); 1. H. Kaye (ed), The Face ofthe Crowd: Studies in Revolution Ideology and
Popular Protest (New York, Harvester, 1988).
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urban centres. And if not, why not? The issue of why mass mobilisation heightened in
Pietermaritzburg during the 1980s will also be investigated.
The problem with the study of resistance crowds is that it is very difficult to explain what one
means by resistance crowds. This study regards resistance crowds as groups of people who
were mobilised for political purposes and who viewed each other as having a collective identity
in struggling against apartheid laws and policies. Another issue is that of numbers. At what
point does a crowd become big enough to justify the term 'mass mobilisation'? The answer
depends partly o~ context. In very repressive or difficult circumstances of mobilisation, a crowd
of one or two hundred people could be called a 'mass crowd'. In this study, crowds of differing
sizes are studied. In certain circumstances what is significant is not so much the size of the
crowd, but its formation in public places such as streets and city squares. This study pays more
attention to how and why crowds formed rather than to the sizes of crowds, although one
should point out that the issue of the size of the crowd is also important in understanding
changes in contexts.
The history of anti-apartheid crowd resistance in Pietermaritzburg has not received much
scholarly attention. Different researchers have paid a lot of attention to political violence, which
has been a feature ofPietermaritzburg during 1980s and early 1990s. Furthermore, published
writing about resistance in South Africa tends to focus on cities such as Johannesburg, Cape
Town, Pretoria, Durban, Port Elizabeth and East London. I decided to do something different
and to look at how people were mobilised to resist apartheid in Pietermaritzburg. I do so by
examining selected events of crowd mobilisation during the two main eras covered in this
thesis. The chosen events were different in nature and required different tactics of organisation.
The events are analysed as strategies of resistance to apartheid and they are viewed against the
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socio-economic and political contexts in which they occurred. Those that involved violence are
not just relegated to the status of mob riots but analysed against their historical contexts. As
Crummey puts it:
'We believe that popular violence needs to be seen in the light of other kinds of popular
protest and politics. It especially needs to be seen in the context of other state
structures, for popular violence arises in situations where states claim a monopoly on
the legitimate use of violence and direct it against the people.,2
A variety of sources have been used in order to gather the data for this study. Use was made of
archival recor~s:l published books, newspapers, manuscripts, theses, journal articles and oral
accounts. Some sources were useful in all sections of the thesis while others were helpful only
in certain sections. In some sections I had to rely heavily on newspapers, as books and oral
accounts were less helpful. The issue of sources in studying crowd events is a tricky one
because in many cases the history of the crowd is the history of other people's perception of
that crowd. Harrison pointed out that' since the crowd existed through the eyes of
commentaries that were rarely crowd members themselves, and who frequently occupied
advantaged social positions, its existence functioned largely to reflect the beliefs of the
commentaries.,3 Interviews are a vital source of information when one is studying crowd
events. Rude pointed out that 'official records and sources will rarely tell us much about the
identity of either the rioters or the victims and remarkably little (as a rule) about the more
detailed pattern of events, or about the motives or behaviour of those most actively involved.,4
It is in such cases that oral accounts become more important for they provide information that
goes beyond simple and obvious facts that are printed in newspapers and archival sources. In
my interviews I heard accounts of people who participated in the crowd events and of those
who observed 'the events. The interpretations and views of people about these events, however,
2 Crummey, Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in A/rica, p. 1.
3 Harrison, Crowds and History, p. 38.
4 Rude', The Crowd in History, p. 12.
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change over time and are influenced by their backgrounds. There were cases where interviews
proved unhelpful, even when the interviewees had participated in some of the events. For basic
information and dates one had to rely on newspapers, as they were contemporary sources. The
newspapers remain, in most cases, the only documentary source of crowd events and they
provide both the 'supposed facts' relating to the crowd, and the opinions of the reporter.
s
The
weaknesses of different sources that were used in this study were taken into consideration.
One should also say a few more words about my interviews. The oral data leans quite heavily
on the ANC-UDF-SACP-COSATU side. That is because it was people in these organisations
that were active in anti-apartheid mass mobilisation, particularly the events that I have selected
as case studies. The history of how those that were opposed to these crowd events viewed them
then and now could be a separate study on its own. However, in cases where those views were
accessible, I incorporated them as part of the argument in different chapters.
The thesis consists of seven main chapters and a comparative conclusion. Chapter One is a
short survey of selected literature that compares, explicitly and implicitly, anti-apartheid
resistance during the 1950s and the 1980s. Chapter Two explores the socio-economic and
political context in Pietermaritzburg during the period from 1950 to 1961. This chapter sets the
scene for the two case studies of that decade. Chapter Three is a case study of the first set of
significant events of anti-apartheid crowd mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg, occurring in
November 1956 and January 1'957, and involving mostly women. These demonstrations were
part of a nationwide anti-pass campaign. The fourth chapter is the second case study and it
. examines the beerhall demonstrations and the Sobantu Village revolt of August 1959. The
events are placed within the context of other demonstrations and riots that were taking place at
5 Harrison, Crowds and History, p. 39.
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that time in other urban and rural centres of Natal. Chapter Five provides an overview of socio-
economic and political contexts in Pietermaritzburg from the early 1960s to the early 1980s and
addresses the question of why anti-apartheid resistance crowds did not develop during this
period. Chapter Six is the third case study of the thesis and the first case study of the 1980s: it
examines the stayaway of July 1985 in Pietermaritzburg. It looks at the impact that stayaway
had on mass mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg. Chapter Seven is the second case study of the
1980s and "it explores the Defiance Campaign march which took place in Pietermaritzburg in
September 1989. The conclusion returns to the comparative framework of the 1950s and
1980s, and draws together the main findings of the dissertation.
CHAPTER ONE
The 1950s and the 1980s: An Overview of Literature on Resistance Politics
It is noticeable how some academics and political activists, when writing or talking about the 1980s,
like to draw comparisons between the politics of the 1980s and that of the 1950s. Some
commentators, such as Lodge and Carrim, have explicitly compared the 1950s and the 1980s while
others have done ~his implicitly by pointing to the significance of the struggles of the 1950s as a
mobilising reference point and as a basis for the struggles ofthe 1980s.
1
Within the literature on such
themes there is ~ common emphasis on differences as well as similarities in strategies and tactics of
mass mobilisation during the two periods. These writers acknowledge that the events of mass
mobilisation took place in different contexts socially, politically and economically. But a common
thread that weaves through their analysis is the argument that the popular struggles of the 1980s
were related to, and influenced by, the earlier phases ofmass resistance.
In order to have a more nuanced analysis, the' insights and propositions of different authors will
inform my comparative framework for anti-apartheid mass mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg. This
chapter presents an outline of these perspectives. Various authors commonly view the resistance of
the 1950s as a forerunner ofthe popular struggles ofthe late 1970s and 1980s. Writing in the 1980s,
. Suttner and Cronin argued that 'the 1950s were the last period when the development of mass
1 T. Lodge and B. Nasso~ All, Here and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s(Cape Town,
David Philip, 1991), pp. 28-30, 39 and 61; Y. Ca.rrin\ 'The Defiance Campaign: Protest Politics on the
March', in Indicator South Africa, Volmne 6, Nmnber 4, (1989), pp. 51-52; N. Worden, The Making of
Modem South Africa: Conquest, Segregation and Apartheid (Oxford, Blackwell, 1994), p. 136; International
Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, Apartheid: The Facts (London, IDAP, 1991), p. 101; R.V.
Lambert, 'Tfade Unions and National Liberation in South Africa: Past Perspectiv~s and Current Strategies',
paper delivered at Conference on Southern African Economy after Apartheid, at the Centre for Southern
African Studies, University of York, 29 September - 02 October 1986, pp. 1-26; 1. Baskin, Striking Back: A
History ofCosatu (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1991), pp.l6-17 and 316; Y. Muthien, 'Protest and Resistance in
Cape Town, 1939-1965', in R. Cohen, Y. Muthien and A. Zegeye (eels), Repression and Resistance: Insider
Accounts of Apartheid (London, Hans Zell, 1990), p. 84; A. Jeffery, Forum on Mass Mobilisation
(Johannesburg, South African Institute ofRace Relations, 1991).
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organisation was possible in our country'. 2 Associated with this kind of view, the mid-1960s to the
late 1970s is portrayed as a period when overt anti-apartheid resistance was relatively muted.
3
The
relative quiescence is attributed to state repression, economic stability and internal ideological
problems within black political organisations.
4
The key focal points of my analysis in this dissertation will be incidents of crowd mobilisation in
resistance politics during the 1950s and the 1980s. The 1950s saw many events of mass
mobilisation, ranging from strikes, the defiance campaign of 1952, the Congress of the People
campaign, the a.x;ti-Bantu education campaign, anti-pass campaigns, the potato boycotts, protest
marches, stay-at-homes and the generalised urban and rural militancy of 1959-1960. These events
were part ofthe African National Congress Youth League's (ANCYL) Programme of Action and of
the campaigns of the Congress Alliance, which was an alliance of anti-apartheid organisations. The
last incident ofmass mobilisation during the 1950s phase was the stay-at-home ofMay 1961.
The 1980s were also characterised by relatively intense mass mobilisation and heightened political
consciousness. Suttner and Cronin view this as a period when mass democratic struggles were again
emerging.
5
Political radicalism during the 1980s was reflected in protest marches, strikes, election
boycotts, consumer boycotts, school boycotts, stayaways and political instability.6 Lodge argues that
the scale of political awakening helped make the 1980s the climax of a century of black protest in
which blacks had tried petitions, civil disobedience, labour stayaways and guerrilla warfare in an
2 .
R. Suttner and 1. Cronin, 30 Years ofthe Freedom Charter (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1986), p. 249.
3 Worden, The Making ofModern South Africa:. p. 113. .
4 Ibid. pp. 113-119; Baskin, Striking Back, pp. 16-17; Lodge, All, Here and Now, p. 30; International
Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, Apartheid: The Facts, pp. 103-106; P. O. Tichmann, 'African
Worker Action in Durban, 1940-1960', Unpublished MA Thesis, Durban, University ofNatal, 1983, pp. 56-
57; Suttner and Cronin, 30 Years of the Freedom Charter:. p. x. argue that during this period the whole
process ofpolitical mobilisation ground to a halt.
5 Suttner and Cronin, 30 Years ofthe Freedom Charter, p. x.
6 Lodge, All, Here and Now, p. 3; IDAF, Apartheid: The facts, p. 109.
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effort to obtain their rightS. 7 In addition to political organisations, trade unions, civics and youth and
church groups were active during the mass struggles ofthe 1980s.
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Shaping the Comparative Framework
The views ofdifferent writers have shap~d my framework of comparing and contrasting incidents of
anti-apartheid resistance. Y. Carrim, a Pietermaritzburg political activist and academic, compares
and contrasts the defiCUlce campaigns of 1952 and 1989.
9
My comparative framework has been
shaped by his focus on similarities- and differences in the nature of anti-apartheid opposition,
strategies, objectives of the campaigns, constituencies and followings, and the impacts of differing
political environments. Carrim's arguments help set the scene for my investigation of why the
defiance campaign of 1952 did not develop momentum in Pietermaritzburg while the 1989
campaign was well supported.
Tom Lodge explicitly compares the 1980s with the 1950s and highlights aspects such as the
differences in constituencies, the roles of the youth, trade unions and church groups, the nature of




'In the 1980s the UDF vented popular anger at inequality and oppression as the ANC had
done in the 1950s, but the constituencies that fuelled the anger had changed. By the 1980s
black workers had become the dominant force in manufacturing; in the 1950s they were
confined largely to unskilled drudgery... Expanding educational opportunities helped
produce a highly politicised generation ofblack students... "Amandla Ngawethu!" (power is
Ours!) was a slogan inherited from the 1950s. Then it voiced an aspiration; in the 1980s it
11 '
became an assertion. '
These are the important kinds of issues to address in comparing the events of the 1950s and the
7 Ibid. p. 4.
8 IDAF, Apartheid: The Facts, p. 109; M. Swilling, 'The United Democratic Front and the Township Revolt',
in W. Cobbett and R. Cohen (eds), Popular Struggles in South Africa (London, lames Currey, 1988), pp. 93
and 102-103.
9 Carrim, 'The Defiance Campaign', pp. 51-52.
10 Lodge, All, Here and Now:. p. 112.
1980s. On the theme ofthe kinds oforganisations that mobilised people, Lodge points out that
'Although the UDF's style seemed to echo the mass mobilisation led by the ANC thirty years
before, with songs, slogans and speeches which extolled Mandela and other ANC heroes,
the movement was different in significant ways. ,12
Suttner and Cronin, both members of the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African
Communist Party (SACP) alliance, wrote a book on the thirtieth anniversary ofthe Freedom Charter
(in 1985), and stressed the relationships and links between the struggles of the 1950s and those of
the 1980s. In their foreword, in connecting the 1980s with the 1950s, they point out that
'There ls another significant similarity between the period of 1955 and today. The Congress
ofthe People Campaign was initiated after the successful Defiance Campaign. The campaign
to defy unjust laws represented a fundamental challenge to the apartheid regime. The
Congress of the People sought to take this crucial, though essentially negative campaign
further. While continuing to reject racist laws, the campaign to create the Freedom Charter
raised the positive vision of an alternative, apartheid-free South Africa. In 1985 the
oppressed and democratic people of South Africa have recently emerged from successful
campaigns to boycott black local authority and tri-cameral elections. Thousands continue to
boycott Bantu education and the pass laws are rejected as unequivocally as ever. But, as in
1955 the people are taking this process further. They are again asserting the vision of a
South Africa free from oppression and exploitation, the South Africa of the Freedom
Charter. ' 13
Furthermore, these authors also stressed the links and continuities by showing that many of the
leaders of the 1950s were also active in the struggles of the 1980s and could be found in the
leadership of the United Democratic Front (UDF)).14 From the mid-1980s there was wide-scale
mobilisation around symbols and campaigns ofthe 1950s and the early 1960s.
It is vital also to analyse the socio-economic and political contexts in which crowd mobilisation
occurred. The contexts shaped the nature of anti-apartheid struggles and the choice of strategies.
Studies by Lodge and Sapire on East London and Brakpan respectively during the 1950s have
shown that such socia-economic factors as the rate of industrialisation, urbanisation, population size,
11 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
12 Ibid. pp. 61-62.
13 Suttner and Cronin, 30 Years p. x.
municipal policies and political aspects such as political leadership, youth militancy and the tradition
of resistance politics influence the nature of political mobilisation.
15
Studies of the local politics of
relatively small towns by Lodge and Sapire have influenced my decision to research the history of
political mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg. Local studies enable one to investigate specific
characteristics rather than to generalise on a nation-wide basis. Local conditions were vital to an
explanation of why Pietermaritzburg was relatively quiet in the 1950s whereas, in the 1980s, it
became a site of radical anti-apartheid resistance. This does not~ however, mean that the national
context should not be taken into consideration.
It is also imperative to compare the targets and objectives of mass mobilisation during the two
phases. The effectiveness of local and national campaigns in mobilising people is a vital issue to
explore. This will be significant for the comparative framework because the case studies that I have
selected consist of both local and national campaigns. One will have to grapple with issues such as:
Did people respond in large numbers to calls for national boycotts, such as those that protested the
white-only elections during the 1950s? Did the call for action against local grievances receive larger
support than did the national campaign issues? Did the differences between national and local
campaigns shape and influence mass mobilisation during the 1980s as well?
In her study of protest and resistance in Cape Town from 1939-1965, Yvonne Muthien grapples
with the above issues. She argues that most of the campaigns of the 1950s were relatively
ineffective because they focused on broader national political issues and paid little attention to local
14 Ibid. pp. 26-50.
15 T. Lodge, 'Political Mobilisation during the 1950s: An East London Case Study', in S. Marks and S.
Trapido (eels), The Politics ofRace, Class and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century South Africa (London.
Longman, 1987), pp. 318-330; H. Sapire, "African Political MobiJi?,ation in Brakpan in the 1950s', in R. Hill,
M. Trump and M. Muller (eels), African Studies Forum~ Volume 2, (pretoria, Human Sciences Research
Council, 1993), pp. 89-105.
grievances and building grassroots organisations.
IG
She, however. points out that mobilising tor
national issues is important in the sense that 'In many cases mobilising around national campaigns
helped transcend the limited appeal of parochial issues and the geographic separation of the
oppressed communities.' 17 Nkosinathi Gwala has supported Muthien and argues that <national
campaigns should have local resonance in order to translate easily into political action.' 18 Drawing
from the ideas of the above authors I will be able to analyse the popular response to local and
national campaigns in my case studies. During the 1980s the struggle for national liberation became
interwoven with the everyday local struggles ofpeople, more so than occurred during the 1950s.
Rob Lambert explores the role of trade unions in national liberation and he compares the South
African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions~s
(COSATU) roles in mass mobilisation, and their different contexts. This analysis of the relationship
between trade unions and political organisations during the two phases of mass mobilisation will be
significant for my comparison. During the 1980s political organisations and trade unions openly
formed alliances and combined their forces to resist apartheid. 19 The merger of political and
community grievances with shop-floor issues resulted in a formidable and sustained anti-apartheid
mobilisation. Lambert's study of trade unions and national liberation has shown that workers were
an important pillar of anti-apartheid resistance during the 1950s.20 He points out that anti-populism,
which challenged SACTU's populist position in the 1950s, continued to have an impact during the
years of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) and COSATU during the late
16 Muthien, 'Protest and Resistance in Cape Town', p. 73.
17 Ibid.
18 N. Gwala, 'Inkatha, Political Violence and the Struggle for Control in Pietennaritzburg', paper to
Workshop on Regionalism and Restructuring in Natal. Durban, University of Natal, 28-31 January 1988, p.
18. (Nkosinathi Gwala was a pseudonym ofDr Blade Nzimande)
19 S. Mkhize, 'Mass Mobilisation and Resistance: a Study of Selected Stayaways and Protest Marches in
Pietennaritzburg, 1985-1989', Unpublished BA Honours Thesis, Pietennaritzburg, University ofNatal, 1995.
pp. 9-23.
20 Lambert. 'Trade Unions and National Liberation'. pp. 4-23.
-
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1970s and the mid-1980s.
21
However, Lambert argues that political unionism was not the main
cause ofSACTU's demise, and that COSATU could benefit from 'the lessons of the 1950s,.22 But
he acknowledges the fact that the federations were mobilising under different socio-econorrUc and
political conditions. Lambert has been supported by 1. Baskin, a COSATU official, who argues that:
'SACTU's involvement in politics did not divert it from the union tasks but instead helped
to influence anti-apartheid politics. As the union movement re-emerged during the 1970s
and 1980s the influence of SACTU was often felt. Some held it up as a model to be
emulated while others saw in its history mistakes to be avoided. It was no accident however,
that sections from the preamble of SACTU's constitution were incorporated into the
preamble ofthe COSATU constitution and its guiding motto - 'an injury to one is an injury
to all' - would become the new-federation's slogan. ,23
The signjficant point to highlight is that the contexts of the two periods gave rise to different kinds
ofworking class and workers, and this influenced the formations of mass mobilisation.
Nigel Worden addresses the question of leadership in mass mobilisation. He argues that most of the
campaigns of the 1950s failed because of the lack of determined leadership and also because of
political and ideological differences among the leaders. He examines the nature of the political
leadership that was responsible for mobilising crowds for political ends during the two phases. He
points out that:
'One of the reasons for the failure of the popular struggles of the 1950s, much debated by
historians, was the nature of the relationship between mass mobilisation and the leadership
of the national organisations... Clearly the ANC failed to mobilise and co-ordinate
widespread unified protest, as much because of its limited financial and administrative
resources and heightened state repression as because of the conscious alienation of its
leaders from popular or working class interests. Case studies have shown that particular
local circumstances need to be considered when assessing the effectiveness of campaigns
and of national leadership. The opposition movements not only faced difficulties of tactics
and popular mobilisation, they were also increasingly divided in terms of ideology. ,24
It can be argued that during the 1980s a new generation of anti-apartheid leaders was mobilising
people under a different context. That leadership was a product of the socio-economic and political
21 Ibid., pp. 19-21.
22 Ibid., pp. 8-19.
23 Baskin, Striking Back~ p. 16.
24 Worden, The Making ofModern South Africa, pp. 102-103 and 104.
conditions of the mid-1960s and 1970s.
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Some of the authors I have read also dealt with the issue of the impact of different state policies on
mass mobilisation. The government's attitudes towards extra-parliamentary opposition during the
two decades were different. The 1950s were a period of the implementation of apartheid. The State
had not crystallised its security machinery. It is even pointed out that the police at that time were
lenient and treated political prisoners humanely.26 The 1980s, on the other hand, saw the state's
determination to crush anti-apartheid. politics. There were no possibilities of holding protest marches
as was the case·during the 1950s. However, as Worden argues, 'in the course of the late 1970s and
the 1980s, the rigid Verwoerdian model developed during the· heyday of apartheid began to break
down. The National Party government experimented with a number of refonns designed to adjust
apartheid to changing economic and social circumstances while still maintaining a monopoly of
political power. ,27 The government began to introduce limited refonns and coercion (manifested in
the State ofEmergency and security force brutality) in an attempt to diffuse the political crisis. The
government's strategy of limited refonn led to a combination of expectations and fiustrations. As
Carrim puts it in his comparison ofthe Defiance Campaigns:
'The 1950s campaign took place in the context of a government relentlessly
implementing racial policies and a state that was becoming increasingly powerful. The
campaign was in a sense defensive, seeking to prevent the further encroachment of
racial policies on the whole society. The present campaign occurs at the time when the
government is moving away from rigid racial policies and the state is somewhat more
fractured and indecisive. The rvIDM is on the offensive as part of the overall thrust to
.C'. • ,28translorm SOCIety.
One can argue that the views of the writers I have examined so far were influenced by the
context in which they wrote. The perspectives of some of these commentators were probably
25 1. Seekings, Heroes or Villains: Youth Politics in the 1980s (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1993).
26 Author's interview with A. S. Chetty, 12 November 1997.
27
Worden, The Making o/Modern South A/rica, p. 121.
28 Carrim, 'The Defiance Campaign', pp. 51-52.
shaped by their political and ideological preoccupations. They wrote during the 1980s and the
early 1990s, which were characterised by confrontationist anti-apartheid resistance and mass
action. To provide evidence of the continuity of struggles and to look for inspiration, some
analysts looked back at the 1950s, which were commonly seen as a 'decade of defiance'. The
protest marches, particularly those that began from 1989, apart from being useful weapons of
mass action in a changing environment, were also significant in connecting the 1950s with a
later era of political confrontatio~ and intense mass mobilisation.
Conclusion
This chapter sought to survey the views of academics and political activists who have written
explicitly, as well as those who have drawn comparisons implicitly, of the anti-apartheid struggles of
the 1950s and the 1980s. The literature I have read consists of attempts to provide portrayals of
both nation-wide and local case studies. The writers on the campaigns of both the 1950s and the
1980s assess their effectiveness by generalising from studies of big cities such as Johannesburg,
Cape Town, Durban and Pretoria. While aspects of the dramatic and violent politics of the mid-
1980s in Pietermaritzburg and the Natal Midlands in general has attracted a great deal of scholarly
analysis, the anti-apartheid politics of the 1950s remain virtually unexplored. 29 Against the backdrop
of a variety ofviews, both political and academic, which draw the 1950s and the 1980s together in
comparison, I evaluate patterns of how resistance crowds formed, or did not form, in
Pietermaritzburg's specific and changing context during these two decades.
29 M. Kentridge, An UnoffiCial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town, David Philip,
1990); 1. Aitchison, 'Numbering the Dead: The Course and Pattern of Political Violence in the Natal
Midlands, 1987-1989', Unpublished MA Thesis, Pietermaritzburg, University ofNatal, 1993; A. 1.
Jeffery, The Natal Story: 16 Years o/Conflict (Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race
Relations, 1997).
CHAPTER TWO
Socio-Economic Contexts and Anti-Apartheid Resistance in
Pietermaritzburg, from the 1950s to the early 1960s: A Brief Outline
The main purpose of this chapter is to explore the socio-economic and political contexts of
Pietermaritzburg during the 1950s, in order to set the scene for the two case studies of anti-
apartheid political mobilisation which follow. It has been argued that events of political mobilisation
take place within a particular context and this shapes specific types of responses.
1
Furthermore,
local studies of political mobilisatiOIl by Tom Lodge, on East London, and Hilary Sapire, on
Brakpan, have shown that local circumstances were important influences in anti-apartheid politics.
2
Large cities with many industries usually experience an increased rate of urbanisation. This, in turn
creates a potential constituency for political mobilisation. However, that does not assume that mass
mobilisation can only happen when there is a large industrial working class. After sketching in some
economic and social features, I will provide an overview of incidents of anti-apartheid crowd
mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg during the 1950s and the early 1960s. This will include incidents
that occurred nationally. This outline will help set the scene for my case studies. The national
political context will be useful in showing that some local incidents were influenced by what was
taking place at the broader national political level. The fact that African people in Pietermaritzburg
did not participate in national campaigns in the same way as in other towns is interesting and
necessitates local studies ofpolitical mobilisation.
1 N. Worde~ The Making ofModern South Africa: Conquest, Segregation and Apartheid (OxforcL
B1ackwell, 1994), p. 103. .
2 T. Lodge, 'Political Mobilisation during the 1950s: An East London Case Study', in S. Marks and S.
Trapido (eds), The Politics ofClass, Race and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa (London,
Longman, 1987), pp. 310-331; H. Sapire, 'African Political Mobilisation in Brakpan in the 1950s', in R.
Hill, M. Trump and M. Muller (eds), African Studies Forum, Volume 2, (pretoria, Human Sciences
Research Council, 1993), pp. 89-105.
Economic developments to the 1950s in Pietermaritzburg
Pietennaritzburg developed from 1838 as a Voortrekker town and was later, from 1842, annexed
by the British and used as the administrative capital of the colony ofNatal.
3
The city maintained its
status and character as a political capital of Natal throughout the nineteenth century. Later in the
19th century it acted as a market base for the nearby amakholwa of Edendale and Mpumuza
communities and for the surrounding areas in the Natal Midlands.
4
Pietennaritzburg did not become
a significant industrial centre but during the late 1800s it was connected through railway lines to the
other major economic centres such as Durban and Johannesburg.
5
It has also been argued that the
existence ofa military garrison at Fort Napier also shaped the nature of the city's social and cultural
character and that the garrison's presence for many years boosted the city economically.6 During
the early twentieth century Pietermaritzburg's character was enhanced when the University ofNatal
was established in 1910. During this time there was little interest in industrialisation and it appears
that the authorities were content with Pietennaritzburg being the agricultural, political, educational
and administrative capital of Natal. It was only during the 1930s that the city authorities began to
move towards industrialisation.
7
There were, however, son1e within the City Council who were
opposed to industrialisation. The change of attitude to industrialisation occurred after the Second
World War.
The years after the Second World War, it has been argued, represented a period of economic
31. Benyon, 'Colonial Capital', in 1. Laband and R. Haswell (eds), Pietermaritzburg 1838-1988: A
New Portrait ofan African City (Pietennaritzburg, Shuter and Shooter, 1988), p. 86.
41. Lambert, 'The Pietennaritzburg Market and the Transfonnations of the Natal Midlands in the
Colonial Period', in Laband and Haswell (eds) Pietermaritzburg 1838-1988, pp. 130-134.
5 B. Guest, 'Economic Development of the Capital City, 1838-1910', in Laband and Haswell (eds)
Pietermaritzburg 1838-1988, pp. 120-128.
6 G. A. Dominy, 'The Imperial Garrison in Natal with Special Reference to Fort Napier, 1843-1914: Its
Social, Cultural and Economic Impact', Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of London, 1995.
7 C. Torino, ' Industrialisation, 1838-1987' in Laband and Haswell (eds), Pietermaritzburg 1838-1988,
p. 145.
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prosperity. Many towns and cities in South Africa had new industries opened.
8
Owing to a number
of reasons, Pietermaritzburg lagged behind some other cities in industrial development. A
combination of factors such as the City Council's lethargic attitude to industrial development, the
high prices of industrial sites, the belief that Pietermaritzburg would most likely achieve success as
an agricultural, education and residential centre, and the City Council's selective policy regarding
the types of industry it wished to attract, were responsible for this.
9
In addition, the shortage of
housing, and the higher price of electrical power, relative to Durban, were deterrents to industrial
10
growth.
The Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Industries (PCI) became influential in fostering industrial
development in the city and it worked in collaboration with the City Council. However, there
were still some problems regarding the industrial development potential of the city. Seethal
points out that: 'Although Pietermaritzburg experienced a rapid spurt of new industries from
1950-1954 (when ten new plants were established) this development was not resumed till 1964.
Most of the city's industrial development during the 1950s resulted from the expansion of the
previously established factories rather than from the establishment of new plants'. 11 In February
1957 the President ofthe PCI, D. G. Sutherland, Councillor R. M. Maud and the Mayor, C. B.
Downes, expressed their concern about the lagging behind of the city in industrial
development. 12 The Chainnan of the Pietermaritzburg Publicity Association, Harvey-Williams,
supported that view by arguing that:
. 'Maritzburg cannot go on with its lethargic attitude towards industry. Other cities are going
ahead and are benefiting financially as a result of industries they attract. In this respect
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., C. E. P. Seethal, 'Civic Organisations and the Local State in South Africa 1979-1993', Unpublished
PhD Thesis, University of Iowa, 1993, pp. 37-39; The Natal Witness, 18 and 23 February 1957.
10 Seethal, 'Civic Organisations', p. 38.
II Ibid., p. 36.
12 'Maritzburg lags behind in industrial expansion', The Natal Witness, 18 February 1957.
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Maritzburg is left behind... Modern industry is clean and does not spoil the countryside or
affect the cultural aspects of a city, and the development of industry in Maritzburg would
tend ~o k~eg our young people from having to go to other centres to obtain work
expenence.
This situation continued while the City Council and the PCI were trying to devise ways of attracting
industries to the city. In October 1958 the PCI submitted a memorandum to the Council regarding
industrial facilities and attraction of industries to Pietermaritzburg. In accordance with this pro-
industrial mood the City Council approved some areas in addition to Mkhondeni as industrial loci,
such as the Fitzsiinons Road, the Mountain Rise industrial area, the Edendale Road industrial area
and the Woods Drive area. 14 Aitchison pointed out that Pietermaritzburg's industrialisation was
delayed because it had a liberal administration and that the central government punished
Pietermaritzburg for that. 15 Pietermaritzburg's industrial development only got a major boost after
it was proclaimed as one ofthe border industry areas during the early 1960s.
The economic developments in Pietermaritzburg are pivotal when one investigates the issue of
political mobilisation. Tom Lodge's study has shown that factors such as industrialisation,
urbanisation, unemployment, rural connections and the nature of the urban municipal policies
shaped the nature ofAfrican responses to political mobilisation in East London. 16 East London, like
Pietennaritzburg during the 1950s, had negligible industrialisation and there was no adequate
housing for Africans who, similarly, were subjected to oppressive measures such as influx control.
However, as we shall see, people of the two towns responded differently to calls for anti-apartheid
resistance. In her study ofpolitical mobilisation in Brakpan in the 1950s, Sapire has also shown that
13 'Industry should be welcome in city', The Natal Witness, 23 February 1957; Seethal, 'Civic
Organisations', p. 38.
14 NAD, TC Files, Housing Committee Minute Book, Minutes of the Housing Committee, 27 March 1958
and 13 October 1958.
15 Author's interview with J. Aitchison, Centre for Adult Education, 5 November 1997.
16 Lodge, 'Political Mobilisation during the 1950s', pp. 319-320.
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the lack of a solid industrial base and workforce profile had some important consequences for
political mobilisation. It meant that 'as in the smaller platteland towns, African cleaners, servants,
messengers, watchmen, shop assistants and municipal labourers far outnumbered factory workers.
As a result, trade unionism was to have a negligible impact on the political culture of the local
African population' .17 However, it should be pointed out that existence of a large working class is
not the only factor that precipitates mass mobilisation. There can be mass mobilisation even in areas
where there is not a substantial, unionised, working class.
It would seem that the situation in Pietermaritzburg was similar to that in Brakpan in terms of
the profile of the workforce because there was opposition within the City Council to the
establishment of large industries despite the pressure exerted by different interest groups. The
estimates of the Census Report of 1960 for the metropolitan area of Pietermaritzburg offers an
insight into the level of industrialisation and the occupational profiles of the workforce in
Pietermaritzburg. 18 . By 1960 the population of Pietermaritzburg was estimated to be 128 446,
with 55 990 Africans.
19
There were 8 796 people recorded in the manufacturing industry and
about 3 270 of those were Mricans. Indians were also significantly represented in the
manufacturing industry numbering about 2 526. The sectors in which most people worked in
were food, footwear, metal, and transport equipment industries. African people also worked in
significant numbers in the wholesale and retail industry, with Indians also well represented. Out
of a total of 6 541 employed in commerce and finance, there was about 2 145 Africans, with
whites being dominant in this sector. The census categories in which a large number of
Africans were recorded were In the government, recreation, and personal services. About
17 Sapire, 'African Political Mobilisation', p. 91.
18 Population Census 1960, Volume 2 No.6, Report on the Metropolitan area ofPietennaritzburg
(Pretoria, Bureau of Statistics, 1966), pp. 1-9 and 133 - 154.
19 Ibid., p. 3.
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1 546 people were in the government service, 1 404 were in the health and medical services,
1 017 in accommodation and 9 281 in domestic employment. 20 The domestic service' sector
was dominated by Africans, both males 3 674 and females 5 607. There was obviously a
significant imbalance between the domestic and the manufacturing sectors. Furthermore, the
small numbers of people in the manufacturing sector meant that Pietermaritzburg was not an
industrialised city, at least before the beginning of the 1960s. Government employment and the
domestic sector attracted many people. The census also suggests that the majority of African
- -
labourers in Pistermaritzburg resided in the formal townships and in the Edendale area rather
than in the municipal and industrial compounds. That meant that by the late 1950s the African
labour force was becoming more' stable and permanent and the unions could potentially
mobilise people to see the city as more than just a workplace and to have a stake in the social
and political life as well.
The rate ofurbanisation was far ahead of the level of industrialisation. Torino pointed out that from
the mid-1940s to the 1950s there was 'a wave of black peri-urban population growth in the
Edendale-Vulindlela area to the west of the city. The City Council was forced to acknowledge that
genuine grievances such as unemployment and overcrowding did exist. ,21 The next section seeks to
explore aspects relating to housing and population growth for Africans in Pietermaritzburg during
the 1950s.
Accommodation and population changes during the 1950s
This section seeks to examine social factors such as housing and the population ofPietermaritzburg
in order to locate anti-apartheid resistance within that context. The fust part will investigate
20 Ibid., p.3.
21 Torino, 'Industrialisation', p. 147.
16
demographic factors during. the 1950s in order to establish whether there was a numerical
constituency for mass mobilisation. The demographic patterns were vital in that they were related to
the level of industrialisation. The issue of housing is pivotal, and it was shaped by municipal policy
towards housing for Africans. The accommodation factors were also related to influx control,
because providing houses for Africans meant acknowledging their permanent residence in the cities.
In investigating the housing problems for Africans in Pietermaritzburg during the 1950s, I will also
examine how the Group Areas Act and the attitude of municipal administrators shaped these.
There will be a focus on the African population. However, the problems that affected other racial
groups, such as Indians and Coloureds, will be part of the discussion as well. The focus on Africans
does not assume that it was only Africans who suffered or participated in the politics of resistance.
The discussion below will show that people of different racial groups used to collaborate in the
struggle and the focus on Africans is not meant to undennine that. Africans, however, seem to
have been most severely affected by apartheid and they were the majority of the inhabitants of
Pietermaritzburg.
In 1951 the African urban population ofPietermaritzburg numbered at approximately 36 609 while
that ofDurban was 136 520.
22
To a certain extent this helps to explain why most of the events that
involved significantly large crowds during this period in Natal took place in Durban. According to
municipal population estimates for the year ending June 1952, Pietermaritzburg consisted of30 740
Whites, 20 943 Africans, 3 439 Coloureds and 17 321 Asiatics.23 These municipal figures for
Africans did not, however, include Edendale, which was excluded from the Pietermaritzburg
boundary. At that time the African population of Edendale was estimated at 12 912. The reasons
for Edendale's exclusion from the Pietermaritzburg boundary will be discussed in detail in another
22 Population Census, 1951, Volume 1, Geographical Distribution of the Population of the Union of
South Africa, pp. 16-27 and pp. 28-29.
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section below. The City Engineer reported that, the 'native' population, to use the term of that
time, was growing at rate of 3% annually.24 In 1955 the local Native Administration Department
published its population estimates of Africans who were domiciled within the borough boundaries.
According to these estimates the African population in the urban area was 22 780. Approximately
4 960 of these people stayed in Sobantu Village and 17 820 were housed in European areas.
25
These population estimates were produced in order to assess the need for African accommodation
within the boundaries ofthe borough ~fPietermaritzburg.
In the Race Relations Survey of 1956-1957 Pietermaritzburg's population was listed alongside the
following estimates.26
Major Towns
Whites Coloured Asians Africans Total
Johannesburg 393 300 46400 28700 561 600 1,030200
Durban 177000 24900 214400 196 500 612800
Pietermaritzburg 37600 3800 21200 25600 88200
East London 48700 6800 1 900 48700 106 100
Port Elizabeth 95200 52300 5200 86900 239600
Pretoria 176000 7600 7200 144500 335 300
Bloemfontein 67400 5700 73500 141 600
In the case of Afiicans these estimates should be viewed with caution. Some people might not have
been counted because they did not have relevant permits to stay in the urban areas, and also
because Edendale, an area that was populated by many Afiicans, was excluded from the boundaries
ofthe Pietermaritzburg borough.
23 Pietermaritzburg Corporation Yearbooks, 1951-1952, p. 72.
24 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/4/2/74 Ref. 14011, Pietermaritzburg Native Housing Scheme, City Engineer,
16 September 1957.
25 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/4/2/74 Ref. 14011, Pietermaritzburg Native Administration Department, 29
March 1955.
26 'The Population and Measures for its Registration and Control', in A Survey ofRace Relations in
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Where did the Afiican people stay? The administrative capital of Natal consisted of areas
demarcated for different racial groups even before racial segregation was legalised by the· Group
Areas Act of 195027. However, there were places where people of different racial groups stayed in
close proximity to each other.28 Aitchison mentions the case of areas such as New Scotland Road,
Pentrich, New England Road and Hay Padd~ck (present-day Hayfields), which were inhabited by
people ofdifferent racial groupS.29 These areas were later declared 'white' areas in accordance with
the Group Areas Act. During the 1950s most whites in Pietermaritzburg stayed in the suburbs that
were in close proXimity to the city's central business area. The Indians and Coloureds were found
on the eastern side of the city while Afiicans, with the exception of those at Sobantu Village,
resided on the southwestern side of the city in areas such as Edendale, Ashdown and Vulindlela.
Edendale and Vulindlela were not formal townships, like Ashdown, and they were outside the
borough boundaries (see Map1). During this period there were many Indians living in Edendale,
until they were resettled under the Group Areas Act.
30
Names of some of the shops and bus stops
remain as proofofthe multi-cultural nature ofEdendale' s past.
Edendale was established in 1851 and was the oldest area of urban Afiican settlement in
Pietermaritzburg. It was a place where Afiicans had freehold land rights and where the owners
usually rented plots to tenants, who in turn had their own sub-tenants.31 Its extension consisted of
South Africa, 1956-1957 (Johannesburg, South African institute ofRace Relations, 1957), p. 38.
27 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/4/2/288 Ref. 138/2, Proposed scheme for housing of Coloured community at
Dorpspruit (1940-1945); Ref. 139/3, Economic housing Schemes: barracks for Indians (1940-1944); Ref
139/4, Suggested sub-economic housing for Indians (1940-1944); Ref 14011, Housing of Natives: General
(1941-1946); Ref140/2/40, Additional houses at Native Village: sub-economic houses and recreational halls.
28 P. Brown and 1. Aitchison, 'Opposing Apartheid in the Pietermaritzburg region', in 1. Laband and R.
Haswell (eds), Pietermaritzburg 1838-1988, pp. 111-112; N. GwaI~ 'Inkatha, Political Violence and the
Struggle for Control in Pietermaritzburg', paper to Workshop on Regionalism arid Restructuring in Natal,
Durban, University ofNatal, 28-31 January, 1988, p. 3.
29 Author's interview with John Aitchison, 5 November 1997.
30 GwaIa, 'Inkatha, Political Violence', p. 3; Author's interview with Waiter Msimang, Edendale, 16
January 1997.
31 Ibid. pp.6-7; Department of Economics, Experiment at Edendale: A Study of a Non-European

























areas such as Machibisa, Dambuza, Siyamu, Wilgefontein and Mount Partridge. Edendale was
excluded from the Pietennaritzburg boundaries even though it was less than 20 kilometres from the
city. Perhaps this was due to it having a substantial number of the Afiican population, which the
municipality viewed as an administrative burden. From the mid-1920s onwards the majority of
Afiican people who migrated to Pietennaritzburg ended up staying at Edendale. The population of
Edendale grew rapidly. As a result ofthese factors such as unorganised settlement and especially the
mushrooming ofshacks and the gro~h ofthe Afiican population, the Pietennaritzburg municipality
felt reluctant to incorporate Edendale into its borough.
During the mid-1930s a Provincial Committee had been set up to investigate the question of
Edendale's insanitary conditions, uncontrolled settlement and its relationship with Pietermaritzburg.
This Committee rejected the incorporation of Edendale into Pietennaritzburg as a solution on the
grounds that 'It was doubtful whether Pietennaritzburg could deal expeditiously with the problems
involved; that the financial burden would be too heavy; that the rateable value ofEdendale was low
and that neither the City nor the Edendale inhabit~ts desired incorporation,.32 In 1941 Edendale
was put under the control of the Local Health Commission (LHC) in accordance with the
recommendations of the Thornton Report, which had been looking at the issue of Edendale's
incorporation into Pietermaritzburg.33
In 1928 the city authorities had decided to build Sobantu Village for Afiicans on the southeastern
Settlement with Special Reference to Food Expenditure and Nutrition (pietennaritzburg, University of
Natal, 1951), p. 1-12; For another detailed history of Edendale see S. Mein~es,'Edendale 1851-1930:
Fanners to Townspeople, Market to Labour Reserve', in 1. Laband and R. Haswell (eels), Pietermaritzburg
1838-1988, pp. 66-69.
32 Ibid., p. 12.
33
R. Gordon, The Place ofthe Elephant: A History ofPietermaritzburg (Pietermaritzburg, Shuter and
Shooter, 1981), p. 134.
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side of the city, adjacent to European areas.
34
However, it was small and could not cope with the
influx of people who needed accommodation. I will return to the story of Sobantu later on in this
section. Ashdown was a township that was built next to Edendale during the 1940s. Apart from
Edendale, Sobantu and Ashdown, Africans were accommodated in their employers' backyards,
while others were housed in hostels in town, such as the East Street Native Men's hostel, the
Ohrtmann Road hostel and the Berg Street Hostel for African women.
35
Sobantu, owing t6 the disapproval of the nearby white property owners and the Minister of Native
Affairs, Dr H.F. Verwoerd36, could no longer be extended to accommodate more people and the
City Council had to look for a suitable place. The last houses were finished in 1957 and by this time
Sobantu had approximately 1091 dwellings. The City Council resolved to look for a suitable new site
in the Slangspruit area37 It took many years for the Department ofBantu Affairs to approve the area
in which the City Council wanted the new township of approximately 7000 houses to be built. The
new township known as Imbali was only built during the early 1960s.
One can conclude this section by pointing out that Pietermaritzburg was still a developing town
both socially and economically. In the economic sphere there were few initiatives by the city
authorities in an attempt to industrialise the city. The workforce profile has shown that many
34 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/4/2/74 Ref 140/1, Native Administration Department: Native Housing, pp. 1-3; R.
Gordon, The Place of the Elephant, pp. 136-137. For a more detailed account on Sobantu Village see H.
Peel, 'Sobantu Village: An Administrative History of a Pietermaritzburg Township, 1924-1959',
[
Unpublished BA Honours Thesis, Pietermaritzburg, University ofNatal, 1987.
35 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/4/2/340 Ref 200/19, Bang's memo to TC; Vol. 4/4/2/342 Ref 200/14, Bang's
memo to TC, 9 October 1940, and Ref 200/11/40, Bang's memo to TC.
36 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/4/2/74 Refs. 140/1 and 140/110, Sobantu Village: Proposed Removal of
Inhabitants, Letter from Town Clerk to Secretary for Native Affairs, Pretoria,·6 November, 1956; Ref
140/1, Chief Native Commissioner's Memo 28/12E Second Location for Pietermaritzburg: Points for
discussion on 30 July 1957; 'Native Housing and the Future of Sobantu Village' Pietermaritzburg
Corporation Yearbook 1955-1956, p. 32.
37 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/4/2/74 Ref. 14011, Native Housing at Edendale, Joint Confidential
Publication of the City Council and the Local Health Commission.
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many people were still working in domestic service and there were very few big industries. The
population figures also show that there were few people compared to other cities. However,
what the estimates show is that the population was growing. There was also the problem of
housing for the African section of the population. It was during this time that the City Council
recommended that a new township be built for Africans but that only came about during the
early 1960s. The aim of the above section has not been to provide a detailed history of
Pietermaritzburg, but to give a broad idea of the certain features of the city up to the 1950s. In
the light of the contexts investigated above I will now shift my focus to the aspects of
resistance. The section below will sketch in some aspects of crowd events and politics of
resistance in Pietermaritzburg from the 1950s to the early 1960s. It is in no way intended to
become a detailed history of resistance in Pietermaritzburg, but to set the scene for the case
studies of succeeding chapters.
Resistance and political mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg: 1950-1961
The purpose of this section is to make a broad overview of incidents of anti-apartheid mobilisation
that took place at both the local and the national levels. The sketching ofthe national scene will help
in locating the events in Pietermaritzburg in a wider context of resistance. The politics of anti-
apartheid resistance in Pietermaritzburg during the 1950s occurred within the context of
-
countrywide protests of that period.
38
The people in Piet_ermaritzburg took part in some actions of
political resistance. It also appears that the scale of anti-apartheid mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg
was small. After discussing national resistance politics, I will explore local aspects such as the multi-
racial mobilisation against the Group Areas Act in Pietermaritzburg, and other fonns ofprotest that
were waged largely by the African middle class against the municipality in places like Sobantu. The
38 Author's interviews with Archie Gumede, Clennont, 2 October 1997 and Anton Xaba, 28 October
investigation of the fonnation of resistance crowds, or the lack of such crowds. in Pietennaritzburg
during the campaigns of the 1950s to the early 1960s will also be conducted with a view to
understanding how the local context shaped the patterns of anti-apartheid resistance. Furthennore,
the municipal attitude towards local Africans amidst this context of resistance and municipal
perceptions of the politicisation of Africans will also feature in the discussion.
Anti-apartheid political mobilisation took a rather different dimension from 1950 onwards, with the
spate of struggles such as those waged by the workers and by African women against the canying
of passes.39 During this decade of turbulent political activity, up to 1960, the emphasis of all the
campaigns was on peaceful protest and on non-violent methods of struggle..fO It was a decade of
relatively intense mass mobilisation in both urban and rural areas of South Africa. There were
campaigns such as the national strikes of 1950 and 1951, the celebrated Defiance Campaign of
1952, the anti-Bantu Education Campaign of 1955, the Congress of the People campaign of 1955,
the women's anti-pass campaigns of 1956 to 1958, the women1s militancy of 1958 and 1959, the
potato boycott and the pound-a-day campaigns. There were also the stay-at- homes of 1957, 1958,
1960 and 1961. These were organised by different political organisations and by the South African
Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). These campaigns occurred amidst the implementation of a
host ofapartheid laws by the government. It has been argued that:
'The year 1950 was a turning point in the political history of the African people of this
country. It was marked by a number of events that took place from the beginning of the
year. These events indicated a new political outlook on the part of the African people. The
events showed clearly that the conditions under which the African people lived have
become intolerable and that the masses are marching far ahead ofthe leadership. ,41
1997.
39 D. Posel, The Making ofApartheid 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise (Oxford, Claredon,
1991), p. 221.
40 H. Bernstein, For Their Triumphs and For Their Tears: Women in Apartheid South Africa (London,
International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1985), p. 84.
41 'Draft Report of the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress to the Annual
Conference, December 15-17, 1950', in T. Karis and G. Carter (eds), From Protest to Challenge: A
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This resistance took place in an atmosphere which was being systematically engineered by the
government to be hostile to any form of opposition. It has been pointed out that 'the period
between 1950 and 1960 saw a tightening up of influx control regulations, an intensification of the
pass laws and ofliquor raids by police.
42
Furthermore, Worden points out that:
'The 1950s saw an unprecedented upsurge of popular protest. In some ways this was a
logical development from the trends seen in the 1940s, notably the doubling of the urban
African population, employment in the secondary industry and the growth oftrade unionism
in industry. But it was given an new impetus by the imposition of apartheid laws and the
social ellgineering ofthe Nationalist government. ,43
During the late 1940s the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC), under the influence
of the Indian passive resistance campaigns of the mid-1940s, had decided to embrace a strategy
based on mass action: the strikes, boycotts and civil disobedience entailed in the Programme of
Action which was adopted in Bloemfontein in 1949.
44
Against this background of widespread nationwide resistance, this section seeks to explore protest
politics ~ Pietermaritzburg during the 1950s. One can also point out that it is not adequate to stop
at 1960 when one analyses the resistance politics of the 1950s. Anti-apartheid resistance continued,
under difficult conditions, and gained increased momentum up to 1961, when the last stay-at-home
was organised by SACTU and the ANC.
45
In Pietermaritzburg, particularly, there was resistance
Documentary History ofAfrican Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964, Volume 2, (Stanforci, Hoover, 1973),
p.452.
42 P.O. Tichmann, 'African Worker Action in Durbal\ 1940-1960', Unpublished MA Thesis, Durbal\
University ofNatal, 1983, p. 45.
43 Worden, The Making ofApartheid, p. 99.
44 T. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 (Johannesburg, Raval\ 1983), p. 33.
45 D. Bonnin, 'Class Consciousness and Conflict in the Natal Midlands, 1940-1987: The case of the BTR
Sanncol workers', Unpublished M Sac Sc Thesis, Durbal\ University of Natal, 1987, pp. 164-165; 1.
Baskin, Striking Back: A History ofCosatu (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1991), pp. 14; T. Karis, G. Carter and G.
M. Gerhart (eds), From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History ofAfrican Politics in South Africa,
1882-1964, Volume 3, (Stanford, Hoover, 1977), pp. 358-364; Lodge, Black PolitiCS, p. 196; International
Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 'Repression and Resistance', Apartheid: The Facts (London,
IDAF, 1991), p. 102; D. McShane, M. Plaut and D. Ward, Power! Black Workers, Their Unions and the
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against many issues and this was led by the local ANC and the Natal Indian Congress (NIC).46
According to Anton Xaba 'the 1950s were the years of defiance. I was very active in
Pietermaritzburg during the potato boycott campaigns of the 1950s' .47 However, according to
Kader HaSsim, the ANC was not strong in Pietermaritzburg during the 1950s.
48
These differences
reflect the struggles of interpretation and they show how people from different political
backgrounds interpret historical events.
Struggles, in various forms, had been happening in Pietermaritzburg long before the 1950s. In
Sobantu, there was the Sobantu Village Advisory Board, .elected in accordance with NAD
regulations and whose members used to stay in office for a long time.
49
There was an opposition
group to this, known as the Sobantu Residents Association (or Isolomuzi Vigilant Association). 50
Numerous letters were written to the City Council by the Association, complaining about the
Advisory Board, which they claimed was not a legitimate and representative body. In a circular
written in 1952 by G. F. Khumalo, chainnan of the Isolomuzi, one can discern a sense of alignment
with anti- apartheid politics when he concluded with slogans:





(The Zulu nation must speak)
(This land is ours!)
(This village is ours!)51
In another letter written by the Association to the City Council, there was a sense of preparedness
to work with the local authorities and not to participate in the broader resistance politics of that
year. The letter written in October 1952 by the Isolomuzi's secretary, Mr Amos Mntaka, to the
Struggle/or Liberation in South Africa (Nottingl1an\ Spokes~ 1984), p. 32.
46 Author's interview with Archie Gumede, Clermont, 2 October 1997.
47 Author's interview with Anton Xaba, 28 October 1997.
48 Author's interView with Kader Hassim 4 November 1997
49 Author's interview with V. Sikhosana,'07 October 1997..
50 NAD, TC Vo!. 4/4/2/340 Ref 198/2.
51
NAD, TC Vo!. 4/4/2/570 Ref 199/l01, 5 August 1952.
Town Clerk captured the feeling of that time by saying that:
'Sir, there is the defiance campaign of civil disobedience. We wish to avoid trouble with the
local authorities. Please allow us to hold our meetings in order that we may get on with the
work we intended doing at the beginning of the year: - viz "Our 1952 socio-economic
development programme". If the city Council refuses us permission we shall be forced into
the hands of the defiance campaign. Sir, we believe in direct representation, goodwill in
negotiation and co-operation of races in the solving of South Africa's burning problems.
Please give us a chance to show you what we are. Believing in misrepresentation by evil
sources hidden in the Municipal Native Administration will certainly lead to trouble. ,52
This reflects the ambiguities of resistance politics in some organisations of the. time. The role of
Khumalo and the Association in the history of Sobantu will be dealt with later in Chapter 4.
Besides these kinds of actions, which were pursued by individuals and community organisations,
there were also other actions of anti-apartheid resistance. Owing to a variety of reasons
Pietermaritzburg did not provide volunteers during the Defiance Campaign of 1952.53 Probably this
lack of participation in Pietermaritzburg was related to the riots that occurred in Durban in 1949,
where there was fierce conflict between Africans and Indians.
54
However, Kader Hassim, who was
observing political events during this time, argued that:
'It was not the 1949 riots that caused the lack ofparticipation. The" ANC itself was inactive
in Pietermaritzburg during the early 1950s. There was also the problem that Indians in
Natal had seen the harshness of the National Party government during the 1946 passive
resistance campaign. Furthermore, we in the NEUM, launched an anti-defiance campaign
in Natal and one of the key people there was Dr Motala who later became active in the
NIC and the ANC,.55
Another reason might have been problems within the ANC in Natal. 56 The leadership struggle
which led to the defeat of George Champion by Luthuli in 1951, and the subsequent resignation of
Selby Msimang in 1952, were likely to be reasons for low participation in Natal and
52 Ibid. Letter from Amos Mntaka to Town Clerk 2 October 1952.
53 Brown and Aitchison, 'Opposing Apartheid in Pietermaritzburg', p. 211.
54 Author's conversation with Ruth Lundie, 21 August 1996; Tichmann, 'African Worker Action', p. 53;
Lodge, BlackPolitics, p. 60; Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, p. 420.
55 Author's interviews with Kader Hassim, 4 November 1997 and 26 November 1997.
56 Tichmann, 'African Worker Action', p. 53.
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Pietennaritzburg particularly.57 A. S. Chetty argued that Pietennaritzburg's level of political
development had not reached the stages of other cities. He pointed out that they were not ready for
the Defiance Campaign in Pietennaritzburg and that some volunteers from Pietennaritzburg,
including his mother, went down to join the campaign in Durban. 58 Benson argues that 'By
December 1951 all the provincial congresses of the ANC were ready and had read the blueprint of
non-violent action. It was only Natal, where Champion, who had received the plans just before his
defeat, had kept them to himself Luthuli only learnt of the proposed campaign as he set off for the
ANC's annual cbITference. All he could do was discuss with other Natal delegates as they drove to
Bloemfontein' .59 A fonner organiser and secretary of the ANC in Pietennaritzburg during the
1950s, Archie Gumede, confinned that it was problems within the leadership ofthe ANC that led to
the lack of participation. According to him Champion's attitude made people uncertain about the
campaign and he is reputed to have said that the Defiance Campaign was like 'trying to hold the sun
with hands' (Ukubamba ilanga ngezandla).60 Probably Champion saw the campaign as too
advanced and inappropriate an action for that period. Leo Kuper argued that:
'The reasons for regional differences are not at all clear. The level of participation in Natal
was exceedingiy low, when compared with the extent of Indian resistance in the 1946
campaign. This is all the more remarkable, since Indian life in Natal is seriously threatened
by the Group Areas Act. The explanation is possibly that the Indian Congress, as junior
partner in the campaign, did not wish to take the lead, that the Natal branch of the African
National Congress was poorly organised, and that strong nationalist and anti-Indian
sentiment dampened African enthusiasm for the campaign. Yet Africans participated fully
and in great numbers in the resistance meetings. ,61
Kuper refers to meetings that took place later in the year when Durban joined in the campaign.
57 Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, p. 413; Tichmann 'African Worker Action', p. 53; M.
Swanson, 'Changing the Guard: Champion-Msimang-Luthuli, the ANC in Natal, 1945-1951', in The
Societies of Southern Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Volume 16, Institute of
Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1990, pp. 50-56; M. Be~son, South Africa: The
Struggle for a Birthright (International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1985), pp. 127 -
139.
58 Author's interview with A. S. Chetty, 12 November 1997.
59 Benson, South Africa: The Struggle for a Birthright, p. 138.
60 Author's interview with Archie Gumede, Clermont, 28 July 1997.
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Even then there was no spillover ofthe Defiance campaign in Pietennaritzburg. The extent to which
S. S. Bhengu's Bantu National Congress's (BNC) campaign against the ANC contributed to this
lack of participation is not clear.62 Bhengu led the BNC, which was an organisation in Natal that
propagated racial separation among Afiicans and Indians.
It is not enough, however, to say that Pietennaritzburg did not participate in the Defiance
Campaign because of its size. Other. relatively small towns like East London and Brakpan
participated remarkably. Writing about the Defiance Campaign in the Eastern Cape, Kuper has
argued that 'In any event, whatever the explanation, the large and small towns of the Eastern Cape
h f h
. ,63
were t e cores 0 t e reSIstance movement.
There was no evidence from either the Pietennaritzburg's municipal records or from the local
newspaper, of any march or 'disturbance' which took place in 1952. Instead, in his 1952 annual
report, the Manager ofthe Native Administration Department, D. N. Bang wrote:
'1 am happy to be in a position to be able again report that the behaviour of the Natives of
Pieterrnaritzburg has been exemplary in spite of the racial tension in other parts of the
Union. There have been no riots, and the few meetings held by the so-called "agitators"
were so poorly attended that it was evident that the Pietennaritzburg natives constituted on
the whole a contented community. The Council has continued to give its full support to
sport to entertain the natives in their leisure hours, and so keep them from drifting to
political meetings. ,64
The existence of the so-called "agitators" implies that there was political mobilisation that was
going on in Pieterrnaritzburg. The interesting thing is that the City Council used sports and other
fonns of entertainment for political purposes, that is, to divert the attention of Africans from anti-
apartheid politics. The annual reports of the Manager of the Native Administration Department
61 L. Kuper, Passive Resistance in South Africa (London, Jonathan, 1956), p. 123.· .
62 P. La Hausse, 'So who was Elias Khuzwayo?: Nationalism, Collaboration and the Picaresque in
Natal', in P. Bonner, P. Delius and R. Posel (eds), Apartheid's Genesis, 1935-1962 (Johannesburg,
Ravan, 1993), pp. 213-214.
63 K p. R .uper, aSSlve eSlstance, p. 124.
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used to mention how enthusiastic 'Natives' were about sports, films and other forms of
'entertainment'. According to Anton Xaba 'The young people in Sobantu decided to boycott the
bioscope which was shown at the Sobantu Hall. The municipality did not want us to use the hall for
our meetings but wanted us to only come for the bioscopes where we paid our tickies. ,65
In contrast to the Defiance Campaign, organisations ill Pietermaritzburg participated in the
Congress of the People Campaign of 1954-1955. There was the Congress of the People
Committee, which was composed of Dr M. M. Motala, Archie Gumede, Mr. Mungal and Moses
Mabhida.66 A. S. Chetty, a local politician, who was active. in mobilisation for the campaign,
pointed out that there was a vigorous campaign when volunteers were making house-to-house
visits even in the rural areas. 67 This drew the attention of the Native Affairs Department. Mr Bang
wrote in his 1956 report that:
'Although the behaviour of the Natives in the City has been excellent, one can sense a
strained atmosphere, particularly among the educated and semi-educated groups ofNatives
who have taken to reading both European and Native papers avidly. However, taking
everything into account the Native people of this city are to be commended for their good
behaviour. While the Council continues to show its goodwill to its Native people by
listening sympathetically to reasonable representations, I feel sure that the natives will
reciprocate by refraining from rash examples of their brothers in some of the other towns.
On the other hand the European employer is also contributing his share towards this
harmonious relationship, as there has been marked tendency to treat native employees
68
better.'
Bang's statement reflects the attitude of the officials in his department, who were patronising
Africans, and also the idea of pretending as if Africans were satisfied with their plight. He saw
himself as an 'expert' on issues relating to Africans, an attitude that was typical of most incumbents
64 Pietermaritzburg Corporation Yearbook, 1951-1952, p. 92.
65 Author's interview with Anton Xaba, 28 October 1997.
66 Brown and Aitchison, 'Opposing Apartheid in the Pietennaritzburg Region', p. 211; lbis was confinned
during my interview with Archie Gumede, 02 October 1997.
67 R. Suttner and 1. Cronin (eds), 30 Years ofthe Freedom Charter (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1986), pp. 46-50.
lbis was also confinned during author's interview with Anton Xaba, 28 October 1997.
68 Pietermaritzburg Corporation Yearbook, 1955-1956, p. 74.
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of his similar position in other areas, who always confinned that they were in control of the
situation. John Aitchison, who knew him personally, argued that Bang was a sympathetic person
and pointed out that he allowed night schools to continue in Pietermaritzburg at the time when the
government had closed them all over the country.69 At that time there were no schools for Afiicans
that went up to matric in Pietermaritzburg, and the only way in which Afiicans could finish
secondary school education was through night schools.
70
There were some local initiatives in the resistance politics that were going on in Pietermaritzburg
during the 1950s. There was an ANC branch in Pietermaritzburg and it used the East Street Men's
Hostel as a base for meetings. Archie Gumede was secretary and Moses Mabhida was his
assistant. 71 During this period the ANC and the NIC used to organise joint meetings at the Lotus
Hall.
72
One ofmy informants pointed out that there was a building in Retief Street, which was used
for clandestine meetings where they held meetings in the dark with all the lights switched off and
only one candle for the speaker.
73
In May 1954 D. N. Bang wrote a letter commenting about an
anonymous letter, which he had in his possession, coming from the Cheesa-Cheesa Army. This was
an undated typed circular and it appealed to Afiicans to revolt against the oppressors.
74
Perhaps the
fact that this circular was found in Sobantu shows that underground anti-apartheid kinds of
resistance were taking place in Pietermaritzburg, though not on a large scale. Archie Gumede and
Anton Xaba pointed that the ANC had a significant and an active membership in Sobantu. One of
my interviewees, however, pointed out that only a few selected families in Sobantu were politically
69 Author's interview with John Aitchison, 5 November 1997.
70 Ibid.
71 Author's interview with Archie Gumede, 2 October 1997; The importance of the area in downtown
Pietennaritzburg in the struggle was confinned during author's interviews with Anton Xaba, 28
October 1997 and Kader Hassim, 4 November 1997.
72 Points made by Ruth Lundie during interview with Archie Gumede, 2 October 1997.
73 Author's interview with V. Sikhosana, 7 October 1997.
74 NAD, TC Vol. 4/4/2/570 Ref. 199/101. Undated Circular from the Cheesa-Cheesa Army.
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active. 75 Some people were still reluctant to participate openly as there was the threat of being
evicted from the township. According to Xaba:
'People were still afraid of participating in politics. Ifyou mention politics they think of the
jail, particularly ifyou mention the name ANC. People were afraid of leaving their families
and their luxwy houses and go to jail. I had the same problem with my mother who was
always worried about my participation in politics.' 76
There were also worker struggles during the 1950s. Harry Gwala and Moses Mabhida were active
in the mobilisation _of the workers. According to Kader Hass~ SACTU was more active that the
ANC in Pietermafitzburg. He points out that it was people who were aligned to the SACP, such as
Gwala and Mabhida, who actively mobilised in Pietermaritzburg. A nton Xaba said:
'We worked hard with Gwala in the unions. I was active in mobilising workers in
Pietermaritzburg, which was a very conservative place. Pietermaritzburg was a small
developing town at the time. We managed to mobilise workers in factories such as Scottish
Cables. We distributed newspapers such as New Age and the Fighting Talk to workers
during lunchtime. We were volunteers and we used money from our pockets to travel
around Pietennaritzburg. ,77
It seems that the politicisation ofthe workers in Pietermaritzburg was very slow and there were few
large industries in Pietennaritzburg at the time. Both A. S. Chetty and Kader Hassim pointed out
that the Howick Rubber Workers Union at Sarmcol was highly organised and politically active. 78
The main trade unions that existed in Pietermaritzburg were in the leather industries and these were
not keen on involving workers in political issues.
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Chetty argued that one of his early political
activities was mobilisation in the leather industries. It should be remembered also that during this
time African workers were not 'legally' allowed to join the unions.
In 1956 and 1957 there were two protest marches in the city by African women who were
75 Author's interview with V. Sikhosana, 7 October 1997.
76 Author's interview with Anton Xaba, 28 October 1997.
77 Author's interview with Anton Xaba, 28 October 1997.
78 Author's interviews with A. S. Chetty, 12 November 1997 and Kader Hassirn, 26 November 1997.
79 Ibid
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complaining about the extension of passes to African women.
80
Bonnin argued that people in the
Natal Midlands, including Pietermaritzburg, were involved in other campaigns of the late 1950s
such as the pound-a-day campaign and the potato boycott organised by SACTU.
81
In August 1959,
African women from areas surrounding Pietermaritzburg demonstrated in the city against a variety
of grievances and demands, and in Sobantu a revolt erupted against municipal exploitation.
82
This
incident, which involved the destruction ofproperty and loss of life, shocked the city authorities and
it changed the way they viewed the behaviour of African inhabitants of the city. The women's anti-
pass protests arid-the 1959 riots will be subjects of a more detailed investigation in chapters 3 and 4
below.
The late 1950s were characterised by the radicalisation of anti-apartheid resistance in South Africa.
Pietermaritzburg could not escape that wave of radicalism. In his letter to the Town Clerk, the
Director of the Bantu Administration Department, D. N. Bang, wrote on the subject of Bantu
unrest',
'On the afternoon of the 29th January, 1960 the African National Congress Women's
League held two meetings on an open piece ofground in Boom Street - one at 2 p.m. and
the other at 5.30 p.m. Speaking through loudspeakers, the leaders denounced discriminate
legislation such as influx control, reference books for women, and lower wages for the
Bantu. They also complained about the increase in taxation, the Corporation beerhalls and
"Boer" buses. On the latter point they did not reach a decision, but on the other points they
decided to take action, firstly by organising a boycott of Corporation beer and secondly by
organisin~ for the display of suitable placards on the occasion of Mr Macmillan's visit to
Durban'.
80 A Survey o/Race Relations in South Africa, 1956-1957, p. 71; Contact, December 1956 and February
1957; The Natal Witness, 29 November 1956 and 31 January 1957.
81 Bonnin, 'Class, Consciousness and Conflict', pp. 153-162; This was also supported by Anton Xaba, 28
October 1997.
82 .
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This was a significant step by local women because even though they had organised events of mass
mobilisation during the middle and the late 1950s they were not organisationally strong. It has been
pointed out that the ANC Women's League in Pietermaritzburg was not widely influential and that
it was mostly women from outside Pietermaritzburg and wives of prominent local ANC members
who were mobilising women. 84 According to one of my informants the Women's League in
Pietermaritzburg got off the ground during the Treason Trial (1956-1961), when people began to
be serious about establis~g political structures.85
The controversial Group Areas Act of 1950 caused confusion in Pietermaritzburg as well. There
was a vigorous opposition campaign in the city from the early 1950s by Africans, Indians and some
Whites who were members of the Liberal Party. One of the organisations that fought against this
form of residential segregation was the Group Areas Resistance Committee, which was led by Dr
M. M. Motala.86 It appears that the City Council was uncomfortable or ambivalent with the way the
Group Areas Act was implemented from the top down. During the meeting of 5 June 1961, in
sYmpathy with Indians and Coloureds, the Council distanced themselves from the actions of the
Group Areas Act Board.87 In 1958 the Estates Manager had expressed his concern about the
impending proclamation of Group Areas in Pietermaritzburg which 'was bound to lead to a similar
state of affairs as existed in Durban at the present time, i.e. confusion and unrest, particularly
amongst the Indian and Coloured groupS,.88 Probably the Municipal attitude to the Group Areas
Act influenced the nature ofopposition to it. The Council purported to be concerned with
February 1960. .
84 Author's interviews with Archie Gumede, 2 October 1997 and Mrs V. Sikhosana, 7 October 1997.
85 Author's interview with Archie Gumede, 2 October 1997.
86 NAD, TC Files, Housing Committee Minute Book, Meeting ofthe Housing Committee, 10 May 1961.
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maintaining hannonious race relations and its attitude residential segregation could be viewed
against that preoccupation. However, it has been pointed out that the residential segregation was
ultimately implemented in Pietennaritzburg and the establishment of Imbali Township rather than
the expansion of Sobantu Village was one example.89
An important historical event took place in Edendale, Pietennaritzburg, in early 1961. In March the
leaders ofthe liberation move~ents ~r:.ganised an "All-in Africa" Conference.
90
This was an attempt
to find solutions to South Africa's problems following the Sharpeville massacre ofMarch 1960 and
the subsequent banning of the liberation movements. Although .the ANC's speakers dominated this
mass meeting, with Congress songs and slogans, other organisations were also represented and the
large numbers of participants came from both the rural and the urban areas of Natal.
91
This
conference suffered harassment by the state security branch, when it was discovered that recording
devices had been installed in the public hall at Edendale. Consequently, candidates had to walk two
miles in a drizzling rain to a Hindu hall (Arya Samaj), where the meeting continued.
92
According to
one of the local organisers ofthe conference, they were able to get the Hindu Temple at Plessislaer
because of their good relations with the NIC and the Indian community in Pietennaritzburg.93
Another informant, who took part in the conference, pointed out that they sang and chanted slogans
all the way from Edendale to the Arya Samaj Hall.94 This hall is now fenced inside the Zibukezulu
High School near the entrance to Imbali Township.95 Two highlights, which made this event
significant were, firstly, the appearance of Nelson Mandela, a national ANC leader, who had been
restricted and had not spoken on a public platform since 1952, and, secondly, the fact that an
89 Wills, 'The Segregated City', p.41.
90 Brown and Aitchison, 'Opposing apartheid', p. 211~ The Natal Witness 27 March 1961
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important decision to stage one of the last national events of mass mobilisation followed this
conference. The presence of a disguised Mandela added flavour to the conference and one
participant recalls that his speech was inspiring and that after the conference, they sang and chanted
slogans to the delight ofone black policeman who stopped taking notes and started dancing.96
In 1961 the ANC and SACTU called for a three-day stay-at-home to protest against the
proclamation of South Africa as a Republic. The official impression was that the whole event was a
failure. The stay-at-home took place on the 29th to 31st of May 1961. In his memo to the Town
Clerk, Bang pointed out that:
'The strike did not only fail to materialise but there were also no incidents...One minor
incident took place at 9.30 p.m. on the 25th May when an intruder was intercepted while
trying to climb over the wall of the headquarters' offices. The specially engaged guard, who
was in a secluded spot nearby, grabbed the culprit and hurled him to the ground. While
endeavouring to put the handcuff's on the offender the latter drew a knife. The guard lost his
grip and the culprit escaped leaving his stick. A European, responding to the whistle, gave
the guard a lift, but the culprit disappeared in a side street offPietermaritz Street. ,97
It is not clear whether this incident was related to the call for a strike. However, the fact that the
Director drew connections shows the way in which anti-apartheid politics was intruding into the
agenda of the city administrators. This memo gives an insight into the organisation of this stay-at-
home. He wrote:
'The workers were bombarded with leaflets from all sides. The more intensive campaign
came from the organisers ofthe strike. On the 15th and 16th it is understood that the police
distributed pamphlets to counter the campaign. Again on the 18th and 19th anti-strike
pamphlets purporting to be issued by the banned Pan Africanist Congress, made their
appearance. In a van equipped with public address equipment the police gave talks
wherever there were groups of Bantu. These addresses were tactfully worded and were
well received by the Bantu. The walls of buildings in the lower part of the city, and village
streets and buildings were plastered with stickers or painted slogans such as "One man one
95 'Tracing the Route to Freedom' The Natal Witness, 10 January 1997.
96 Author's interview with v. Skhosana, 7 October 1997. Mrs Skhosana said Mandela had disguised
himself with a long beard and a black mask on his face. She said she was surprised when she saw him
in 1990 that he does not wear a long beard and was light in complexion.
97 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/4/2/570 Ref. 199/101, 'Strike tension and unrest among the Bantu workers',
Director, BAD to TC, 3 June 1961.
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vote", "Mayibuye", "General Strike" and "No school 29-31 May", "victory is ours" etc. ,98
The report shows the strategies of political mobilisation of that time. This shows mobilisation and
counter-mobilisation at work. These pamphlets were also distributed in some schools as one of my
informants, Mrs Sikhosana, recalled that the city authorities and the local education officers accused
them of distributing pamphlets. What this event signalled was that mass mobilisation had entered
the scene inPietennaritzburg in a way that the authorities found difficult to comprehend. This event
had been preceded by two kinds of..-crowd events, which involved the taking of people to the
streets. These twe incidents will be the case studies for the next two chapters. After these incidents,
especially the 1959 riots, Afiicans in Pietermaritzburg were 119 longer "the good and exemplary
Natives", until then a dominant perception in the Bantu Administration Department for many years.
Conclusion
This chapter sought to sketch in some aspects of the socio-economic and political situation in
Pietermaritzburg during the 1950s. Political mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg should be understood
against the background, which has been provided· in this chapter. During the 1950s
Pietermaritzburg was still maintaining its character as the main agricultural and educational centre
of Natal. There was very little development in the industrial sector even though the City Council
and the Chamber of Industries were promoting industrialisation. There were few African people
working in the manufacturing sector. The majority ofAfiicans were employed as domestic workers
and it is likely that that impacted on the difficulties of forming a unionised working class. There
were also other problems relating to housing. In the case of Afiicans the city authorities decided to
solve that problem by allocating land in Slangspruit for a new township.
98 Ibid.
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Owing to a number of reasons, Pietermaritzburg was not counted among the main centres of
resistance during the 1950s. However, there was resistance on a local scale against the- Group
Areas Act. The African National Congress and the Natal Indian Congress were responsible for
political conscientisation and mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg at a low level. Resistance
politics in Pietermaritzburg was undergoing changes during the 1950s. There were a few
incidents of crowd resistance, such as the anti-pass campaign marches of 1956 and 1957 and
the Sobantu riots of 1959. The last significanf incident of resistance, which took place in
Pietermaritzburg during this period, was the All-in Conference of March 1961 and the stay-at-
home ofMay 1961. This also does not seem to have led to any significant mass mobilisation in
Pietermaritzburg although it should be noted that the context in which occurred had changed.
Against the background provided in this chapter, the next one will analyse the protest marches
that took place in Pietermaritzburg in 1956 and 1957 as part of the anti-pass campaigns by
women.
CHAPTER THREE
The Women's Anti-Pass Demonstrations in Pietermaritzburg, 1956 -
1957.
"Whether you call it a reference book, an identity book or any other name, to us it is a pass and it means
that homes will be broken up when women are arrested under the pass laws" (Memorandum from
women to the ChiefNative Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, January 1957, Nan Paten Centre Liberal
Party Papers, PC 2/4/61-5 'Anti-Pass Campaigns')
In November 1956 and January 1957 crowds of women marched in the centre of
Pietermaritzburg. They were marching in order to express their anger against the passes that
were being extended to them. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse these two protest
marches. These two incidents took place in a context of nation-wide protests by women
against passes. Passes fuelled the anger of African women who had already been subjected to
many sorts of oppression for a long time. During the mid-1950s women in Pietermaritzburg took
to the streets to protest about the added oppression that they foresaw was going to accompany
their subjection to pass laws. These protest marches which took place in Pietermaritzburg were
about more than simply passes. They were part of the broader popular struggles that were
spearheaded by various political and women's organisations to resist apartheid, as the discussion
below will show. In line with the anti-apartheid marches in other areas, women of all races led these
two protest marches, although the majority of the participants were Africans. This was
understandable considering the fact that passes were aimed particularly at Afiican women.
As the overall focus of my research is on mass mobilisation and resistance, this chapter seeks to
explore these incidents in that light. These marches, which mainly involved women, will be analysed
against the background of intense anti-apartheid mobilisation that was taking place nationally. My
objective is to present a vivid picture of these marches and their significance in the broader struggle
against apartheid. In addition, crowd behaviour and mobilisation in these marches will be important
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to understand, particularly when one compares these events with the others which took place in the
city in the later years. Before plunging into the case studies, I will sketch in some aspects relating to
passes, women and the broader resistance context of the 1950s.
Why women versus passes? Background to the anti-pass campaigns of the
1950s.
The pass campaigns of the 1950s were not the first ever to take place. In 1913 women ill
Bloemfontein resisted canying the documents whose purpose was more or less similar to that of
passes. As a result the struggle against passes remained a prime objective and proved effective in
drawing mass support. 1 According to Julia Wells, there were two main events of resistance by
African women to passes before the 1950s. The first event occurred in Bloemfontein in 1913 and
the second one took place in Potchefstroom in 1930.2 One noticeable thing about the loci of these
campaigns was that they occurred in areas that had a strong Afrikaner character.
What were the passes and why were they resisted by those to whom they applied? Passes, in
different forms, can be traced back to the early nineteenth century when they were used by the
British in the Cape to control the movement of people and to co-ordinate the labour supply,
particularly among the Khoisan. 3 Passes were not applied in a stringent way until the discovery of
mining centres and the growth ofurban areas. Hindson argues that passes served different purposes
at different points in time. 4 According to him the pass system was used, at specific times, for the
I H. Bemstein, For their Triumphs and their Tears: Women in Apartheid South Africa (London,
International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1985), p.85.
2
1. C. Wells, We Now Demand!: The History of Women's Resistance to Pass Laws in South Africa
(Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press, 1993), pp. 2-3.
3 Ibid. p. 5; D. Hindson, Pass Controls and the Urban African Proletariat (Johannesburg, Ravan Press,
1987), pp. 15-16.
4 Ibid., p. x.
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reasons of differentiating the labour power of Africans.
5
The pass controls functioned as
mechanisms to limit the growth of the African urban population and to exclude those who were
unemployed from the urban areas.
It was for these reasons that passes became the most hated documents in the lives of Africans. By
the -1950s pass laws applied to African men, most of who formed part of migrant labour in the
towns. There were, however, cases -of informal controls on women in towns before the pass laws
became a national policy during the 1950s.
6
Many women, although supposed to be in the rural
areaS in order to supplement their husbands' meagre wages, had migrated to the towns during the
urbanisation of the 1940s. During these years there had been an increase in urbanisation of African
women due to the state's leniency towards the process, and to the collapse of subsistence life in the
so-called reserves.
Even though women were not subjected to stringent pass controls they suffered degradation at
seeing their menfolk being humiliated and it was still difficult for them to manoeuvre.7 From the late
1940s to early 1950s their presence in the towns became an antithesis ofthe state's policy of rooting
out African urbanisation as their stay meant permanence of African families. 8 On the other hand the
state was in a relatively awkward position because it had not devised an effective tool of regulating
the lives ofwomen as was the case with men.
What were the causes of the increase in African urbanisation during the 1940s? There are a
plethora of reasons, but the common one is that there were a combination of poverty in the
5 Ib·d .1 ., pp. X-Xl.
6 Information supplied by Tiro NuttalI, 7 January 1998.
7 Bemstein, For Their Triumphs, p. 18.
8
C. Walker, Women and Resistance in South Africa (London, Onyx, 1982), p.
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reserves and the availability of opportunities in the urban areas during and after the Second
World War.9 During this time the ability of the reserves to continue functioning as a
reproductive base for the' miwant labour system had been almost depleted.
1O
This coupled
with severe land shortage in the rural areas led to the increase in the urban African populatio~
as the requirements of the manufacturing industry induced growing numbers of women to
11
leave the reserves for the towns.
The demand fol' African labour was increasing in the towns, and many manufacturing industries
preferred a stable urban proletariat to a migrant labour force.
12
However, this did not go
unnoticed by the agricultural sector, which showed dissatisfaction with what the government was
doing by allowing African labour a free-flow to the towns leaving, them without an adequate
labour supply.13 This resulted in the reintroduction of passes in 1945. Despite their increase in
numbers in towns, women fonned an insignificant percentage in the manufacturing industry
before the 1960s. This situation compounded women's economic and political vulnerability, as
their exclusion from the mainstream industry meant they could not build workplace solidarity as
their male counterparts could do.
I4
The condition ofwomen in both the rural and urban areas was
exacerbated by the victory ofthe National Party in 1948.
After its election victory in 1948, the Nationalist Party decided to take some drastic steps in
solving the problems of unregulated movement and labour, not only of women but also of
Africans generally. 15 Lodge points out that the above situation was altered when, 'In 1948, with
9 Wells, We Now Demand, p. 8; Hindson, Pass Controls, pp. 53-55.
10 .
Walker, Women and ResIstance, pp. 69 and 128.
II Hindson, Pass Controls, p. 8.
12 Walker, Women and ReSistance, p. 124.
13 Ibid., p. 124; Wells, We Now Demand, p. 8.
14 Bernstein, For their Triumphs, pp. 16, 85 and 86.
15 .
Walker, Women and ReSIstance, p. 73.
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the advent of the Nationalist administration there were fresh compulsions to control the mobility
of African women.,16 When the first move was made to introduce passes to women in 1950 it
met with rebuff: and a groundswell of discontent by women led to many demonstrations in some
towns. I? Struggles against passes became fa powerful rallYing point for African women and for
the broader militant African opposition. The government continued, however, with its policy of
extending the pass_system.
In 1952 the Natives (Abolition of Passes and the Co-ordination of Documents) Act was
passed. 18 This law consolidated the existing pass laws and "introduced a uniform passbook
for Africans. 19 To strengthen the above-mentioned law, the government passed the Native
Laws Amendment Act in the same year and made amendments to the Urban Areas Act thus
providing definitions of who was allowed (and not allowed) to live and work in the urban
areas. 20 As the new 'reference books' were extended to the entire African population, black
women were now directly subject to these new restrictions.
In 1955 the Minister of Native Affairs, Hendrik Verwoerd, announced that from January 1956
African women were to be issued with passes.
21
This announcement was greeted by a wave of
demonstrations by African women and one relatively big march took place in October 1955 in
Pretoria. The campaign against passes intensified in 1956 when the government began issuing
passes to sections of women that were least likely to protest, such as those in the rural areas,
16 Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1983), p. 140.
17 Ib·d .
1 ., p. 130. .
18 Ibid.; Lodge, Black Politics, p. 140; A Survey of Race Relations 1955-1956 (Johannesburg, South
African Institute ofRace Relations, 1956), p. 85; Hindson, Pass Controls, p. 61.
19 Hindson, Pass Controls, p. 61.
20
Wells, We Now Demand, p. 8; Walker, Women and ReSistance, p. 126.
21
K. Luckhardt and B. Wall, Organize or Starve} The History of the South African Congress of
Trade Unions (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1980), p. 301; Bernstein, For their Triumphs, p. 87.
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fann workers and government employees. Protest escalated throughout the country and in many
towns women gathered together to burn their passes, their 'badges of slavery'.22 These mass
demonstrations by women culminated in a march that involved approximately 20 000 women
from all over South Africa in Pretoria at the Union Buildings on 9 August 1956.
23
This march,
organised jointly by the African National Congress Women's League (ANCWL) and the
Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW), became the source of inspiration and a major
celebrated event ofresistance by Sout~African women.24
Having sketched in some contextual aspects relating to the 1950s, we can now move to the
Pietermaritzburg case studies. Although the above discussion was about the national context, its
significance for the local situation cannot be downplayed. It appears that municipalities had some
degree of flexibility in terms of the implementation of pass controls. For instance, by the 1950s,
Pietermaritzburg and Durban had decided to introduce some controls on a voluntary basis.
25
In
order to be able to gain access to certain services women had to be in possession of documents,
which were regarded as permits: In Durban the permits were referred to as "letters of privilege".
Pietermaritzburg had an indirect enforcement policy because even though permits were not
compulsory, women were still required to produce the document as proof that they had the right
to be in the urban area when they were applying for municipal housing or wanting help in finding
26
employment. The fact that documents were voluntary for women does not mean harsh
legislation did not apply to Africans in Pietermaritzburg. It was amidst that situation that women
22 Ibid. p. 302; Lodge, BlackPolitics, p. 143; A Survey ofRace Relations, p. 86.
23 F. Meli, A History of the ANC: South Africa Belongs to Us (Londo~ lames Currey, 1988), p. 132;
Wells, We Now Demand, p. 112; Lodge, Black Politics, p. 144; Walker, Women and Resistance, pp. 194-
195; Bemste~ For their Triumphs, pp. 88-90. . '.
24 Meli, A History ofthe ANC, p. 129-132; A Survey ofRace Relations, p. 86; Lodge, Black Politics,
p. 144; Luckhardt and Wall, Organise or Starve!, pp. 301-302; Wells, We Now Demand, pp. 105-
117;Walker, Women and Resistance, p. 189.
25 A Survey ofRace Relations in South Africa 1955-1956, p. 86.
26 Ibid.
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staged two protest marches in the Pietermaritzburg city centre, in November 1956 and in January
1957.
The first protest march: November 1956
This section seeks to investigate a public demonstration by women which took place in the
Pietermaritzburg city centre in November 1956. Despite the fact that there is not yet adequate
source mate~al that can provide us ~th information relating to some of the specificities of the
march, available evidence can give some insights as to what, how and why it happened.
Newspapers do not give any insights into how the march was planned. However, the oral sources
too were not very helpful in giving precise information regarding how the march was organised.
Information as to how women were mobilised for the protest march was not easy to gather. My
interviewees still remember that the marches took place and they were organised by different
organisations, but the specific details about behind-the-scenes mobilisation are lacking.
27
Unlike
in other areas where there was evidence of a strong local Women's League, which took over the
role of mobilisation, in Pietermaritzburg it appears that this was not the case. My interviewees
indicate that in many cases prominent women from outside Pietermaritzburg were invited to lead
the marches. Archie Gumede said he remembers that it was mostly the wives of prominent ANC
members who were responsible for mobilising local women.
28
Another interviewee also pointed
out that during this time there was not a strong Women's League and that very few women were
politically prominent in Pietermaritzburg.
29
According to Anton Xaba, it was not necessarily
women who had to mobilise for passes, the local ANC men also participated in mobilising for the
27 Author's interviews with Ruth Lundie, August 1996, Archie Gumede, 2 October 1997 and Mrs V.
Sikhosana, 7 October 1997.
28 Author's interview with Archie Gumede, 2 October 1997.
29 Author's interview with Mrs V. Sikhosana, 7 October 1997.
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anti-pass campaigns.30 With information from both oral and written sources I will give a picture
ofthe protest march which took place in Pietennaritzburg in 1956.
At about 1:45 p.m. on 28 November 1956, approximately 620 women marched in
Pieterma:ntzburg.31 They had assembled at Market Square before they proceeded up Longmarket
Street. The leaders of this march were drawn from a wide range of organisations such as the
ANCWL the African Women's Association (AWA), the Durban and District Women's League, - ~
(DDWL), the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), the Liberal Party (LP) and the Congress of
Democrats (COD).32 The spokesperson for the women was Viola lunod of the Liberal Party.
This broad alliance shows that this demonstration was not a spontaneous march, but an event
that was well co-ordinated by a conglomeration of anti-apartheid organisations. This was the
trend during the 1950s, to have these organisations participating collectively in campaigns.
Archie Gumede said he remembers that Chief Luthuli, who was President of the ANC from
1953, used to come to Pietermaritzburg to address NIC and Liberal Party meetings.
33
The women formed a procession carrying banners and flags with slogans such as: "No Passbooks
for women" and "Away with pass laws".34 They also carried hundreds of copies of printed
protests, signed by approximately 800 people, which they intended to deliver to the ChiefNative
Commissioner (CNC) at his office at Braemer House.
35
Printed protests were also carried by the
women during their famous march to the Union Buildings in Pretoria in August. 36 On their way
up Longmarket Street the Pietermaritzburg women were singing "Nkosi Sikelel' i Afrika" and
30 Author's interview with Anton Xaba, 28 October 1997.
31 The Natal Daily News, 29 November 1956; The Natal Witness, 29 November "1956; Contact, December
1956.
32 The Natal Witness, 29 November 1956.
33 Author's interview with Archie Gumede, 2 October 1997.
34 The Natal Witness, 29 November 1956; The Natal Daily News, 29 November 1956.
35 Ibid.
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giving the thumbs-up sign.37 According to the Natal Daily News, shortly after the procession had
moved into Longmarket Street, a municipal traffic officer warned the leaders that they were
contravening a by-law by marching in a procession without permission.
38
The procession
immediately moved off the road onto the pavement and continued without interruption to the
corner of Longmarket and Chapel Streets, where the office of the Chief Native Commissioner
was located (see Map 2). The absence of permission seems to imply that when the march was
organised the leaders adhered to tl)e. principles of defiance that were prevailing during that
decade. SimilarIy~ by moving off the road, the marchers were clinging on to the philosophy of
peaceful protests because they did not want to disturb the traffic and cause unnecessary
commotion. It has also been pointed out that along the route, the procession was followed by
cars with plainclothes policemen and a police photographer who occasionally went out of the car
39
and took photographs ofthe marchers.
The march proceeded until the women reached Braemer House. There they stopped and formed
up on the pavement. At this stage, and. before any move could be made to enter the building,
uniformed policemen under the command ofMajor K. C. van der Merwe appeared.
40
It has been
argued that some of the police had come from Durban.
41
He asked Junod, who was at the head
of the procession, whether the organisers had permission to march in Pietermaritzburg. She
replied that they had considered the permission unnecessary as they had informed the Chief
Native Commissioner about the procession. Van der Merwe then ordered his police to take up
positions in order to flank the procession at intervals, while on the other hand Junod told the
36 Infonnation supplied by Tim Nuttall, November 1997.
37 Natal Witnes, 29 November 1956.
38 Daily News, 29 November 1956.
39 Natal Witness, 29 November 1956.
40 The Natal Daily News, 29 November 1956; The Natal Witness. 29 November 1956.
4\ Author's interview with Archie Gumede, 2 October 1997. The same point was confinned by Ruth
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women to be quiet as they were now under arrest. 42 Then a police-orchestrated procession
started when the women marched towards the police station at Loop Street. The crowd of
women who were singing and chanting and giving the thumbs-up signal marched off down
Chapel Street and into Loop Street, to the police station.
At the police station the women were taken to a shed on the rear side ofthe building which acted
as the courthouse (this shed was at the_corner ofLoop Street and Club Lane, where there is now
a telephone exchange building). The next three hours were spent summoning court officials and
lawyers.43 The special court was eventually held at dusk at about 5.30 p.m. Among the accused
were about eight Europeans, 30 fudians, five Coloureds, and the rest were Afiicans.
44
All were
represented by lawyers and it was reported that one of them had dashed from Durban to
represent his clients. The newspapers gave descriptions ofwhat was happening in the courtroom
even though they were ordered out shortly before court proceedings started. The Daily News
reported:
'While the court sat, babies cried in their mothers arms and the soft murmur of voices
made the whole proceedings inaudible beyond the first one or two rows. It was raining
outside and the only light in the gloomy gara§e was provided by the lamps of a motor
car which had been driven up to the entrance.' 5
To add to the drama, an ordinary office table was used as a Bench which the Acting Chief
Magistrate, Mr A. 1. Serfontein, utilised. The accused sat among the parked police vehicles,
which took up a great deal of space in the body of the court. The women continued to sing that
afternoon and chanted slogans which echoed through the surrounding streets. Outside the police
station there were groups of Afiicans who collected there to watch. The prosecutor, Mr C. 1.
Lundie during the same interview.
42 Ibid.
43 The Natal Witness, 29 November 1956.
44 Ibid.
45 Daily News, 29 November 1956; The Natal Witness, 29 November 1956; TIlls was also confinned by
Ruth Lundie.
47
Wilson, had made a draft charge, but he argued it was not ready to be put to the accused.
46
This
prompted Mr Nathan, one of the lawyers, to ask on behalf of the defence team for an
adjournment to 19 December. He further asked that the accused be released without bail as 'they
were well-known members ofsix organisations' and would come to their trial.
47
According to one
informant 'The magistrate realised that the net was too small and could not hold the big catch.
That was why he decided to set them free' .48 At 5.45 p.m. the hearing was adjourned and the
accused were released.
The whole proceeding took approximately 10 minutes. The women had not accomplished their
mission of handing in their printed protests to the authorities. Nevertheless the police had helped
them by giving them attention and their event more publicity. The significance of this protest
march does not only lie in the fact that it was, as the Witness reported, 'the first of its kind in
Natal,49, but also in that it was probably the first anti-apartheid event to take place during the
1950s which involved public demonstrations of mostly African people in the streets of
Pietermaritzburg. There are no reports of large, mainly African, protesting crowds being formed
in the city during the Defiance Campaign of 1952.
The presence of African women with their children shows that they were determined to show
their anger and to suffer ifneed be. Perhaps taking their babies with them to the march was meant
to show the authorities they not only came as protestors but also as mothers whose position was
being jeopardised by the pass laws. Most probably they envisaged that being imprisoned with their
babies would have elicited a huge outcry and sympathy for their cause. The reaction of the police
46 The Natal Witness, 29 November 1956; The Natal Daily News, 29 November 1956.
47 Ibid.
48 Author's interview with Archie Gumede, 2 October 1997.
49 The Natal Witness, 29 November 1956.
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is also notable in the sense that they did not baton-charge or shoot at the marchers but arrested
them. It can be argued that baton-charging the crowd would have created more chaos and
pandemonium in the city centre in view of the number of the demonstrators. It is unlikely that
police would have reacted in that manner had the crowd consisted of males or not had white
women in it. The presence of white women in the march is likely to have influenced the police
response. 50 In this case it seems that the nature of the crowd influenced the response of the
police. Having been unable to meet ~th the Chief Native Commissioner the women were not
discouraged. The court did not sit again for the women's case on the scheduled date on 19
December because it was discovered that the women had been arrested under an obsolete
municipal by-law, which applied only to Durban.
51
The women decided to stage another protest
march in January.
The Second Protest March, January 1957
On 29 January 1957, The Natal Witness reported that hundreds ofwomen were going to stage a
protest march in Pietermaritzburg against the issuing of pass books for African women. 52 They
were going to follow the same route as the previous march, leaving Market Square at 8 a.m. and
proceeding up Longmarket Street to the office of the Chief Native Commissioner at Braemer
House. (see Map 2). There they would hand over their protest petition. About 200 women were
expected to arrive by bus from Durban.
53
The total number that the organisers hoped to draw was
50 In his autobiography Joe Slovo (Slovo: The Unfinished Autobiography (Randburg, Ravan, 1995)
spells out clearly that during this period, white and black activists were not getting the same treatment.
African activists could not expect any mercy from the authorities when they are imprisoned whereas
their white counterparts were treated decently. Harassment by the security police, accommodation and
food in jail and treatment in courts were determined by colour. White activistS enjoyed many privileges
that were denied to black activists.
51 Author's interview with Ruth Lundie, 21 August 1996; Author's interview with Archie Gumede, 28
JU1'1997.
5 The Natal Witness, 31 January 1957.
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about 600.54 The arrangement was that a deputation of 12 women would present the Native
Commissioner, Mr Turton, with a petition, which he had agreed to receive. About 8 European
women were expected to take place in the parade, which had been sponsored by the LP, ANC,
NIC, and COD. A meeting was planned to take place in Red Square in Retief Street after the
delegation had returned from the Native Commissioner. The organisers had been granted
pennission for. both the march and the meeting.55 It seems from this petition that women were
concerned about their position in. the -NJican family system that was in danger of being destroyed
by the pass system. Their traditional roles as mothers and as central figures in families, when men
were being constantly forced to become migrant labourers were also in jes>pardy.
Again it has not been possible to get the exact details of the organisation of this second march.
Some people, who were active during the 1950s, do not remember quite clearly how mobilisation
happened. Even a person who said she participated in the march does not remember quite how
the march was planned and organised.56 The dearth of that kind of information makes it difficult
to get a picture of how the people were mobilised. However, with the sources available one can
put together a narrative ofthe protest march.
On 30 January a protest march took place in the streets ofPietermaritzburg.57 At 8.30 am
about 100 women marched from the Market Square carrying banners reading "Away with pass
laws" and "No passes". 58 However, Ilanga, a Zulu-language newspaper, estimated the crowd to
be more than 200.
59
It seems that there had been an agreement that the majority of the protestors
should go down to Retief Street for a meeting. On their way to Braemer House, the marching
54 Ibid.
55 UmAfrika, 09 February 1957; The Natal Witness, 31 January 1957.




protestors were singing Congress songs and there was the occasional chanting of the Congress
slogan, ''Mayibuye i Afrika".60 Traffic police escorted the protestors in order to make sure that
cars and onlookers did not disturb them. 'From the balconies and windows of the buildings along
Longmarket Street black and white workers came out to watch and some of them had no idea
h h
.,61
W at was appernng.
The marchers reached Braemer House at 9 a.m. where a deputation of 12 left the main group and
proceeded to Mr. Turton's office.62 At the same time two men of the special branch kept a watch
on the marchers. The same policemen later attended the protest meeting that was organised in
Retief Street.63 Except for the traffic officers and these two security men there was no strong
police presence, as was the case with the first march. The memorandum that was submitted to
Turton had been signed jointly by the representatives of the ANCWL, the NIC, SACPO, the LP
and the COD, who, it was reported, represented African, Indian, coloured and white women.
64
What emanates from the press reports is that there was still a pre-occupation with racial
categorisation, as these women were not seen as representing their organisations but their racial
groups instead. This is understandable in the sense that during this period people in South Africa
were being psychologically programmed to think in racial terms. Even the anti-apartheid
organisations were still classified in racial terms even though some, such as the banned-South
African Communist Party (SACP) and the Liberal Party, were moving towards non-racialism.
However, Anton Xaba, who was active in Pietermaritzburg during the 1950s argued that 'people
58 The Natal Witness, 31 January 1957.
59
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in racial or organisational terms. They saw themselves as one' .65
Part ofthe memorandum that was submitted to Turton read "We call upon the Minister ofNative
Affairs, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, and through him the Nationalist Party Government, to rescind the
decision to extend the system of passes to African women. ,,66 Reasons given for this request were
that 'the passes discriminated against the Native section ofthe South African community and that
passes for women would attack the foundation of Native society, the family'. 67 Furthermore the
memorandum quoted speeches by Dr Verwoerd claiming that it was not the intention to proceed
with the practicalllpplication for pass laws for African women. The first to speak to Burton was I.
Shange, who was representing the ANC Women's League and who, according to the Ilanga
reporter, said "We the women of South Africa are here to complain about the law which makes
women carry passes. We represent thousands of women who were unable to come here today.
We are saYing away with the pass because it humiliates and breaks up families... ,,68 She further
explained that: "Families will be destroyed, children will be left uncared for when a women who is
head ofthe household is imprisoned for a pass. Women will be humiliated by being stopped in the
streets by police demanding passes. Women will be hindered by passes from travelling freely in
our country of birth... ,,69 She was followed by Viola Junod who began by complaining about the
treatment they got during the previous march, and then went on to support the sentiments of the
ANC as espoused in Shange's speech.
70
Next was H. van Doren of SACPO, who said that some
Coloureds were being forced to carry passes in areas like Johannesburg because they were seen as
not white enough. Then came R. Singh representing the NIC, who pointed out that a pass was
not good even for men and was undesirable. The last to speak was V. Ponen of the COP, who
65 Author's interview with Anton Xaba, 28 October 1997.
66 The Natal Witness, 31 January 1957.
67 Ibid.
68
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concluded by saying, "A nation that enslaves another one cannot progress.
7l
" After listening to
them, Mr Turton promised to send their petition to the Secretary for Native Affairs in Pretoria. 72
The deputation then left the Chief Native Commissioner's office and marched down Longmarket
Street to the meeting that :vas taking place in Retief Street where a crowd of almost 500 people
waited for them to report back.
73
(See Map 2)
At the meeting venue in Retief Street the back of a truck was used as a podium for the speakers
--- .
to stand on. Fro~there a militant woman, Mrs Ostrich, was delivering a firing speech. She spoke
so furiously that the interpreter refused to translate some words, which, it was later said, were
about white people's private partS.74 Mrs F. Meer, who presided at the meeting, told the crowd
that the si,gnificance of the protest was that European, Coloureds, Indians and Natives were
standing together to form a united front against the pass laws.
75
Thereafter Viola Junod reported
on the discussion with Turton. She argued 'The pass laws \vere used for political reasons. They
were not used for identification purposes, but to control and regulate the community and to get at
elements of the community who have committed no crime other than to protest against
oppression. ,76 She went further to say "We gave Mr Turton, as an example, the case of the bus
boycott in the Transvaal. In order to weaken the force of the boycotters, policemen are being
stationed in locations at street corners, stopping all boycotters and asking them for their passes. ,,77
There are no reports of any activities that happened except the reportbacks. It seems that it was
those speeches by women that conluded the campaign of that day. One should point out that the
71
Ilanga, 2 FebIUal)' 1957.
~: Natal Witness, 31 January 1957; Ilanga, 2 February 1957; UmAfrika, 9 February 1957.
Ilanga, 2 FebIUal)' 1957; Natal Witness, 31 January 1957.
74 Ruth Lundie's comments during an interview with Archie Gumede, 2 October 1997. Archie Gumede
said Mrs Ostrich came from Cape Town to address women on that day.
75 The Natal Witness, 31 January 1957
76 Natal Witness, 31 January 1957.
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January protest march and meeting by women received a different response from the police when
compared to the first one. The conspicuous absence of the police showed that the police were not
anticipating any trouble and trusted the organisers. However, it seems that this was the current
trend in other areas as well. Wells argues that: 'During the 1950s, the virtual absence of the
police action against women protestors in the early stages only served to boost the women's
morale and confidence. ,78 In Pietermaritzburg it seems also that the context had become different
because now there was no talk of contravening a by-law and the request for permission was
unnecessary. Sta~g a march and holding a meeting inside the city was now legal. However, it
should be highlighted that Retief Street was on the edges of the' town and not in the city centre.
This southeastern part ofthe city that was the main locus of anti-apartheid mobilisation during the
1950s.79 The crowds at both the protest march and the meeting were remarkably non-violent. In
contrast to the first march, the women accomplished their mission ofhaving an interview with the
ChiefNative Commissioner.
Although it was reported that some women had come from Durban, the majority of women
were local. Women from other areas came not just to add to numbers, but because
Pietermaritzburg, as a legislative capital ofNatal, was the seat of the ChiefNative Commissioner,
whose office was given the task of ensuring that the issuing of passes was going smootWy.
Women in Pietermaritzburg joined with the others in other centres in South Africa by marching
against the passes that they perceived as a ploy by the government to tear the fabric of the African
family system into shreds. Obviously the government saw the place of African women to be in
rural production rather than in the productive sphere ofthe urban areas.
77 Ibid.
78
Wells, We Now Demand, p. 134.
79 During author's interview with Anton Xaba he pointed out that some buildings in the vicinity of the
Retief -Berg Street - East Street area are still standing and should be declared national monuments.
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Conclusion
This chapter sought to examine two protest marches by women that occurred in Pietennaritzburg
during the 1950s. These two case studies of protest marches were analysed as anti-apartheid
events. To set the scene for the protest marches a section provided the context in which the
marches took place and the position oIwomen vis-a.-vis passes. This section intended to provide
background information in order to understand why women were protesting against the extension
of passes. Although women were not subjected to pass controls before the 1950s, there were
measures that were used to regulate their movement. The change of government in 1948 ushered
in a new administration that was not prepared to tolerate the little freedom African women had.
During the 1950s the Nationalist Party government gradually extended passes to African women.
This led to countrywide protests, as African women perceived passes as attacking the lifeblood of
African family life which women represented. These were not feminist protests but reactions to
the destruction ofthe women's traditional roles as mothers and as wives.
The Pietennaritzburg marches occurred in that context of resistance to apartheid. Passes
SYmbolised apartheid oppression and it was due to this that political organisations such as the
ANC became involved in these marches. The wide range of anti-apartheid organisations that
participated in the Pietermaritzburg women's marches shows that they were carefully planned and
that they adhered to the principles of defiance and resistance. Crowds of women took resistance
to the streets ofPietermaritzburg to challenge the authorities, for the first time during the 1950s.
African women, including the Pietennaritzburg protestors, saw the extension of passes as a direct
attack on the nucleus of Afiican families where women had assumed key positions. The women
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succeeded in taking crowds on to the streets of Pietermaritzburg, something that the Defiance
Campaign of 1952 was unable to accomplish. The success of these marches probably influenced
the staging of similar demonstrations in Pietermaritzburg in 1959. Women's militancy in the 1959
incidents, crowd behaviour, police reactions and the multiplicity ofgrievances and the subsequent
riots at Sobantu showed that the socio-economic and political context had changed in both
Pietermaritzburg and nationally since the mid-1950s.
CHAPTER FOUR
"A setback to the harmonious race relations in this charming city of scented
flowers,,1: The Pietermaritzburg riots of August 1959.
In 1959 a series of popular revolts erupted in Natal, starting in Cato Manor in Durban and spreading
out to other urban centres and rural areas. Relatively large protesting crowds were involved in these
incidents. This chapter seeks to investigate one of these events, which took place in Pietermaritzburg
in the context ofcoun~dedisturbances. There was a demonstration by women followed by riots
which occurred-at Sobantu on the weekend of 14-16 August 1959. These events will be analysed
against the background of national anti-apartheid political mobilisation. I will explore the issues that
sparked off this crowd event in Pietermaritzburg, the kinds of organisation and crowd behaviour
which occurred, and the protagonists in the conflict. Furthermore, I will examine the significance of
these events in the politics of local anti-apartheid resistance. I will begin by exploring briefly the wider
background to the demonstrations and the riots of 1959.
Background to the Pietermaritzburg riots
In June 1959 there were widespread riots and disturbances in the Durban African shantytown of Cato
Manor. The fundamental causes were socio-economic; arising from such factors as poor living
conditions and widespread poverty. But it was the exhaustive beer raids on illegal stills that provided
the flashpoint. In areas that were controlled by the municipality it was illegal for Africans to brew their
own beer. Instead they were obliged to purchase it from the municipal beerhalls. Proceeds from the
beerhalls were then supposedly used for the development and administration of African township
facilities in what was known as the Native Revenue Account.2 There were however complex issues, ,
I Natal Archives Depot, Town Clerk Files, Vol. 4/4/2/340, Ref. 197/21, Letter from G. F. Khumalo to Town
Clerk, 19 August 1959.
2 J. Yawitc~ 'Natal 1959: The Women's Protests', paper to Conference on the History of Opposition in
South Africa, University ofWitwatersrand, 1978. p. 206~ L. K. Ladlau, 'The Cato Manor Riots, 1959-1960',
that precipitated the riots in Cato Manor and it was not just the question of beer brewing. The riots
were also related to forced removals from the area.
3
The Cato Manor incident was echoed in similar events in many towns and rural areas of Natal, with
women being at the forefront. In the towns the municipal monopoly over the brewing of traditional
beer (utshwala), police raids, influx control, low wages and unemploYment appeared to be the main
reasons for riots. Women accused their menfolk of spending their meagre incomes in beerhalls. In the
rural areas discontent centred around land shortages, betterment schemes, cattle culling, cattle
dipping, influx control and poverty which was perceived to be caused by the government's policies.-+
African women played an active role in the protests of the 1950s, and were vociferous in opposing
their proposed subjection to the pass laws and the curtailment of informal sector activity.5 Although
the oppression was hard on both men and women there were differences in the way men and women
were oppressed under apartheid laws.
The social positions of African women in both rural and urban areas explains why it was women who
took the lead in confronting the government, even if this involved violence. Many African women in
towns did not work in industry. For them involvement with urban industrial society was neither as
humiliating nor as brutal as that experienced by their menfolk, and this may have conditioned their
Unpublished MA Thesis, Durban University ofNatal, 1975, p. 34.
3 For more on the Cato Manor story see I. Edwards, 'Mkhumbane our Home: African Shantytown Society
in Cato Manor Farm, 1946-1960', Unpublished PhD Thesis, Durban, University of Natal, 1989; I.
Edwards, 'Cato Manor, June 1959: Men, Women, Crowds, Violence, Politics and History', in P. Maylam
and I. Edwards (eds), The People's City: African life in Twentieth Century Durban (Pietermaritzburg,
University ofNatal Press, 1996), pp. 128-136.
4 T. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1983), p. 149; K. Luckhardt and
B. Wall, Organize or Starve: The History ofthe South African Congress ofTrade Unions (London, Lawrence
and Wishart, 1980), p. 304; L. Kuper, 'Rights and Riots in Natal", Africa South, Volume 4, Number 2,
January - March 1960, p. 21; A Survey ofRace Relations in South Africa, 1958-1959 (Johannesburg, South
African Institute ofRace Relations, 1959), pp. 142-144.
5 P. O. Tichmann, 'African Worker Action in Durban, 1940-1960', Unpublished MA Thesis, Durban,
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attitude to authority.6 C. Walker pointed out that:
'Women in the towns in South Afiica during the 1950s were frustrated by the state of flux
and uncertainty that surrounded the urban family, the position of women was often
contradictory, their status confused. On the one hand, women tended to gain independence
and authority. In many cases they were holding the strongest part in holding their families
together, an important factor in explaining why the opposition of Afiican women to the pass
laws was always so deeply felt. On the other hand women's new position was not always
sanctioned by society. In the eyes of the law they were still subordinate to men, while their
right of residence in town was increasin~y insecure, especially after 1952 when the tighter
influx control measures were introduced. '
About women in the rural areas she argued:
'By the 1950s Afiican women's reproductive function within the reserves was strained to near
breaking point. By then it had become manifestly clear that the reserves were no longer
functioning as viable subsistence bases for migrant workers. ,8
It was this complex set of forces that led to the Natal riots of 1959. Following the Cato Manor
incident there was a wave of urban and rural militancy from August 1959. Some of the towns and
rural areas that were affected were Estcourt, Mooi River, kwa Dweshula in Port Shepstone, Harding,
Ixopo, Camperdown and New Hanover.9 While beerhalls seemed to have been the main targets in the
urban areas, in the rural areas dipping tanks, land shortages, and stock culling were the main targets.
Karis and Carter argued:
'In the impoverished rural areas where cattle culling was needed to reduce overstocking, the
purpose of the scheme was not only misunderstood but also deeply resented because of the
traditional importance of cattle and the historic shortage of land. Women resented a new
policy in some areas of demanding rather than paying for their services in the community
dipping of their cattle (to remove parasites). In the urban areas they objected to the
prohibition on the traditional home brewing of beer, which was a source for many families,
and demonstrated to force the closing of municipal beerhalls which drained their husbands
. ,10
mcomes.
University ofNatal, 1983, p. 50.
6 T. Lodge, BlackPolitics in South Africa since 1945 (Johannesburg, Rav~ 1983), p. 141.
: C. Walker, Women and Resistance in South Africa (Londo~ Onyx, 1982), p.149.
Ibid, p. 146.
9 Lodge, Black Politics, p.l95; Race Relations Survey 1958-1959, pp. 140-141; The Natal Witness, 17
August 1959; The Daily News, 17 August 1959; UmAfrika, 22 August 1959; llanga lase Natal, 22
August 1959.
10 T. Karis, G. Carter and G. M. Gerhart (eds), From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of
African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964, Volume 3, (Stanford, Hoover, 1977), pp. 290-291.
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Underlying all these grievances were low wages, unemployment and increasing taxation. In this
hardship it seemed to have come to the women's perception that men were powerless to bring an end
to this bondage. Therefore this militancy by women could be seen against the background of the
men's vacillation in confronting apartheid. One can also argue that there was a perception that the
reaction ofthe government to mass protest action by women would not be harsh as would have been
the case with men. The other possibility is that most men were working and there was always the
threat ofdismissal, so the people who had the time to organise were often women.
The main cause of anger and fiustration with the beerhalls was the fact that they were owned by the
municipalities and that meant the banning of private home brewing, which the women in the urban
areas saw as means of livelihood, more than a component of tradition. Beerhalls were seen as a threat
to women's survival. Most women in towns were unemployed and they earned their income by
brewing traditional beer and other illicit and more potent concoctions such as shirniyane and gavine,
as well as spirits which became integral to the urban culture of the time.
11
The municipal monopoly of
the brewing of what was known as 'kaffir beer" was legally sanctioned by the Native Beer Act of
1908.
12
One ofthe ridiculous aspects ofthe municipal monopoly ofbeer brewing was that
'Permits were given to the residents to brew a limited amount of beer, but that proved to be
traps, because relatives, even a son, with whom a resident enjoyed his drink were arrested and
charged a fine ranging from 2 to 10s. And since it is not Zulu custom for men to drink on
their own, they go to the beerhalls, which take part of their very small earnings. On the way
home they are picked up by the police and the little money they are bringing back for the
children goes in fines. ' 13
Municipalities relied on profit from beer sales for the provision of services to Africans. Municipal
Bantu Revenue Accounts were used to finance urban African housing, recreational facilities, and to
:~ ~au, 'The Cato Manor Riots', pp. 34-36;Tic~ 'African Worker Action', p. 48.
TIC~ 'African Worker Action in Durban', p. 47.
13 Kuper, 'Rights and Riots in Natal, p. 22.
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subsidise welfare activities in the townships such as feeding schemes and milk funds.
14
This explains
why municipalities regarded the sale ofAfrican beer (utshwala) as important.
The raids by police did not deter women from brewing, either for domestic consumption or for sale.
African women continued to defy the law, brewing liquor at home to sell in order to earn a few
pennies more and retain a traditional form of hospitality. Because of the meagre wages their men
brought home, the women deeply resented the money they drank away in the beerhalls.
15
The
municipal monop~ly over the brewing and sale of beer was seen as not only restricting the cultural
expression of the African working class it was also viewed as exacerbating the economic deprivations
of African workers. 16 It was against this background of discontent about beer brewing, liquor raids
removals, poverty, unemplOYment and influx control that African women revolted in Natal in 1959.
Two months after the Cato Manor riots, Pietermaritzburg experienced what were officially referred
to as "Native Disturbances". These events shared some of the features that had taken place in
Durban's shantytown ofCato Manor.
These protest activities by women have been subject of scholarly analysis. Terms such as "Natal
Disturbances", "Natal Riots", and the most common "Beerhall Riots" have been widely used to refer
to the wave ofprotest by women in Natal. In my analysis I will attempt to go beyond just seeing them
as disturbances or mere riots and will portray them as events of political mobilisation amidst the
intensification of state repression on anti-apartheid opposition. Seeing the incidents as just "beerhall
riots" conceals some important dYnamics concerning the positions of African women and African
communities during the late 1950s. The issue of liquor brewing and dipping tanks was important to a
certain extent and helped to galvanise African women's opposition to the European administrators.
14 Ladlau, 'The Cato Manor Riots', p. 34.
15
K. Luckhardt and B. Wall, Organize or StarveL p.303.
16Tic~ 'African Worker Action', p. 49. .
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Women's demonstrations in Pietermaritzburg
Pietennaritzburg was not immune from the political turbulence that was taking place in Natal. Afiican
people in Pietennaritzburg were experiencing fonns of oppression such as influx control, pass laws,
unemployment, housing shortage and poverty. As was the case in Durban, the Pietennaritzburg
municipality maintained the beer-brewing monopoly. The Native Administration Department
purported to be concerned with improving race relations in Pietennaritzburg. In his annual reports, D.
N. Bang, who was Manager
17
of the department, always commended the city for its excellent record
on race relations. The disturbances of 1959 came as a shock to him and he reported:
'In the middle of August, the city's long and excellent record of harmonious race relations
received a setback when large groups ofwomen carried out demonstration at the Sutherland
Police Station, outside the Bantu Men's Hostel and the beer halls. Parties wielding sticks
raided the beerhalls and then left pickets. ,18
On 8 August 1959, at approximately 11 o'clock, a crowd of African women from Raisethorpe
demonstrated at the Otto Street offices of the Bantu Administration Department. 19 Bang reported
that they had been noisy at first but had calmed down when he had given them a hearing. The
grievances included the lack of employment, low wages and influx control, and they demanded that
the authorities reintroduce domestic brewing.
20
In view of the fact that the main grievance for women
was the withdrawal of a previous facility for domestic brewing, he consulted the Bantu Affairs
Commissioner and the Police who 'had no objection to the old system of domestic brewing being
reintroduced as an administrative arrangement,.21 Consequently, the meeting resolved that the system
17 The designation of the Native Administration Departments was changed to Bantu Administration
Department early in the 195Os. The title of Manager was changed to Director. The dropping of the word
'Native' was on the basis that this word was unfavourable to its bearers and that the word 'Bantu' was
'more acceptable to that group of non-white races'. However, the NAD in Pietennaritzburg seemed to
have only effected these changes in 1959 because it is only from then that the new words were used in the
files.
18 Pietermaritzburg Corporation Yearbook, 1959-1960, p. 139.




ofdomestic brewing in Raisethorpe be reintroduced.
It can be argued that this incident was related to the Cato Manor riots in Durban when women were
complaining about ~he prohibition of domestic brewing. Furthermore, the nature of their grievances
seems to suggest that the beer issue was interwoven with other problems which affected African
people generally in the urban areas, and not only women. The response of the Bantu Administration
Department implies that they were trying hard to avoid the simmering confrontation and get rid of
anything which might tarnish the department's image in the eyes of the African population. However,
even this promising gesture was too late to avoid the popular resistance which took the form of a
protest march and a revolt on the weekend of 14-16 August 1959.
On Friday 14 August, after the demonstration by women from Raisethorpe, a crowd of African
women estimated at between 250 and 300 congregated in Pietermaritzburg to see the Chief Native
Commissioner. However, before going to the Chief Native Commissioner's office they started by
staging a protest at the Sutherlands Police Station in Plessislaer, Edendale, where about 30 of their
colleagues were being detained, allegedly for canying dangerous weapons.
22
The weapons that the
women were canying were clubs and sticks. Though both oral and written sources do not provide a
clear picture as to how this ·event was organised, and its pattern, it seems that women from
Pietermaritzburg and the surrounding areas and from Durban had planned to -send their grievances to
the Chief Native Commissioner on that day. Pietermaritzburg was the appropriate meeting place for
these women because, as the administrative capital of Natal, it was where' the office of the Chief
Native Commissioner was situated.
..,.,
-- Natal Witness, 15 August 1959; Daily News 15 August 1959; UmAfrika, 22 August 1959; Ilanga, 22
August 1959; D. R. Bonnin, 'Class, Consciousness and Conflict in the Natal Midlands, 1940-1987: The case of
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The crowd at Edendale involved women from both urban and rural areas around the city. Some came
from as far as Durban and Camperdown. It was reported in one newspaper that before this incident
'the Natives of Pietermaritzburg were whispering of trouble looming ahead'. 23 According to
newspaper reports the whole saga began during the morning of the 14
th
, when a busload of women
arrived at Edendale from Table Mountain to meet the local women and to march together to the Chief
•
Native Commissioner's office. On their way, about 30 of them were arrested for carrying dangerous
weapons. The other 200 waited for them at the Sutherlands Police Station. The Natal Daily News
reported that 'wh~n ~he two busloads of women drove past the Ohrtmann Road beehall on their way
to Edendale, the men rushed outside and cheered them on. At East Street the women commandeered
an Indian bus and ordered the driver to take them to Edendale. They threatened to burn the bus and
he complied. ,24 The Ilanga lase Natal, a Zulu -medium newspaper, said:
'The story began when women from rvtkhambathini (Table Mountain) approached the East
Street Men's Hostel. Those who were drinking at the Berg Street beerhall said ''Nakho phela
sebefikile omameJ"( Look, there come the women!). Then they started running away. Seeing
that women were not coming to the beerhall they resumed their drinking. ,25
While one group of women was waiting at the police station in Edendale, five busloads of women
arrived near Sobantu Village, bringing reinforcements. About 30 members of this crowd were
estimated to have come from Durban.26
The women filtered into town, finally coming together at the Retief Street beerhall.27 However, the
Natal Witness does not mention that there were five buses that arrived.28 In his report Bang pointed
out that:
th~?TR Sanncol workers', Unpublished M SocSc Thesis, Durb~ University ofNataL 1987, p. 160.
Daily News, 17 August 1959.
24 Daily News, 15 August 1959.
25 Ilanga, 29 August 1959. (author's translation).
26 Daily News, 15 August 1959.
27 Daily News, 15 August 1959; UmAfrika, 22 August 1959.
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'The trouble started at 8.30 on the morning of Friday 14th August, when a busload of angry
women congregated outside the East Street Native Men's Hostel. They were first addressed
by a high-ranking Afiican National Congress official, Archibald Gumede, who appeared to be
able to calm down the shouting women. An unknown bearded European of small stature also
addressed the women by saYing they must drop their sticks before coming to consult him.
After they had gone, a junior A. N. C. official, Kunene, who lives at the hostel, worked the
women up to :frenzy by his shouting. They then left for Edendale. ,29
It appears that the ANC was involved in the organisation of this demonstration by women. The
pictur~ about the ~C's role is not very clear because even Archie Gumede, who is said to have
addressed women on this day, does not-now remember doing that.30 However, Mrs Linah Mabhida, a
participant in one ofthe attacks on beerhalls, asserts that Archie Gumede did indeed address them.
31
The women who had been addressed by ANC officials went to the Sutherlands Police Station to join
the others who were already there. (see Maps land 2) At the police station, where the women were
waiting, they sat quietly and waited for the representative ofthe Bantu Affairs Department to speak to
them. Heavily armed police under Major O. Kje1vei, surrounded them.
32
The Additional Native
Commissioner, Mr Otte, went to Sutherlands Police Station to listen to women's grievances. He
asked them to elect representatives to meet with the Native Commissioner and present their problems.
However, the women were sullen and uncompromising. Their main grievance was that their husbands
were not giving them enough money. Other grievances stated were the enfeeblement of their
husbands by the government, poverty, influx control, unemployment, and increased taxation. The
Zulu word they used for enfeeblement or emasculation was ukuthenwa, which can be translated
literally as meaning castration.33 Perhaps the women saw themselves as taking over from the men,
who had been rendered powerless. The word ukuthenwa has a symbolic importance because it is
28 Natal Witness, 15 August 1959.
29 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref 199/214, Bang's confidential report to TC, 20 August 1959.
30 Author's interview with Archie Gumede, Clennont, 2 October 1997.
31 Author's interview with Mrs Linah Mabhida, Slangspruit 20 November 1997.
n '
33 Natal Witness, 15 August 1959; llanga, 22 August 1959; UmAfrika, 22 August 1959.
llanga, 29 August 1959.
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commonly believed that a man's private parts, especially testicles, are his source of power. A women
from New Hanover, who acted as their spokesperson was told "you have come from an area where
a number of dipping tanks have been destroyed. Why do you have to come here to stir up the
people?,,34 This statement reflects the official viewpoint of the local authorities of the time that local
'natives' were quiet and that it was the agitators who were responsible for unrest. The other
dimension that one can discern from the women's action is that this was not just an urban affair, but it
embraced resistance against problems that affected both urban and rural communities. There were
close links in daily and family experiences between the urban and rural communities.
After speaking to Mr Otte at Sutherlands, the women boarded buses to town with the intention of
speaking directly with the Chief Native Commissioner. Wielding sticks, women gathered at an open
space next to the Ematsheni beerhall in Retief Street to await others that were still 'due to arrive by
bus. (see Map 2) Their meeting point was going to be the taxi rank next to Matsheni beerhall and
Native Market in Retief Street.
35
When one police officer asked the women why they were carrying
sticks they told him that they had agreed that they would recognise each other in that way.36
Meanwhile women poured into the paddock where others were already waiting.
37
A call for police
assistance came from the beerhall and 56 policemen arrived, led by the District Commandant,
Lieutenant-Colonel B. C. Geldenhuys. In the paddock the women danced and sang in a circle.38
Suddenly they rushed straight towards the police who were stationed between them and the beerhall.
The police charged and the screaming women scattered in all directions. Basing its report on what it
claimed to be eyewitness sources, an Ilanga reporter wrote:
34 '
Natal Witness, 25 August 1959.
35 Ilanga, 29 August 1959~ Daily News, 15 August 1959; Natal Witness, 15 August 1959; UmAfrika, 22
August 1959.
36 Ilanga, 29 August 1959.
37 It has not been possible to find the exact estimate of the number of women who gathered in Retief
Street, but the size of the police presence suggests it was a large crowd.
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'While women were still waiting for others at a park in Retief Street so that they could go and
see the Native Commissioner [Ndabazabantu] in Pietennaritz Street the police arrived. When
their Commandant arrived he blew the whistle without even speaking to women to hear why
they were there. At that time the baton charge began. The police were beating
indiscriminately, including the onlookers. Women, men and children were scattered. ,39
During that melee two women were injured. Phylis Mkhize of Ashdown location was hurt when she
ran into a wire fence, while Victoria Xaba was beaten on the hand with a butt of a gun.
40
Nine
policemen were stoned and three African men were slightly injured.
41
According to Anton Xaba:
'It was not only women who were in these demonstrations. We as men went there as well.
We were dressing like women. We attacked the beerhalls and those drinking in there used to
say that they were shocked that the women could use sticks in that way. In the rural areas we
went around filling the dipping tanks with stones at night. During the day women would
come and demonstrate and do more damage' .42
Mrs Linah Mabhida, who was active in women's politics in Pietennaritzburg during the 1950s,
corroborated this. She is the wife of the late Moses Mabhida, who was working together with Archie
.Gumede and Harry Gwala to mobilise the people in Pietennaritzburg. Describing one incident of
beerhall attacks Mrs Mabhida said:
'We had been having meetings to talk about the beerhalls. Women had been saYing that men
should not go and drink their money in the beerhalls. Instead they must bring the money
home. If they want utshwala, they must buy imithombo (maize and sorghum ingredients) so
that their wives would prepare utshwala for them. One Friday we had a meeting and it was
agreed that beerhalls should be boycotted. The following day we went to town with women
from Durban and other areas. We met with Archie Gumede who told us we should not
attack the beerhall in East Street as the police were watching on us. Women went to stand in
the open space next to Dr Motala's surgery. Mysel( Mrs Cebekhulu and three other women
from Machibise, decided to stay behind. We went into the beerhall and pretended to be
hungry and wanting to buy food. We hid our sticks so that people inside the beerhall could
not see. The beerhall was full. One woman from Machibise kicked th(( door and we entered
the bar. We saw some young men who were standing leaning on the-wall. One of them was
Anton Xaba and others whom we knew. Seeing them gave us courage and we started
beating the men inside in the beerhall. There were loud cries and At)~on and his friends helped
also. They too had their sticks, which they had hidden. We started to beat the men and they
all ran out. We beat them with sticks and with beer pots, which were on of the .tables. One
old man died during that stampede. When the police came after hearing the commotion,
38 Daily News, 15 August 1959: UmAfrika, 22 August 1959.
39 Ilanga, 29 August 1959.
40 Ibid.
41 Daily News, 15 August 1959.
42 Author's interview with Anton Xaba, 28 October 1997.
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Anton and his mends pretended to be crying and injured. They hid their sticks. We then went
out quietly with our clothes dirty with beer. We went straight to Archie Gumede who was
shocked with what we had done. He told us to take off our clothes and they gave us new
ones. He told me to leave immediately because I was known to the police. Mrs Cebekhulu
and I then left using the small lanes. We did not use the bus and we went straight eastward
until we reached Prince Alfred Street. We walked up Prince Alfred and then joined College
Road. Thenwe took Topham Road until we reached Slangspruit. ,43
Even the use of force by the police did not diminish the women's determination as they congregated
again after being baton-charged. Lieutenant-Colonel Geldenhuys said that there were about 75
women in the precincts of the beerhall and the rest were chanting on a vacant plot nearby. After the
initial baton-charge the streets were cleared of 'Native onlookers'. Women went into the beerhall
from the rear and upset some of the tables with beer mugs on them.44 After the baton-charge,
according to Bang,
'The women were apparently dispersed but they had actually only infiltrated into the crowd of
bystanders. Patrons returned to the beerhall, but just before 5 p.m. women stormed the
beerhall from the unguarded side entrance, turned the tables over and in a few seconds had
dispersed the patrons and disappeared into the crowds. The beerhall was then closed and the
police warned for possible arson,.45
While the police were regrouping in the road after dispersing the women, they were pelted with
stones and bottles through the window of one of the buildings where the police stood.46
Reinforcements were quickly sent to the beerhall and the streets were cleared again. Subsequently
two people were arrested; one Indian male who was alleged to have been involved in stoning the
police and an African male who was arrested for obstruction.47
The demonstration continued until the evening when women started to board buses back home. In the
43 Author's interview with Mrs Linah Mabhida, 20 November 1997.
44 Natal Witness 15 August 1959.
45 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref 199/214, Confidential report from Bang to TC, 20 August 1959; Peel,
'Sobantu Village', p. 134.
46 UmAfrika, 22 August 1959~ Bonnin, 'Class, Consciousness', p. 160.
47 Ibid.
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evening, according to one newspaper report, 'the last busload of women returned to their homes in
Durban and the country districts and the city settled down to a quiet night' .48 However, it seems that
the situation was not as quiet as the report claims because on the same evening, just before 8 p.m. 1.
J. Roestafwas seriously injured when a halfbrick hit him on the head while he was walking past the
Retief Street beerhall, which had been the main scene ofthe day's conflict.49
On the following day, Saturday 15 August, the situation was still tense and the Retief Street beerhall
was closed. The atmosphere was still volatile at the Berg Street beerhall when an obviously hostile
group of men and women assembled outside the entrances.50 Apparently, would-be patrons were
intimidated by this action. Business continued at other beerhalls in Ohrtmann and Havelock roads.
However, in the case of the Havelock Road beerhall, Bang received a telephone call at 1.45 p.m. He
reported:
'Before I got there I saw women wielding sticks making their way from the beerhall. The
police then arrived but they were too late. The women had cleared the beer hall and had
thrown away their sticks. The hall was then closed, and the Police briefed to watch entrances
and be on the look out in case ofany attempts being made to bum property. ,51
How then can this set of events be explained? These can be seen as an important moments of
resistance by women against government policies. The Saturday incidents at beerhalls were surely a
continuation of the Friday's protest demonstrations. It appears that there was some co-ordination;
these were not just spontaneous outbreaks. This demonstration by women was an incident of mass
mobilisation, which involved relatively large crowds. The extent of the women's participation was
remarkable as well as their detennination to speak for themselves. Protesting at beer halls was
consistent with the trend in other areas such as Cato Manor where beerhalls had been attacked.
48 Daily News, 15 August 1959.
49 The Natal Witness, 17 August 1959.
50 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref. 199/214 Bang to TC, 20 August 1959.
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Beerhalls came to symbolise the whole structure of municipal control. 52 Apparently, the issue of beer
brewing was just one of several problems. Women were fiustrated by influx control and the pass laws
that had began to bear heavily on them. In the insecurity of town life, and as a result of the migrant
labour system, the st~le core ofthe family was the mother and her children.53
One can also see these events as contributing to the emerging militancy of the broader struggle for
liberation and to assertions of the position of women in the struggle against apartheid. One significant
aspect of this was that the crowds went to the city centre rather than being confined to the African
residential areas. The women used the space available next to the beer halls as their venue of mass
mobilisation. The proximity of the taxi rank to both the vacant plots of land and the beerhall helped
women find a place where crowds could easily amass. Co-incidentally, what they viewed as the main
source oftheir suffering was just in front of them.
Pietermaritzburg provided a convenient meeting place for both rural and urban women, as it was
where the Chief Native Commissioner was situated. There was a strong likelihood that this action of
protest and defiance had an influence on what occurred at Sobantu Village the following day. The
Sobantu revolt was different in that it involved both men and women and, unlike the women's
demonstrations elsewhere, this event involved a small community from the same township and was
related to local problems that the residents experienced. The Sobantu incident also differed from the
women's demonstrations in the targets identified by the crowd and in the amount ofdamage ca~sed.
Before plunging into an examination of the Sobantu incident, I will begin by outlining Sobantu's
51 Ibid.; See also Peel, 'Sobantu Village', p. 134.
52 Peel, 'Sobantu Village', p. 135; See also P. du Plooy, 'African Reaction to the Beerhalls', in J. Laband and
R. Haswell (eds),.Pietermaritzburg 1838-1988, pp. 142-143.
53 Kuper, 'Rights and Riots', p. 25.
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economic and socio-political context before and during the 1950s. The intention is not to present a
detailed history of Sobantu Village, but to highlight some of the important aspects that might have led
to the eruption ofviolence on the weekend of 14-16 August 1959.
Sobantu: A "Model Village"
Sobantu Village was built in 1928 in order to accommodate Afiicans, particularly lower middle class
Afiicans, who had clerical jobs in town. 54 The village was situated on the southeastern side of
Pietennaritzburg -and was the first municipal housing provided for Afiicans in the city of
Pietennaritzburg.55 (see Map 3) Interestingly, it was around this time that the Durban City Council
built Lamontville Township in order to 'offer differential accommodation in order to co-opt Durban's
Afiican petty bourgeoisie and to raise this class above the ranks of the worlcing class. From the outset,
the municipal officials made it clear that all applications for residing in the township would be
"carefully scrutinised" to ensure that the "right type of native" was selected, and occupancy was
"subject to proper behaviour". 56 It was also hoped that the establishment of Sobantu would offer a
solution to the problem of unorganised settlement around the edges and in the backyards of
Pietennaritzburg.
57
From its establishment the place had been referred to as the Native Village, but in
54 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/4/2/74, Ref. 140/1, Native Housing, pp. 1-3; For a detailed account on the
history of Sobantu Village see H. Peel, 'Sobantu Village: An Administrative History of a
Pietennaritzburg Township, 1924-1959', Unpublished BA Honours Thesis, Pietennaritzburg, University
of Natal, 1987; A Xaba's address to the students of the School of Environment and Development,
University ofNatal, at Sobantu hall, 15 July 1997.
55
R. Gordon, The Place of the Elephant: A History ofPietermaritzburg (Shuter and Shooter, 1981), p.
136.
56 L. TOIT, 'Lamontville - Durban's "Model Village": The Realities of Township Life, 1931-1960', in
Journal ofNatal and Zulu History, Volume X, 1987, pp. 103 and 107.
57 Author's interview with Mrs V. Sikhosana, 7 October 1997; 'The Environmental and Development
Challenges of Sobantu Village', Introduction prepared by the University of Natal's School of
Environment and Development for Coursework examinations, a component of which was a project on
Sobantu.
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1947 it was renamed Sobantu to honour Bishop W. Colenso, on whose fann it was built.
58
However,
one resident of Sobantu claimed that there was a beautiful princess who was the daughter of the chief
of Mpumuza, a section of the Zondi chiefdom, whose name was Sobantu, and it is likely that the
. h h 59name was m er onour.
Sobantu Village was situated within a short walking distance from the white residential area of
Bishopstowe and from the city's central business district (see Map 3). The first houses that were built
were in appalling conditions, and according to one resident:
'The houses were very bad and small. I wonder ~ow whites thought about us that they could
put us in such houses. They were also small. Perhaps it is because they thought we were used
to living in beehive huts (emaqhugwaneni). However, those huts were neat. ,60
R. Gordon points out that originally the facilities were meagre.
61
The women fetched water from
stand taps in the streets and sewerage was collected through a bucket system. The first houses had
floors smeared with cow dung, and the washing facilities were in a communal bathroom. Residents
were allowed to brew four gallons of beer per week on a permit system.
62
Sobantu grew rapidly and
more houses were built after the original 100 houses were finished. In 1954, however, the expansion
of Sobantu was halted. By this time there were about 3000 people living in 545 houses, with more
already under construction.
63
The last houses were completed in 1957, bringing Sobantu's final
complement to 1091.
64
The halting of expansion worsened the housing crisis as the community of
58 S. W. Kirkpatrick, 'Sobantu Planning Initiative' (Final Draft) Prepared for Kw~ulu-Natal Provincial
Administration (May 1994), p. 11; Peel, 'Sobantu Village', in 1. Laband and R. Haswell (eds),
Pietermaritzburg 1838-1988: A new portrait ofan African City (Pietennaritzburg, Shuter and Shooter,
1988), p. 82; A. Xaba and E. Ntshangase's talks during the field examination fot Masters students of the
School of Environment and Development at the Sobantu Community Hall, 15 July 1997.
59 Anton Xaba's address to the students of the School of Environinent and Development, 15 July 1997.
60 Author's interview with Mrs V. Sikhosana, 7 October 1997.
61
Gordon, The Place ofthe Elephant, p. 137.
62 Ibid.
63 Seethal, 'Civic Organisations', p. 203.

































































For many years Sobantu was the only fonnal Afiican residential area within the Pietennaritzburg
borough and, as such, it was controlled by the City Council. 65 As it was pointed out in Chapter 2,
Edendale was not included within the boundary of the Pietennaritzburg municipality. In 1954 the
Minister ofNative Affairs, Dr H. F. Verwoerd, earmarked Sobantu Village for removal, as it was not
sited in accordance with the Group Areas Act.66 It was not only the minister's disapproval that cast a
dark shadow over Sobantu's future; the nearby white property owners of Bishopstowe also opposed
Sobantu's existence. Ironically, it was the ratepayers from the same area who had originally voted for
the establishment of Sobantu at the Bishopstowe site instead of the one at Mason's Mill.67 It should
be pointed out that during the 1950s the control of Afiican townships was increasingly centralised by
the Department of Bantu Affairs in Pretoria. The threat of removal came during the mid-1950s and
made it impossible for any expansion to take place. The future of Sobantu Village looked bleak and in
1956 the Pietennaritzburg City Council reported:
'The City Council is faced with the problem of finding suitable land to establish its future
Native location arising from the refusal of the Minister of Native Affairs to allow the
extension ofthe existing Sobantu Native Village. ,68
The proposal to remove Sobantu was opposed by the City Council as well as the Liberal party and the
Afiican National Congress.
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Sobantu was regarded as a "model village" and was held in high esteem
by the Pietennaritzburg municipality and by different local organisations.
65 Ibid. p. 82.
66 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/4/2/74, Refs. 140/1 and 140/110, Sobantu Village: Proposed removal of
inhabitants, Letter from Town Clerk to the Secretary for Native Affairs, Pretoria, 6 November 1956; Ref.
140/1, Chief Native Commissioner's Memo 28/12£, Second Location for Pietermaritzburg: Points for
discussion on 30.07.57; Native Housing and the future of Sobantu Village', Pietermaritzburg
Corporation Yearbook 1955-1956, p. 32.
67 Peel, 'Sobantu Village' _
68 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/4/2/74, Ref. 140/1, Native Housing at Edendale, Joint Confidential Publication
of the City Council and the Local Health Commission.
69 Peel, 'Sobantu Village', pp. 113-114.
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The Pietermaritzburg City Council was responsible for the administration of Sobantu Village. Two
officials were responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the township, and these were the
superintendent and his assistant. This was the usual phenomenon in other townships. According to
Torr 'The concept of a "model village" or township implies more than a placated and self-contained
community with a permanent stake in an urban area. Control and repression of political activity were
central to the administration ofthe model township.,70 Rex argued:
'In these "locations", a location .superintendent responsible for the local authority ruled with
absolute !luthority aided by his specially recruited municipal police force concerned with
implementing dozens of laws which in his everyday life the migrant, his wife and his children
might break. In the location a continuous programme of pass raids, liquor raids and other
forms of harassment creates a total insecurity which effectively prevents any but completely
clandestine political organisation.' 71
The superintendents of Sobantu Village during the 1950s were Mr T. W. McAllister and from 1958,
his former assistant, Mr S. W. D. St. John Ward, took over. Ward had been a policeman before and
like other 'location superintendents, he had his municipal police force'. His assistant was R. V.
Taylor. These white officials lived with their families in Sobantu. It has been argued that the
relationship of ·the villagers with the municipality as a whole depended largely on the degree of
rapport between the residents and the superintendent, as he was the official with whom they were in
direct and daily contact.
72
The residents of Sobantu used to complain about Ward's attitude.
According to one resident:
'The municipal police were very active and coercive during his time. They used to raid
houses at night looking for people without permits. He also victimised many widows in
Sobantu by ordering them to be evicted from Sobantu or forcing them to register their
houses under their eldest sons. Many women suffered as a result of his actions. He tried to
do the same thing to me after the death of my husband but he failed. He had a personal
vendetta against my husband because he used to challenge him at meetings. He was also
responsible for the taking of many unemployed young men to work in the potato farms. His
70 L. TOff, 'Lamontville - Durban's "model village'" p. 105.
71 1. Rex, "The Compound, in the Reserve and the Urban Location", quoted from TOff, 'Lamontville -
Durban's "model village"', p. 105~ (The Zulu word by which the superintendents were known was
Nsumpa)
72 Peel, 'Sobantu Village', p. 132.
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limited knowledge ofZulu made him utter words which were insulting and derogatory, such
as "azihambe ziyogand', meaning widows must get married to local men if they want to
remain in Sobantu. Ifyou were summoned to his office you knew that you were going to be
humiliated. He made people sit in a row and disclosed a person's private affairs in front of the
73
others.'
It is clear that Ward was a typical superintendent of the time. His duty was to implement municipal
policies and he did' that with vigour and without consideration of the feelings of the people.
According to Xaba, 'Ward was a very cruel person. The residents of Sobantu used .to call him
"Ngqavini", after there was a man who was hanged after killing many women and scaring the whole
ofNatal during the 1950s. Because ofhis cruelty the people of Sobantu named him after that killer' .74
Although Ward was effective in reducing large arrears in rentals, his method of calling tenants to
account at 4 a.m. could not have improved his popularity or that ofthe City Council.
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The body that represente~ the residents of Sobantu was the Sobantu Advisory Board, but it is
questionable if its members enjoyed the support of the residents. During the late 1950s the Board
members were S. T. Khumalo, T. 1. J\.1khize, 1. M. Sikhosana, S. S. Zondi, P. 1. Ngcobo and L. B.
Msimang.
76
According to one resident, members of the Board were sincere about representation and
some of them were very active in the African National Congress.
77
Regrettably the Advisory Board
files in the State Archives do not give biographical information about its members, as this would have
helped in understanding the profiles of the Board members. Mr L. B. Msimang is said to have come
from to Sobantu during the 1950s. He was a senior clerk in the Bantu Administration Department. He
was originally from Edendale and within a year of his stay in Sobantu, he was made a member of the
73 Author's interview with Mrs V. Sikhosana, 7 October 1997. The zi in Ward's statements was
derogatory because he should have used aba. In this case zi could refer to animals. He occasionally used
zi when referring to people instead of aba.
74 Author's interview with Anton Xaba, 28 October 1997.
75 Peel, 'Sobantu Village', p. 133.
76 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/4/2/340, Ref. 198/3, Minutes of the Sobantu Advisory Board Meetings.
77 Author's interview with Mrs V. Sikhosana, 7 October 1997. (She is the wife of the late Mr J. M.
Sikhosana, a Board member during the 1950s.
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Board and that made the people of Sobantu very uncomfortable. Members of the Board used to
stay in office for a long time. It has been argued that this was due to the fact that very few residents
took an interest in choosing their official representatives.79
An opposition group known as the Sobantu Residents Association or Isolomuzi Vigilant Association
had been formed during the 1940s. It consisted of people such as G. Khumalo, A. Mngadi, L.
Mtshali, K. Tlale and H. Dladla. This group accused the Advisory Board of being unaccountable to
the residents. This situation continued during the 1950s and numerous letters were written by the
Association to the City Council complaining about the Advisory Board, which they accused of being
an illegitimate and unrepresentative structure. The prominent figure in the Isolomuzi was Godfrey
Khumalo, who used to write letters to the Town Clerk and the Chief Native Commissioner in which
he complained about poor municipal administration in Sobantu and he saw himself as the "chief' of
Sobantu.
80
He is said to have gone to meetings that were called by the Board at Sobantu Hall to stage
a one- man opposition.
8I
One resident said he remembers "Malan" (Khumalo's nickname) who used
to stand (or the people of Sobantu and fight the corporation. 82 To him Khumalo was a hero who was
voicing the concerns of the people of Sobantu Village. Paul la Hausse, in his analysis of people such
as Elias Khuzwayo, H. C. Sibisi, S. S. Bhengu and V. D. Maillie, included Khumalo as an example of
a picaresque figure, who unscrupulously used missionary education and trickery to manoeuvre within
the apartheid structures.
83
Khumalo' s actions should be viewed against the background of his
78 Ibid.
79 Peel, 'Sobantu Village', pp. 123.
80 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/4/2/340, Refs. 197/21, 197/21(40), 198/02. In one of his letters he even asked
why the Bantu Authorities Act was not applicable to Sobantu Village.
81 Author's interview with Mrs V. Sikhosana, 7 October 1997.
82 Mr E. Ntshangase's address to the students of the School of Environment and Development, Sobantu
Hall, 15 July 1997.
83 P. la Hausse, 'So Who was Elias Khuzwayo?: Nationalism, Collaboration and the Picaresque in Natal',
in P. Bonner, P. Delius and D. Posel (eds), Apartheid's Genesis 1935-1962 (Johannesburg, Ravan,
1993), pp. 211-217.
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vendetta with the Advisory Board from which he had been expelled. Khumalo had been a teacher for
many years. He was also active in the formation of development schemes in Sobantu, some of which
were the Bantu Co-operative Union in 1937, the Bantu Social Services in 1939, the Bantu Workers
Club in 1943 and the Community Sunday services in 1944.
84
In 1946 he was accused of being
unscrupulous after it was found that that he had embezzled some funds for the Ikhwezi Committee of
the Village.85 He was a gifted organiser, a musician and a good public speaker. In 1949 he was
charged with the failure to pay rent, and that led to his ultimate expulsion from Sobantu Village, but
he continued writing letters from Edendale.
86
In 1956 Bang reported that there was 'a strained atmosphere, particularly among the educated and
the semi-educated group of Natives who had taken to reading both European and Native papers
avidly' .87 This atmosphere was related to the material hardships that most young people in Sobantu
were experiencing. These young people found themselves unemployed in an urban area in which they
enjoyed preferential rights of emplOYment. There was also a tendency by Ward to make young people
to pay a rent for staYing at their parents' homes. They had to pay rent or risk being evicted even
though their parents were paYing the rent. 88 To worsen the crisis, which was caused by the shortage
of housing and by unemploYment, economic rents for houses were introduced in December 1956.89
This was a directive from the central government and it forced residents with an income ofmore than
fifteen pounds per month to pay economic rentals. This measure resulted in r.ental increases of up to
84 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/4/2/340, Ref. 197/21, G. F. Khumalo's correspondences to the Chief Native
Commissioner and Town Clerk.
85 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/4/2/340, Ref. 197/21, Letter from Mr W. Chiliza to Town clerk, February
1946.
86 Ibid. Letter from the Secretary for Native Affairs to the ChiefNative Commissioner, 4 November 1952.
87 Quoted in Peel, 'Sobantu Village', p. 126.
88 Author's interview with Mrs V. Sikhosana, 7 October 1997.
89 Peel, 'Sobantu Village', p. 128~ Seethal, 'Civic Organisations', p. 205.
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100% in some cases.
90
While the residents were still astonished by the news of rent increases, the City council announced
that there was going to be a possible increase from 2/- to 8/6d per month on electricity charges.
91
The
electricity tariffwas just one of their numerous problems. Besides the economic rentals, since January
1959 the residents had been facing an increase in the Bantu General Tax.
92
To add to these pressures
the Department of Bantu Education recommended that a levy of 2/- per family be paid for buildings
to cover the rent for the school buildings.
93
Bang was, however, reluctant to implement this measure
as the relatively high tension and unemploYment in the Village was unsettling him. He argued that this
levy was going to constitute an added burden and recommended that its introduction be delayed. 94
These increased financial demands were proving to be too heavy for a community that was already
facing overcrowding and unemplOYment. It would appear that the local Bantu Administration
Department was sensitive to this tension, for early in August 1959 Bang recommended to the City
Council that the electricity tariffs and school levy be suspended for another year on the ground that
'unemplOYment is rife and for other reasons there is a feeling of tension. The introduction of
additional charges at this moment is therefore inadvisable' .95 To this motion the Council concurred,
but these news did not reach the Sobantu residents early enough to avert the riots which occurred in
the middle of August. According to Seethal 'it was these increases, in conjunction with other
grievances and events, which precipitated a riot in Sobantu from 14-16 August 1959, with damage
90 Seethal, 'Civic Organisations', p. 205.
91 Peel, 'Sobantu Village', p. 130; NAD, TC Files, NAC Minutes Minute Book 25 11 August 1959
92 ' , .
Peel, 'Sobantu Village', p. 130.
:: NAD, TC Files, NAC Minutes, Minute Book 25,11 August 1959; Peel, 'Sobantu Village', p. 131.
NAD, TC Files, Minute Book 25, 11 August 1959.
95 Ibid.
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estimated at 23 000 pounds' .96
"A distressing shock to all of US,,97
On Saturday 15 August an outbreak of violence occurred at Sobantu Village. The riots in Sobantu
occurred a day after the women's demonstrations in the city's Retief Street beerhall on Friday.
Although these riots were related to the tense atmosphere, which had prevailed in Pietermaritzburg
since the women's demonstrations on the previous day, they had some distinctive features. The issue
of how and why the riots took place at Sobantu will be explored. Aspects such as the targets
identified by the crowd are also worthy of analysis. The question arises whether this was a
spontaneous event or a carefully planned political action. The behaviour of the crowd during the
incident showed that the event was influenced by what was taking place in others places such as Cato
Manor. The composition of the participants in this incident also makes it different from the previous
protest actions in the city in which crowds were predominantly composed of women from different
areas.
It has been difficult to put together a comprehensive narrative about how the riots in Sobantu were
organised. It seems it was something that was organised by a group ofyoung people of Sobantu. One
interviewee pointed out that she·does not know how the whole thing was organised but that it seemed
to have been well planned.98 Anton Xaba, who argued that he was mobilising tire youth at Sobantu at
the time, pointed out that meetings had been taking place at Sobantu where young 'militant' people
were voicing their dissatisfaction and frustrations. He pointed out that there was a significant ANC
membership in Sobantu during the 1950s. According to him 'There was been a meeting on Saturday
96 Seethal, 'Civic Organisations', p. 205.
97 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref. 199/214, Letter from the Pietermaritzburg Bantu Urban School
Board to Town Clerk, 26 August 1959.
98 Author's interview with Mrs V. Sikhosana, 7 October 1997.
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15 August at which the youth resolved to boyco : municipal facilities. The municipality had prohibited
the youth of Sobantu from using the community hall for their meetings but opened it for the films' .99
The situation was tense during the day. You, gsters from Sobantu were at a soccer match at
Fitzsimons ground. The police came and it seemed they were looking for someone but they left
without saYing anything. On the same afternoon the riots erupted in Sobantu.
10o
Xaba pointed out
that he did not participate in the riot activities but he stood as an observer. He pointed out that he
was later imprisoned because the police suspected that he was involved in the riotS.
101
The story of
what happened is complicated and I have made use of oral accounts, newspapers and archival records
in order to attempt to tell this story.
It was reported that on Saturday afternoon the overseer at the Ohrtmann Road beer hall, which was
adjacent to Sobantu, was assaulted by 'a band of armed people', when he refused to let them in with
their weapons. 102 N. H. Nicholson was later taken to hospital with lacerations to his scalp and chin.
This incident was related to the Sobantu revolt because, according to Anton Xaba, 'The police who
came to the plaYing ground were looking for the man who had beaten the old white man who used to
sell admission tickets at the beerhall. That person was Emanuel Kunene and his nickname was
uMahlomb 'ohlanya (the madman's shoulders)' .103 The carrying of sticks can be viewed as an
intention to attack, but the carrying of sticks was also part of what Afiican men, particularly in the
rural areas, did. However, the beating ofNicholson reflected the atmosphere that was prevalent at the
time. This relatively minor incident was likely to be related to the attack on the beerhalls. Bang viewed
this event as mere robbery because the attackers took some of the money when it was spilt on the
99 Author's interview with Anton Xaba, 28 October 1997.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Natal Witness, 17 August 1959~ llanga, 22. August 1959; NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref.
199/214, Bang's report to TC.
103 Author's interview with Anton Xaba, 28 October 1997.
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floor. 104 However, this was not an isolated incident in view ofwhat occurred subsequently.
Bang was concerned about the turbulent atmosphere, which had surfaced in Pietermaritzburg.
Suspecting that corporation institutions such as beerhalls were in danger of being attacked, he spent
the whole day patrolling them. To add to his anciety, when he was driving past the bus terminus at
Sobantu Village at 6 p.m., he
'Noticed a crowd of young people asselnbled there. As I drove past they shouted "Afrika!
Mayibuye iAfrika! Asinifuni! (Come Back Africa! We don't want you!) and gave the thumbs
up signal of the ANC. I then warned the superintendent that the atmosphere was
unwholesome and also reported to the police' .105
The incident shows that there was an advanced level of political consciousness in the village. The
chanting of slogans suggests that the spirit of resistance had found fertile ground among the local
youth. It has been argued that there was a general dissatisfaction among the young people of Sobantu
with Bantu Education.
106
The unemployed youths were also becoming the victims of municipal
regulations.
The drama that ensued after Bang had seen the young people shocked the administrators and other
interested groups who viewed Sobantu as a 'mod.el village'. According to Anton Xaba it began when
the youth stoned a municipal bus. He points out that 'I was walking up to the northern part of the
township after the meeting where we resolved to boycott municipal facilities when I heard the noise.
There was a municipal bus, which was coming to Sobantu. When it entered th~ township crowds of
youths started stoning it. The driver turned the bus and he drove back to town. There was a long
queue of people wanting to go to their respective areas having been to Sobantu to visit during the
I04 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref 199/214 Bculgto TC.
105 Ibid.
106 Author's interview with Mrs V. Sikhosana, 7 October 1997.
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day. ,107 The official report from Bang and the new-spapers' reports do not mention the stoning of a
bus. Bang points out that trouble started when Constable de Kock's police van was stoned at the bus
stop at 6.30 p.m., after he had come to the village allegedly to make an arrest despite being warned of
the intensity ofthe situation. Ward, the village Superintendent, arrived with his township police when
he heard commotion. He approached from the eastern side of the Sobantu hall, only to be met by a
hail ofstones. Ward was forced to retreat to the offices and by then Constable de Kock had got to the
Superintendent's house. According to Bang's report, De Kock warned Ward to evacuate the
European women-and children but, 'as stones were falling on the roof and driveway, it was necessary
to fire two shots into the air in order to get his car.' 108 It was not only Ward's family that had to be
evacuated, there was also the family ofR. V. Taylor, who was Assistant Superintendent at Sobantu.
According to Bang's account:
'Mr Taylor came to take over while Mr Ward took the families away. He then took
some men with him and proceeded towards the mob, which listened to him for
awhile, but resumed stone throwinfi so he and his men were obliged to retreat. The
police then came in and took over.' 09
Meanwhile the road near the Ohrtmann Road beer hall was barricaded and cars passing there were
.pelted with stones. The Village shopping centre wo.s then attacked by a group of Africans, and police
reinforcements arrived. HO This was what allegedly provoked the police, who were led by Major O.
Kjelvei, to use their revolvers to defend themselve,;. They allegedly fired at the feet of the advancing
mob, aiming at leaders who were at the front. III It should be taken into consideration that Bang was
not an eyewitness, but reported what he had been told by the police and by Ward, as he had left
Sobantu before the flare-up ofviolence. The crowd used sticks, stones and bricks to fight the police.
107 Author's interview with Anton Xaba, 28 October 1997.
108 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref. 199/214, Bano· to TC.
I® ~
NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref. 199/214, Bang to TC.
110 Peel, 'Sobantu Village', p. 136.
III NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref. 199/214, Bang's report to TC.
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The official sources estimated the crowd to be about 300 men and a few women. During this
pandemonium two Africans were shot dead. It vias reported in the Witness that the two men who
were killed were 'well-known agitators' and that they led the crowd, which was stoning the police
and the Village officials.
112
The use of the word 'agitators' implies that people were just stirred up to
revolt and they did not share the sentiments of the leaders of the crowd. There were conflicting
opinions about who actually killed these two people. Africans argued that Ward fired the two fatal
shots. One interviewee pointed out that 'The young people wanted to kill Ward and he ran to his
house and began to shoot. I did not see him but I was told that he was the one who was shooting at
the crowd. He climbed on the wall adjacent to his house and fired from there.' 113 The gist of the
matter was that two Africans, George Radebe and Gardon Ndlovu, died ofgunshot wounds.
114
They
were allegedly not the 'agitators' as officials argued. One ofmy infonnants argued:
'They were not even part of the rioting crowd. Mr Ndlovu was a teacher and he used to be
always drunk during weekends. On that day he wanted to go and buy cigarettes. He was told
that the situation was tense but he did not listen and that was how he got killed while walking
up the road. The other one was mentally retarded and I think either Ward or the police were
shooting indiscriminately' .115
Surely these two did not fit the agitator description of the authorities and the police. It is interesting
how sources from different backgrounds viewed and interpreted this tragic incident.
In his report on the events, Bang rejected the idea that Ward shot into the crowd, saying 'This was
not possible as there was a 2,5 metre high wall separating the mob from his-house. In any case the
two Natives who were killed were shot while he was evacuating Mrs Ward and Mrs Taylor and ~heir
families and the police are in possession of the full facts relating to their deaths.,116 According to the
112 Peel, 'Sobantu Village', p. 136; The Natal Witness, 17 August 1959.
113 Author's interview with Mrs V. Skhosana, 7 October 1997.
114 UmAfrika, 22 August 1959.
115 Author's interview with Mrs V. Sikhosana, 7 October 1997.
116 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref 199/214, Bang's report to TC.
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Natal Witness,
'Rocks started landing on the roof of the Ward family as they were getting ready for bed. The
rocks came from the direction of the Sobantu Hall. Two South African policemen in a van
arrived and advised Mr St John Ward to evacuate his family. He switched off the light in his
home and took his wife and children to the front and then went into the yard to fetch his car.
He and the two policemen fired shots into the air that caused the mob to disperse. He took
out his car and drove his family to Topham Road police station, where they were still staying
. Gafu d hi .. .:~ d ,117WIth sergeant eyan s Wile yester ay.
According to newspapers the initial police fire di spersed -the crowd, and people ran towards the
schools. The police suspected that there was a pre-arranged plan when they saw the crowd using cans
ofwhat appeared to be paraffin or petrol to ignite the school buildings.
118
Members of the crowd had
wanted to bum Ward's house. When they failed to do that they turned to other nearby symbols of
Bantu Education and municipal oppression. 119 According to Ilanga all three schools were set alight.
In the Russell Infants School the water tap at the kitchen was left open from Saturday to Monday,
and on the wall was written "Mayibuye iAfrika". 120 According to Mrs Sikhosana, who was a teacher,
her classroom was left untouched and one boy stood on the door and said no one was going to bum
Mam' Sikhosana's classroom. 121 Even though the Pietermaritzburg Fire Depart~ent was called, the
apparently tumultuous situation impeded them from continuing with their work so they ended up
watching helplessly as the buildings were razed. The Witness reported:
'At the primary school a school office was fired first, then the staff room, two lobbies and six
classrooms. In addition, windows in the buildings were damaged, doors broken a typewriter
burnt and crunched underfoot, and books and records hurled in an untidy heap to feed the
flames. Blackboards were ripped from the walls and tossed on to the floor. In one classroom
the hand-twisted iron roofing is hanging down amid the other debris; in another a film
projector is lying still in its case but irreparably damaged. ,122
To a certain extent this incident of the burning of the school could be seen as a result of people's
117 Natal Witness, 17 August 1959.
118 Natal Witness, 17 August 1959.
119 Author's interview with Mrs V. Skhosana 7 Octo er 1997.
120 '
Ilanga, 22 August 1959.
121 Author's interview with Mrs V. Sikhosana 7 October 1997.
122 '
Natal Witness, 19 August 1959.
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frustration with Bantu Education. The schools fell under the Department of Bantu Education, which
during the 1950s had centralised the control of Afiican education. 123 It was the same department that
had recently proposed a levy of 2/- on the resident~ of Sobantu. There is a strong likelihood that the
destruction ofthe schools was because oftheir being perceived as government property.
In a matter of a few hours Sobantu's image as a 'model village' was tarnished. The Sobantu riots
erupted unexpectedly and ended quickly and it VIas left to the authorities and different interested
parties to speculate about the reasons for the revolts. The crowds had formed, selected their targets
and swiftly executed their plans and then dispersed, to the dismay of the police and the authorities
who were totally unprepared for this kind of violer ce. As the memorandum from the Sobantu Village
Advisory Board to the Mayor aptly put it:
'The rioting was swift and unexpected. The South Afiican police were summoned
immediately and took over control and 1 residents were ordered to remain in their houses
with lights switched off Anybody who ignored this directive was in danger of being shot as a
rioter. The Advisory Board, & we dare say, all residents of Village were therefore helpless in
that situation. It is only a commission ofInquiry which could reveal why the rioters were able
to do so mush destruction while the Police were in control ofthe Area. ,124
The authorities did not have much to do by way of prosecution and after the riots there was a lot of
finger pointing. The damage done to the property as a result of the riots became the main concern of
the authorities and different organisations.
Bang pointed out that a feature of the rioting at Sobantu Village was that it was carried out almost
entirely by youths, many of whom were obviously schoolchildren. Only a few older men and women
took part. The preponderance of youngsters in the crowd can be viewed as a legacy of a situation
123 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref.199/214, Letter from Town Clerk to the Secretary for Bantu
Education, Pretoria, 6 September 1959.
124 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref. 199/214, Memorandum Submitted to the Mayor of
Pieterrnaritzburg by the Sobantu Village Advisory Bard.
85
where those who had just finished schooling vv'ere finding themselves joining the ranks of the
unemployed. 125 Finding themselves unemployed in a situation where they had to support their families
was a cause for bitterness. One study has revealed that political consciousness was high among the
youth of the township.126 Peel mentions the case of a retired teacher she interviewed, who
remembered noticing the prevalence of pictures of the Ghanaian nationalist Kwame Nkrumah, and of
the Afiican continent, on the exercise books ofpupils. 127 Pupils were showing their identification with
the liberation struggles that were taking place in Afiica, and with the A£ncan continent, which was
still largely under colonial rule. Nkrumah, the nev\! leader of independent Ghana from 1957, was also
significant in the sense that he epitomised Afiica's ability to eradicate foreign domination.
The violent incident at Sobantu took place in a community that was under socio-economic stress. As
has been pointed out above, the people of Sobcmtu were uncertain about their position during the
1950s as there was a threat of removal. There was also a serious housing shortage and an increase in
rentals. Unlike the other events, which have been studied in this chapter, and which were led
predominantly by women, this one did not focus on gender-related issues. In the Sobantu case,
young men seemed to have formed a substantial majority. The people of Sobantu were prevented by
officials from holding political meetings, but many often went to Edendale to attend ANC meetings
on Sundays.128 Xaba pointed out that he had built a large ANC membership in Sobantu even though
some people were still afraid of joining the A1'~C. 129 Mrs Sikhosana also pomted out that Archie
Gumede and Moses Mabhida were very active in political mobilisation in Sobantu. She argued that,
however, there were very few people who participated in resistance politics. There were some
125 Corporation Yearbook 1958-1959, p. 129.
126 Peel, 'Sobantu Village', pp. 125-126.
127 Ibid. p. 126.
128 Ibid, pp. 125 and 126.
129 Author's interview with Anton Xaba, 28 October 1997.
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families that were active politically and there was no significant ANC membership. 130
These riots shattered the city administrators' c1ainlS to have an excellent record on race relations. The
letter from the Town Clerk to the Secretary for Bantu Education illustrates this when he said: 'As
race relations have always been so good in Pietennaritzburg it was rather surprising that the
disorderly behaviour occurred at Sobantu Village on 15 August 1959.,131 It was the last thing that the
local authorities could have expected to happen in Sobantu. The crowd had focused its attention on
Corporation property, breaking anything that ~Tas possible to break. Houses belonging to several
municipal police were stoned.
132
This destruction was not only directed at properties, but also at
individuals who were seen to be associated with the municipality. Lawrence Msimang, a member of
the Advisory Board, narrowly escaped when the mob came to attack his house and he only survived
by hiding in the kitchen with his wife; having taken the children to his relative after hearing rumours of
the attack. 133 One municipal policeman was also hurt.
Different people and organisations expressed their dismay at what had occurred during the weekend.
The ANC and the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) issued a press statement in which they denounced the
use of violence but pointed out that violence wa.s provoked by the action of the municipal police. 134
Dr Motala and Archie Gumede issued a statement expressing their deep regret about the events of
Friday and Saturday. The Liberal Party (LP) also expressed its regret at the- destruction which had
130 Author's interview with Mrs V. Sikhosana, 7 O(:;tober 1997.
131 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref. 199/214, Letter from Town Clerk to the Secretary for Bantu
Education, 6 September 1959.
132 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref. 199/214, Bang to TC~ Corporation Yearbook 1959-1960 p. 139.
133 ' ,
UmAfrika, 22 August 1959; NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref. 199/214, Bang's report to TC~
Author's interview with Mrs V. Sikhosana, 7 Octo er 1997.
134 Natal Witness, 17 August 1959; See also NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref 199/214 Letter from NIC to
Mayor,5 October 1959.
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occurred at Sobantu and asked tor a commission ofenquiry to be set up. 135 However, the commission
of inquiry was never instituted. The Mayor, C. B. Downes, also expressed his disappointment at what
had happened at Sobantu Village. In line with the official view of the time, he argued that 'it was just
a minority of hooligans who were responsible t::>r this not the proper citizens of Sobantu' 136 Other
organisations also sent their letters to the TOVln Clerk to express their sympathy with the Bantu
Administration Department. 137
The Mayor's view was echoed by some Afiican organisations such as the Urban Bantu School Board,
which pointed out that,
'Sobantu Village has for many years enjoyed the reputation of being one of the model Bantu
Villages in South Africa. It has been a beautiful, loyal and quiet village. The events of last
weekend came as a distressing shock to all of us. We have no doubt that the ruins of the fine
buildings, as they now stand, have convinced everyone of the futility of violence and rioting.
We feel that such things will not happen again in Sobantu.' 138
In his report D. N. Bang also echoed the same sentiments when he said,
'It is my opinion that the local native has had little to do with what has taken place. I am
finnly of the opinion that the A. N. C. have instigated a few local firebrands to cause trouble,
and the sooner the A. N. C. gets banned the better. Unfortunately the masses are in sympathy
with any movement which has as its ultimate aim the removal of European control, so one
cannot expect much active support frOIlI them in suppressing the radical element. Moreover,
they are afraid of reprisals. An instance i~: the case ofMr L. B. Msimang, who, for the sake of
his own safety, has resigned from the Village Advisory Board. ,139
Bang's report seems to suggest that there was substantial ANC support in the village. He even
pointed out that when he visited Sobantu on ~10nday he found that 'Wherever I went those who
135 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref. 199/214, utter from Liberal Party to Mayor, 24 August 1959.
136 Natal Witness, 17 August 1959; Ilanga, 22 August 1959.
137 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref. 199/214: Letters from: African Welfare Society to Mayor, 25th
August 1959: Natal African Teachers Union to the Mayor, 25th August 1959; Local Health Commission to
Mayor, 11 September 1959.
138 NAD, TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref. 199/214, Letter from the Urban Bantu School Board to Town
Clerk, 26 August 1959.
139 NAD. TC Files, Vol. 4/5/551, Ref. 199/214 Bang to TC.
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greeted me gave the ANC's thumb up signal.,14o The ANC was to a certain extent involved in the
Sobantu riots, although official documents newspapers and oral sources cannot provide information
to strengthen this point. Oral evidence suggests that the ANC was behind the riots in Sobantu and
that dissatisfaction about Ward and the Bantu Education system made the situation more fertile for
the revolt.
Godfrey Khumalo, who had been an ardent foe ofboth the Bantu Administration Department and the
Sobantu Advisory Board since the 1940s, also sent his letters with some recommendations about
what to do to avert riots in the future. Unlike many others he did not see the Sobantu revolt as the
work of a few irresponsible hooligans. He arguec that municipal policies were responsible for the
riots. In one ofhis letters he argued that 'The root ~ause is municipal oppression. The City Council is
to blame for allowing it to destroy the children of Afiica... The riots are the flowers of seed planted




The detennination to sabotage what was seen as corporation property continued after the Sobantu
riots of Saturday 15 August. At Edendale on Sunday an Indian garage owner, Dookran, foiled an
attempt to burn bus which belonged to the corporation. 142 On Monday there was an attempt, by what
the Witness called 'Native trouble makers', to burn the Mthethomusha School, which is also at
Edendale. The police who were patrolling nearby ~Iaw the fire and they put it down with the help of
some members of the public.
143
The news of the events at Sobantu probably spread to the other
townships of Pietermaritzburg. Anton Xaba pointed out that that he had started ANC branches in
140 Peel, 'Sabantu Village', p. 141.
141 NAD, TC Files, Va!. 4/4/2/340, Ref. 197/21, Letter G. F. Kumalo to Town Clerk, 19 August 1959.
142 Natal Witness, 17 August 1959~ UmAlfrika, 22 August 1959' llanga 22 August 1959
143 " .
Natal Witness, 18 August 1959.
89
Machibisa and kwaPata. 144 In the afternoon police went to the Havelock Road area when 'native'
women linked arms and blocked the roads against the buses travelling to and from the bus stops. 145
One can argue that these women were doing th s because this area was adjacent to the beerhall. A
deputation ofwomen claiming to be leaders of the Friday demonstration came to see Bang about their
grievances. Their demands included a pound-a-day increase in wages for their menfolk, the relaxation
of influx control so that their men could come to the city freely and obtain work, and they also
demanded the reduction of rent at Sobantu Village.
146
The same woman who had been a
spokesperson at Edendale on Friday led these ~'Omen. Interestingly, the demand for wage increases
was in line with the South African Congress of Trade Union's (SACTU) campaign for a living
147
wage.
Political events such as meetings and other forrns of protest continued in the city after the above-
mentioned incidents. Bang was becoming perturbed about what was taking place. The Africans that
he thought he understood clearly for many years were changing before his eyes. In his annual report
for 1959 he argued,
'It is regretted that the unrest, which occurred at Sobantu during the last corporate year,
continued on a modified scale this year. From time to time meetings were held by certain
Bantu Organisations arid trade union leaders, preceded by the circulation of pamphlets, and
these meetings had an unsettling effect on the Bantu population. Beer halls and markets were
boycotted and women armed with sticks actually raided the beer halls·on certain occasions.
A strange phenomenon was noticeable in that the men offered no resistance. They were in
fact, so terrified that they fled in a panic and did not return for days. ,148
The above quotation suggests that trade unions were becoming active in the politics of resistance in
Pietennaritzburg. What also seems to have perplexed Bang was the gender dimension involved in
144 Author's interview with Anton Xaba, 28 Octobe:r 1997.
145 Natal Witness, 18 August 1959.
146 Natal Witness, 18 August 1959.
147 Luckhardt and Wall, Organize or Starve, p. 244.
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beerhall attacks. The fact that men offered no resistance was astonishing for him. Women were taking
the men's role of canying sticks and using them against men. Women were using male symbolism to
assert their position in the society.
Conclusion
This chapter sought to show that the bone of contention during the 1959 riots in Pietennaritzburg
was not only th~ brewing of traditional beer but al,)o a variety of other policies which African people
saw as causing their poverty. This study has also shown that there was a merger of urban and rural
issues in which women from the rural areas banded together with other local women to fight against
government policies which affected them. The Pietennaritzburg incident should be viewed against the
background ofwidespread unrest that was taking place in the urban and rural areas of Natal. During
the weekend of the Pietennaritzburg unrest there were also other crowd actions led by women in
other areas such as Estcourt, Harding, Ixopo, MJoi River, Hibberdene, Dweshula and many other
areas. The Pietennaritzburg events of both Friday and Saturday seem to have followed a certain
pattern. This suggests that there was organisation prior to their occurrence. One can argue that the
Friday incident involved mass mobilisation against broader issues of influx control, low wages and the
beer brewing. It was not only about issues that affi~cted women only but sometimes women spoke on
behalfoftheir menfolk.
These local incidents should not be seen as separate but as related to each other because it is likely
that some of the people who had participated in the Friday incident or had seen it in town, were
incited to start a revolt at the village. However, their targets and the kinds of masses or crowds were
different. The beerhall crowd incident was largely dominated by women while the Sobantu one
148 Co:poration Yearbook, 1959-1960., p. 32.
consisted of people of different age groups and sexes even though the youth were reported to be in
the majority. One can also argue that these events were not just actions of mobs bent on destruction
because confrontation and other forms of violence seemed to have been provoked by the way the
police reacted to the situation. Resistance crowds came together for a purpose to oppose apartheid
policies. They confronted the police who were perceived as the embodiment of apartheid machinery
and oppressive policies against African people.
There is a strong probability that there were lin'[(S between the women's demonstration and the
outbreak of violence in Sobantu Village of Saturday 15 August. This violence shocked the Bantu
Administration Department, which did not expect 3uch a revolt to occur in the village, which had all
along been regarded as a "model village". The City Council and the BAD attributed Sobantu's
incident to hooligans. They could not imagine that the residents of Sobantu, who had a reputation for
good behaviour, could express their anger and fiustration in that manner.
Sobantu was a community under extreme socio··economic stress with such problems as housing
shortages, increases in rentals, unemployment and overcrowding. From 1954 there was a threat of
removal under the Group Areas Act of 1950. At the same time there was an increase in the rate of
unemployment among the youth in the Village. Anti-apartheid resistance was also making its impact
in Sobantu, as there was a substantial support for the ANC. It seems that what ignited the revolts in
Sobantu were the discontent about Mr Ward, who was the Village superintendent, and among the
youth, Bantu Education, which had just been implemented. There were also other locally related
reasons, which led to the outbreak of violence in the Village. It seems also that the Saturday incident
was carefully planned, as there was a group of youth that shouted resistance slogans. Unlike the
women's demonstrations, which were led predominantly by women, the Sobantu crowd was
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heterogeneous, although the young males formed a large proportion. The Sobantu incident could
therefore be viewed as both a reaction to the local problems, as well as a contribution to the
countrywide anti-apartheid popular struggles, which were taking place at the time. Against this
background of resistance crowds and the heightening of anti-apartheid politics in Pietennaritzburg, I
will move on to the next chapter to investigate briefly the period from the 1960s to the early 1980s.
CHAPTER FIVE
Pietermaritzburg from the 1960 to the early 1980s: An Overview
of Socio-Economic and Political (:ontexts
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a broad socio-economic and political overview of
Pietermaritzburg from the 1960s to the early 1980s. This will be done in order to set the scene for
the two case studies of the 1980s. Although the main focus of the thesis is on the two periods of
the 1950s and the 1980s, it is vital to explore the: 1960s and the 1970s. Leaving out this period will
create a gap and therefore make it difficult to link the eras of struggle. It is important for the
purpose of this study to show a transition from the Sobantu riots of 1959 to other struggles that
occurred during the 1980s. This periodisation might not be relevant for Pietermaritzburg but it has
been adopted against the background of academIc and political claims that the 1960s were a period
ofa lull while mass mobilisation began to re-emerge during the 1970s. The exploration ofthe 1960s
and 1970s will also enable us to discern the changes that occurred in the socio-economic and
political contexts, thus laying the basis for the re5.istance ofthe 1980s. Some studies have, however,
argued that relative quiescence did not mean the absence of resistance but that covert strategies
were being utilised. 1 Sambureni argued that there was a lot of resistance activity by the workers
during the 1960s, and points out that this decade has been 'for along time, erroneously conceived
as an era of silence and defeat,.2 Despite these claims, which tend to pr~~ent a trajectory of
resistance and mass mobilisation, it seems that juring the 1960s and early 1970s there were few
possibilities for overt resistance.
J 1. Seekings, 'Powerlessness and Politics: Quiescence and Protest in PWV Townships, c 1973-1985',
seminar paper in The Societies ofSouthern Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Volume 16,
!1niversity ofLondon, Institute ofCommonwealth Studies, October 1988 - June 1989, p. 84.
- N. Sambureni, 'Working in the Apartheid City: Worker Struggles in Durban, 1959-1979',
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Furthennore, this chapter seeks to examine the politics of the period after the 1961 stay-at-home
and take this overview to the early 1980s, up ':0 the formation of the United Democratic Front
(UDF) in 1983. The aim is to make a broad overview without making an in-depth account of any
particular event of mass mobilisation, which took place during this period. There will be a broad
investigation of the socio-economic and political situation of Pietennaritzburg with the aim of
ascertaining how that shaped the context for the popular struggles of the 1980s. The intention is
not to write a detailed history of the struggle during the 1960s to the 1970s, but to investigate,
using some national incidents of mobilisatior~ whether there was any mass mobilisation in
Pietennaritzburg during this time. The analysis \\rill be done against the background ofthe generally
low level of political mobilisation in Pietennaritzburg during the so-called 'decade of defiance' in
the 1950s. Although emphasis will be on Pietemlaritzburg's local and peculiar conditions, these will
be put into the broader perspective ofthe national resistance struggles. The following overview will
explore the socio-economic and political context of the 1960s and the 1970s in order to place
Pietennaritzburg within a national context.
The national socio-economic and political context: 1960s to early 1980s
The 1960s up to the early 1970s have been generally referred to as an era of economic boom.
3
This
economic prosperity resulted in the increase in the demand for black labour in the urban
industrialised areas. 4 However, _the impact and the nature of that econonric growth have been
subject to debate. Worden points out that this was a period ofunprecedented economic growth for
South Afiica. 5 He illustrates this by pointing out that the GNP grew by 5% per annum and the
Unpublished MA Thesis, Durban, University ofNatal, 1994), p.6.
3 L. M. Thompson, A History ofSouth Africa (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990), p. 221.
4
CII~ South Africa in the 1980s - State ofEmergency (London, Catholic Institute of Intemational
Research, 1986), p. 15.
5 N. Worden, The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Segregation and Apartheid (Oxford,
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levels of black unemployment during the 1960s were relatively low.
6
Baskin, a trade unionist,
argues that the economic boom led to the worsening of the conditions of the African people and
controls became tighter.7 The manufacturing sector was expanded as foreign investors began to
regain confidence in the South African government after the Sharpeville massacre of 1960.
The economic stability and state oppression result<::d in the comparative lack of oppositional politics
during the 1960s.:. There was no mass mobilisation that could take place due to the fact that 'with
economic boom, people seemed to be satisfied and it was difficult to explain to people the
weaknesses of the government.'
8 It has been argued that the lack of overt resistance during the
1960s on the scale of previous years should not be seen as a sign of total quiescence because less
visible developments occurred which provided a crucial background to the re-emergence of overt
. b 9protest ill su sequent years.
The 1960s were difficult years for anti-apartheid organisations because the African National
Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) had been banned in 1960 after the Sharpeville
massacre. Leaders of both organisations were either imprisoned or forced into exile. Both
organisations were forced to operate from underground, and the possibility of mobilising the
masses was made remote. They could no longer organise any campaigns such as strikes, stayaways
and protest marches, which had been the order of the day during the 1950s. These banned
organisations embarked on anned struggle. This :militarisation of the struggle was going to be a
significant feature of South African politics and it was to influence the shape of political
Blackwell, 1994), p. 114.
6 Ibid.
s 7 1. Bas~ Strik!ng B~ck: A History ofCosatu (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1991), p. 16.
Author s mtervIew WIth John Aitchison 5 November 1997
9 . ' .
Word~ The Making ofModern South Africa, p. 114.
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developments up to the early 1990s. As a result both the ANC and the PAC had to be completely
reorganised to meet the challenges of underground work and a more brutally repressive state. 10
This repression left a political vacuum in anti-apartheid struggles in South Afiica, as there was no
longer any internal organisation that could mobilise the masses. The government was now more
determined to crush extra-parliamentary political opposition. The Rivonia Trial and the
government's clampdown on uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) activities was evidence ofthis.
From the mid-1960s the government vociferously implemented its policy of Bantustans which
helped to deflect opposition. The political vacuum, which had been caused by the banning of the
ANC and the PAC earlier in the decade, was partially filled by the emergence of a new layer of
organisations from the late 1960s. New political and student organisations, which adhered to the
philosophy of 'black consciousness', emerged. They made a notable contribution to conscientising
black people, particularly the youth, and in encouraging defiance of oppression and denunciation of
apartheid institutions even though they did not have the significant mass following that the ANC
had at the end of the 1950s.
11
One of the famous leaders of the Black Consciousness Movement
(BCM) was Steve Biko, a student at the University of Natal's Medical School, who was to later
tragically die at the hands of the security police on 12 September 1977. From the beginning of the
1970s new organisations began to enter the political scene. This period also saw the proliferation of
Youth Clubs which were mostly inter-denominational and concentrated on religious and cultural
activities such as drama and poetry in order to conscientise black people about oppression. 12
10 Y. Muthien, 'Protest and Resistance in Cape Towu, 1939-1965', in R. Cohen, Y. Muthien and A. Zegeye
(eds), Repression and Resistance: Insider Accounts (ifApartheid (London, Hans Zell, 1990, p. 82.
11 IDAP, Apartheid: The Facts (London, International Defence and Aid Fund, 1991), p. 103; A. 1. Jeffery,
The Natal Story: 16 Years ofConflict (Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1997), pp.
26-27.
12 1. Seekings, Heroes or Villains?: Youth Politics in the 1980s (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1993), pp. 22-24~
A. Brooks and 1. Brickhill. Whirlwind Before the Storm: The Origins and Development a/the Uprising in
The early 1970s also saw the intensification of resistance against apartheid. While this political
reawakening was going on, the' economy, which had been experiencing significant growth during
the 1960s, entered into a crisis. The economic boom of the 1960s began to dwindle, as it was
followed by a sharp recession during the early 1970s. From the late 1960s there was an alarming
rate of unemploYment in the towns as more and rrlore people had come in search of jobs. 13 It was
no co-incidence that it was around this time that worker militancy increased. The economic growth
had its unplanned consequences of creating the conditions for a new wave of worker resistance and
student militancy when that growth declined. In January 1973 strikes involving thousands of
workers began in Durban and spread to other parts of the countryl4. Socio-economic fiustrations
were also worsened in black communities by Bantu Education. Another feature of this period was
the rising unemploYment in the urban areas, which coincided with a rapid increase in the number of
Africans in secondary schools, and in the number of matriculants. 15 Increasing numbers of educated
people were corning out of school only to find that there was unemploYment due to recession and
economic problems. In June 1976 a wave of student revolts started in Soweto and spread to other
parts ofthe country, although the pattern of protest and defiance varied from region to region.
Subsequently, mobilisation continued and exiled political organisations were boosted by the
Soweto revolts when many youths fled the country to join the banned organisations.
16
The student
revolts marked a watershed in South African histo~. On the labour side new trade unions began to
be formed at the same time as student militancy was increasing. According to McShane the
Soweto and the Rest ofSouth Africafrom June to December 1976, (London., International Defence and Aid
.Fund for Southern Africa, 1980), p. 80.
13 CIIR, South Africa in the 1980s, p. 15.
14 For a detailed account of the 1973 strikes see G. P. Mare, The Durban Strikes, 1973: ''Human Beings
with Souls" (Johannesburg, Ravan., 1976).
15
16 1. Kane-Bennan., Soweto: Black Revolt, White Reaction (Johannesburg, Ravan., 1978), p. 49.
Jeffery, The Natal Story, p. 30.
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presence of some of the SACTU activists during the 1970s helped in keeping the memory of
SACTU alive during the period of the revival of union activity.17 One example of this was the
formation ofthe Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) in 1979.
During the late 1970s grassroots organisations mushroomed and these organised successful
boycotts, protest marches, and demonstrations, establishing a solid basis for the fierce resistance of
the 1980s. 18 Civic, youth and student organisations were formed in communities. With the
advantage ofhindsight it can be said that by 1980 1he building blocks for an unprecedented surge of
bl~ck political opposition were in place. 19 Betweer 1979 and 1983, with the growth of community-
based organisations, there were widespread, su:;tained and, in many cases, intense campaigns
against specific manifestations ofapartheid.
Another noticeable feature of the political mobilisation of the early 1980s was the frequent
prominence of women, reflecting their involvernent in the underlying grievances of rent and
houses.2o They played an active and often leading role in the community struggles over rents, bus
fares, housing and education as well as in the political campaigns. They were closely associated
with the emerging civic structures as well as with organising around the issues specifically affecting
women in the communities.
21
The identification of the apartheid system as a common cause of the
different problems was expressed with increasing clarity, and specific local struggles were
17
D. McShane eta!, Power! Black Workers, their Unions and the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa
(Nottingham, Spokesman, 1984), p. 118.
18 Ibid., p. 129.
19
Lodge and Nasson, All, Here and Now, p. 8.
20 1. Seekings, 'The Origins of Political Mobilisation in the PWV Townships', in W. Cobbett and R. Cohen
(e;F), Popular Struggles in South Africa (London, lames Currey, 1988), p. 67.
IDAF, Apartheid: The Facts, p. 105.
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integrated into the overall struggle against the apartheid system.22
It was in that context of discontents with the government's 'reform measures', part of which was
the Tricameral Constitution that, in 1983, civic organisations, church groups, people's associations
and a wide range of anti-apartheid organisations met to form the United Democratic Front (UDF).
In the same year the pro-Black Consciousnes~l organisations formed the National Forum (NF).
Both the UDF and the NF were amorphous bodies bringing together hundreds of small community
and other organisations, from church groups and sports clubs to parties and trade unions. 23
Mobilisation, led mainly by the UDF and trade unions, heightened during the mid-1980s and, on 21
July 1985, P. W. Botha declared a State of Emergency, affecting about one-third of the South
African population.24 In the following year, in 1986, the State ofEmergency was renewed and, this
time, it covered Natal as well.
Against the background of this broad national overvIew, I will outline selected features of
Pietermaritzburg's history. The focus will be 01 Pietermaritzburg although some parallels will be
drawn with other parts ofthe country.
Resistance and Repression in Pietermarit1:burg during the 1960s
Like other cities ~ietermaritzburg took part in the mass stay-at-home ofMay 1961.25 Thereafter, in
the evidence I have examined so far, there is no mention of any stayaway or mass demonstration
during the 1960s that had any substantial impac'~ on the political struggles in Pietermaritzburg. The
22 Ibid.
23 McShane, Power! Black Workers, p. 126.
24')~IIR, South Africa in the 1980s, p. 7.
-) See chapter 2
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May 1961 stay-at-home had been preceded in ~1arch by large protest meetings in the city against
the Group Areas ACt.26 . Interestingly, the stay-at-home was part of the resistance strategies that
had been approved by the "All-in" Afiica Conference, which took place in Pietermaritzburg on 25-
26 March 1961.27 Nationally, this three-day stayaway was dubbed a fiasco and the ANC had to call
it off on its second day. Pietermaritzburg was no exception, as newspapers reported that business
was normal in most factories except for Sarmcol factory at Howick, which had a 100% worker
absence28 . The failure of the stay-at-home rnigh have been due to state repression, for on 8 May,
the local newspaper reported that a meeting called by Afiicans had been banned and also on May
20 that all meetings had been banned nation-wide
29
.
As regards mass mobilisation, Pietermaritzburg seemed to have expe~enced a relative quiescence
after the stay-at-home. However, one stalwart has argued that the Pietermaritzburg ANC was
active during the early 1960s and, in 1962, wr en ANC leaders were jailed, there was a plan to
execute a major l\1K operation in Pietermaritzburg.30 The sabotage campaigns were happening all
over the country, particularly after the banning ofboth the ANC and the PAC.
Meanwhile the state was beginning to adopt more brutal and harsh methods of crushing resist~ce
than it did during the 1950s. In order to consolidate its repression of extra-parliamentary opposition
26 The Natal Witness, 21 and 29 March 1961. .
27 The Natal Witness, May-June 1961; 'Tracing 1he Route to Freed~m' The Natal Witness, 10 January
1997; T. Karis, G. Carter and G. M. Gerhart (eds), From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of
African Politics in South Africa, Volume 3, (StanfonL Hoover, 1977), p. 232; Author's interview with Anton
Xaba, 28 October 1997; Jeffrey, The Natal Story, p. 18.
28 The Natal Witness, 2 June 1961; D. R. Bonnin, 'Class, Consciousness and Conflict in the Natal Midlands,
1940-1987: The case of the B T R Sanncol worker~', Unpublished M SocSc Thesis, Durban, University of
Natal, 1987, p. 164; During author's interviews with A. S. Chetty, 12 November 1997 and Kader Hassim,
26 November 1997, it came out that the Sanncol workers were the best organised during this period.
29 The Natal Witness, 8 and 20 May 1961.
30 Author's interview with Anton Xaba, 28 October 1997.
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the state began to make use of the Suppression of Communism Act and the General Law
Amendment (Non-Trial) Act with its infamous 90-day detention clause.
31
During the mid-1960s
there is evidence of armed guerrilla activity and acts of sabotage in Natal allegedly carried out by
the Umkhonto weSiiwe. Many of the political trials in Natal took place in Pietermaritzburg, such as
that of Dr Pascal Ngakane (Chief Luthuli's son..in-Iaw)32 and the famous sabotage trial of 1963-
1964, where Curnick Ndlovu and Billy Nair and others were involved.
33
There was also the trial of
ten ANC members who had been charged witl\ inter alia, being office bearers and members of a
banned organisation, enlisting members, organising, defending, advising and promoting the
purposes of a banned organisation.
34
There were other trials, which were taking place in the
country during this period such the sabotage and Pogo trials in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Port
Elizabeth.
35
The security police were active in Pietermaritzburg in their attempt to subdue political mobilisation.
In August 1963 a crowd of 250 people protested in Pietermaritzburg for the release of two
University of Natal students, George Mbele and Freddy Dube, who had been detained under the
90-day detention clause.
36
In September 1963, six members of the Afiican People's Democratic
Union of South Afiica (APDUSA) were detained for distributing political pamphlets in
Raisethorpe.
37
It appears APDUSA was under security police surveillance as, in August of the
31 During author's interviews with Anton Xaba, 28 October 1997 and John Aitchison, 5 November
1997, the 90-day detention clause was singled out as the most brutal measure and this shattered any
doubts people might have had about the cruelty of :he government.
32 The Natal Witness, July - September 1964.
33 Ibid. October 1963 - January 1964.
34 Ibid. 5 - 23 November 1963. These ANC members were Elphas Khanyile, Inglishi Ndlovu, Ligwengwe
Majola, Alphius Gumede, Sikhumba Gwala, Mncengeni Mbanda, Mbambeni Dladla, Cecilia Dladla,
Makelwana Nojiyeza and Dorothy Nyembe.
35 Ibid. 13-14 May 1963,21 May 1963, June 1963,5 November 1963.
36 Ibid. 16 August 1963.
37 Ibid. 10 September 1963.
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same year, its members Hassan Shaik, Vaid Shaik and Abdool Essack were held and later
released.38 According to Anton Xaba, a local ANC leader who was active during the 1950s and
the 1960s, the security police used to follow them wherever they went and, in 1963, he was
arrested for MK activities.39 Aitchison pointed out also that during this time the security branch
personnel in Pietennaritzburg was increased.
40
In 1964 a local ANC and SACP stalwart, Harry
Gwala, was jailed for eight years for involvement in guerrilla activities and for furthering the aims of
the banned ANC.: He had been charged for his recruitment of men for military training outside
South Africa and for furthering the aims of the ANC's Umkhonto weSizwe.
41
To protest against
oppression and particularly the 90-day detention clause, a protest meeting, addressed by Dr Edgar
Brookes and Archdeacon A. 1. Rowley of the Anglican Church, took place at the Pietennaritzburg
City Hall, and it attracted a crowd of approximately 500 people.
42
Meanwhile the Liberal Party appeared to have attracted many African people who had suffered
because of the banning of their organisations. For a short while until its dissolution in 1968 the




'The Liberal Party's membership in the rural areas ofNatal was quite big and this had been
due to the Party's campaign against forced removals. There was also a phenomenon of
dual membership of the ANC and LP in both rural and urban areas, which dated back to
the 1950s' .44
38 Ibid.; TIlls was also confirmed during author's interview with Kader Hassim, 4 November 1997.
39 Author's interview with Anton Xaba, 28 October 1997.
40 Author's interview with John Aitchison, 5 November 1997.
4\ M. Butler, Natal, Violence and the Elections (pietennaritzburg, University ofNata1 (CAB), 1994)~ Ruth
Lundie's private notes on Gwala's life~ The Natal Witness, 19 May 1964.
42 The Natal Witness, 5 June 1964.
43 Jan Mkhize (a one-time member of the Pietermaritzburg ANC branch) quoted from 1. Frederikse, The
Unbreakable Thread: Non-racialism in South Africa (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1990), p. 93~ Author's
interviews with Archie Gumede, 2 October 1997 and V. Sikhosana, 7 October 1997 and Anton Xaba, 28
October 1997.
44 Author's interview with John Aitchison, 5 Novemb r 1997.
103
Apart from a few incidents of detention of people and protest meetings there is no evidence
available of any intense mass mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg during this period. This relative
quiescence was not a feature for Pietermaritzburg only, but was a countrywide phenomenon. This
was the early phase of the armed struggle to which the state retaliated by employing more
repressive and brutal methods in crushing any anti-apartheid resistance. Against this background of
political repression of the 1960s, the section below will investigate certain economic and social
aspects ofPietermaritzburg during the 1960s.
The'border industries' scheme and the dem ographic changes in
Pietermaritzburg during the 1960s.
Other studies have shown that economic development was related to the level and capacity for
political mobilisation.
45
Economically, Pietermaritzburg received a major boost during the early
1960s due to the border industry scheme. This economic development was a national feature
following international investor confidence in tht~ government after the economic crisis subsequent
to the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960. The political quiescence of that time could be ascribed
to the economic boom. In 1960 the City Council allocated funds for the development of the
Willowton industrial area. In 1963 Pietermaritz"burg was declared a 'border industry area' by the
central government and this provided financial concessions to new industries locating in the city.46
-
This programme entailed offering industrial relocation concessions and incentives for the setting up
of labour incentive industries in growth points in close proximity to major population
45
See chapter 2.
46 C. Torino, 'Industrialisation', in 1. Laband and R. Haswell (eels), Pietermaritzburg, 1838-1988: A New
Portrait ofan African City (pietermaritzburg, Shu1er and Shooter, 1988), p. 147; C.E.P. Seethal, 'Civic
Organizations and the Local State in South Africa (1979-1993)', Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of
Aowa, 1993, p. 205.
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concentrations on the fringes ofthe Bantustans.
47
Industrialists, who established themselves in these
areas, were offered a variety of inducements such as free removal transportation, financial
assistance, a remission of taxes within the first four years, and exemption from some of the
provisions of the· industrial labour laws - for example, the minimum wage detenninations.
48
The
idea of the border industries was planned as part of the process of keeping Africans out of the
'white' areas while at the same time making the Illaximum use ofthe cheapest labour available.
49
This proved to be a major boost for industrial development in Pietermaritzburg. The city received
many industrial inquiries. Consequently, the local state undertook to ensure that the Woods Drive-
Pentrich industrial complex be planned and provided with the necessary services as a matter of
urgency in order for the city to secure its share of industries. The local state produced a high quality
brochure of the industrial, educational, recreatior al and residential facilities of the city as part of its
promotional drive. In 1964 the city experienced cm industrial breakthrough when it was announced
that a RI-million food-processing factory (cate ., g for 180 employees) would begin operations by
the end of that year.
50
The city launched a vigorous campaign of attracting new industries.
51
However, according to John Aitchison, Pietermaritzburg seemed to be a loser in some lucrative
concessions. Hammarsdale was becoming rapidly industrialised. It was only during the late 1960s
that industrialisation really got off the ground. 52 In June 1964 it was announced that a new textile
factory would be established in the city. 53 By this pro:industry approach Pietermaritzburg was
moving away from simply being an administrative, academic, cultural, and agricultural supply
47 Seethal, 'Civic Organisations', p. 30.
48 H. Bernstein, For Their Triumphs and For Their Tears: Women in Apartheid South Africa (London,
International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1985), p. 70.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid. p. 49.
51 The Natal Witness, 1 and 19 August 1964.
52 Author's interview with John Aitchison~ 5 November 1997.
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centre ofNatal.
The setting up ofnew industries probably heightened people's expectations about employment. This
led to more people coming to Pietermaritzburg, which had insufficient accommodation to cater for
this influx. D~g the 1960s a new township, kn01Nn as Imbali, was constructed. 54 The population
ofPietermaritzburg was steadily growing. Edendale was also growing with more and more people
coming to settle with the hope that they were going to get jobs in Pietermaritzburg. Meanwhile the
border industry scheme was being implemented and it was helping with providing employment.
According to Torino, 'By 1970 when the border concessions were withdrawn (when the authorities
believed they had achieved the goal of industrialisation), the black population of Pietermaritzburg
was nearing an estimated 250000,.55 Within two years of the termination of this development there
was a decline in industrialisation, and retrenchment and unemployment followed.
Demographic changes in the black population in Pietermaritzburg were related to developments
that were taking place in the economic sphere. In socio-economic terms the black population of
Pietermaritzburg was changing. A class of industrial workers was emerging because of the
industrialisation in the city. There were also plans to increase Afiican housing in Edendale and
Slangspruit.56 The development of a new township known as Imbali from 1963, which was to have
5500 dwellings, was part of that scheme.
57
Imbali was sited in such a way that it could provide
labour for the border industries and that the township could in future fall under a homeland
53 Ibid. 25 June 1964.
54
M. Butler et ai, 1mbali: A Centre for Adult Education Study (pietennaritzburg, University of Natal,
1993), p. 7.
55 TOIino, 'Industrialisation', p. 147.
56 The Natal Witness, 4 April 1963.
57 Ibid.
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administration, so that it could not be a burden to the city's ratepayers. 58 Edendale too was
earmarked for massive housing development so that it could become a regional African township
within an African homeland. 59 When Stage 1 of Imbali Township was completed there was a
population of 11· 000 and by the mid-1970s when Stage 2 was finished it had a total population of
60
26 000 people.
The authorities were concerned with the increa;e of unemployment and the point was made that
local labour should be used in the construction of Imbali.
61
The construction of Imbali provided
local African people with prospects both of getting houses and of alleviating unemployment. Like
Sobantu, Imbali was going to fall directly under white local authorities as opposed to Edendale,
which was an area where Africans had freehold rights over the land. However, Imbali' s
administration by the City Council was going to be a short-term plan; the long-term goal was to
have it controlled by homeland administration. This direct control by the municipality meant that, in
the event of any discontent, the residents were going to face the state directly and not their
landlords as the Edendale people were doing. It was in townships such as Sobantu and Imbali that
political mobilisation first occurred in Pietermari1zburg during the early 1980s.
Having explored briefly some aspects of the ~;ocio-economic context, I will now move to the
-
popular struggles of the 1970s. I will investigate, not in great detail, the two major events of the
1970s, which were the 1973 strikes and the revolts of 1976. This investigation will attempt to
establish whether or not Pietermaritzburg exp(:rienced the same waves of mobilisation as some
other urban centres during this time.
58 Ibid. 3 October 1963.
59 Ibid. 4 April 1963.
60 Butler et al, 1mbali: p. 31.
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Pietermaritzburg and the struggles of the 1970s
The early 1970s began with industrial turbulence in Durban and these strikes spread to other parts
ofNatal. Despite its close proximity to Durban, Pietennaritzburg was not seriously affected by the
1973 workers' strikes.62 Pietermaritzburg, like some other urban centres in Natal, was largely
unaffected by the Soweto revolts of 1976 in any significant scale. Natal was not as tense and
turbulent as other parts of the country in the Cape and the Transvaal. Natal's lagging behind the
other regional c~ntres has been ascribed to a vari.ety of factors such as the political influence of
Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his Inkatha Movement, which had been formed in 1975, which
condemned youth militancy and the student revolts. 63 This relative calm can be attributed to the fact
that Afrikaans, which triggered the revolts, was not the main issue in Natal schools. That implied
that there was not a conspicuous source of conflict around which people could be mobilised at that
time. However, this does not mean that nothing occurred in Natal during these disturbances. It is
likely that the revolts had a psychological impact on students and youths in Pietermaritzburg. The
impact ofboth the 1973 strikes and the 1976 revolts on Pietennaritzburg will be explored below.
The Durban worker's strikes of 1973 and the much-celebrated Soweto student revolts of 1976-77
were the two main incidents of mass resistance that took place in South Africa during the 1970s. I
will start by examining the impact ofthe 1973 'Durban strikes' on Pietermaritzburg. Except for one
strike by 60 workers at Alex Carriers, Pietenl1aritzburg seems not to have experienced the
industrial strike wave of 1973.64 This is int eresting, considering the close proximity of
61 The Natal Witness, 30 May 1964.
62 J. Maree, 'Worker Organisation in Natal in the 1970s', paper to Workshop on Regionalism and
Restructuring in Natal, Durban, University ofNatal, 28-31 January 1988. p. 11.
63 Brooks and Brickhill, Whirlwind before the Storm, p. 131; 1. Kane-Bennan, Soweto, pp. 17-18. (Kane-
Berrnan attributed the relative peace in Durban particularly to both Buthelezi's influence and police restraint);
Jeffery, The Natal Story, pp. 46-47.
64 The Natal Witness, 13 February 1973.
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Pietermaritzburg to Durban, which was the nucleus ofthe strikes. In Durban workers from different
industrial sectors partook in the strikes, primarily over wages. There were Coronation Brick
workers, drivers, Dunlop, dairies, corporation \vorkers and those in other business sectors. The
Natal Witness reported on 3 February that there were approximately 20 000 workers on strike.
65
By the 6th the number had swelled to 30 000.66 Available evidence indicates that Pietermaritzburg
did not experience the industrial turbulence that was seriously engulfing Durban. The
Pietermaritzburg industrialists attributed the Natal strike wave to low wages, lack of
communication and agitators. On 5 February 1973, Mr A. W. Fuller, Director of the
Pietermaritzburg Chamber ofIndustries, was quoted in the newspapers saYing:
'Fortunately, we have had no strikes in :Pietermaritzburg yet, but we must recognise it as a
possibility to which all manufacturers must give careful thought. It is our impression that
some firms have been asking for trouble by paYing too little and some have not been doing
enough to forestall trouble by establishing good lines of communication with their African
67workers'.
The above statement by Fuller implies that al1hough Pietermaritzburg had not experienced the
strikes, they could erupt at any time. It appears that Pietermaritzburg was having the same
industrial problems that had led to the eruption of the strikes in Durban. But why were there no
widespread strikes in Pietermaritzburg? Why did. workers in other factories in Pietermaritzburg not
follow the Alex Carriers example? Perhaps it is because the workers at Alex were instantly
dismissed without an opportunity of negotiatio:1s and that might have frightened the disgruntled
workers in other industries. Furthermore, Durban had many industries when compared to
Pietermaritzburg. Surely, there must be reasons why Pietermaritzburg was not affected? It was
reported in the Natal Witness of 14 February that the Pietermaritzburg City Council had agreed for
65 The Natal Witness, 3 February 1973.
66 Ibid. 6 February 1973
67 Ibid.
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a big rise in salaries for its African workers excluding white workers. 68
There is evidence that some mobilisation was taking place in Pietennaritzburg factories during this
time. For instance, ill his staten1ent, which still adhered to the officialdom's obsession with agitators,
Fuller argued that people had been seen "handing out pamphlets to Afiican workers outside
factories in Pietennaritzburg - so far without effect". 69 According to Maree 'the effects of the
Durban strikes were to heighten Afiican worker militancy and consciousness of the need to
organise themselves. Consequently the membemhip of the Benefit Fund shot up rapidly and six
African unions emerged over the next two years in Durban and Pietennaritzburg'.70 Wage
Commissions were set up in both campuses of the University of Natal and this facilitated the
process of worker mobilisation during the. 1970s.
71
Interestingly, it was during this time that the
Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU), which played a significant role in the popular struggles
in Pietennaritzburg during the 1980s, began to negotiate for recognition at BTR Sanncol, in
Howick.
The 1976 students' revolt also left Pietennaritzburg relatively untouched. On 16 June 1976
students in Soweto staged a march to protest against, among other things, the proclamation of
Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in African ~;econdaty schools. The protest ended in bloodshed
and students in other parts of South Africa took up the Soweto cause.72 According to Brooks and
Brickhill, by August 'the perspectives of the student movement had broadened from the campaign
against Afrikaans and Bantu Education in general into demands for the release ofpolitical prisoners
68 Ibid. 14 February 1973.
69 Ibid. 6 February 1973.
70 Maree, 'Worker Organisation in Natal in the 1970s', p. 4.
7] Author's interview with John Aitchison, 5 October 1997.
72 Kane-Bennan, Soweto, pp. 1-2~ Brooks and Brickhill, Whirlwind before the Storm
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and the rejection of the apartheid system' ,73 A detailed analysis of the revolts is not intended here
but the aim is to situate Pietermaritzburg's resistance politics within the context of these upheavals.
It has generally been argued that Natal, apart from the solidarity demonstrations by students at the
Universities of Durban-Westville and Natal Medical School, and the burning of administration
buildings -at the University of Zululand, remained relatively quiet74. However, there were incidents
of student demonstrations and the burning of schools in places such as Ladysmith, Amanzimtoti,
Eshowe, Greytown, Empangeni, Kokstad, KwaNIashu, Tugela Ferry, Ndwedwe, Weenen and
Chatsworth.
75
Most of these incidents took place in July 1976. In another incident, which was
presumably related to the prevailing revolts, the Woodlands Primary School in Pietermaritzburg
was set alight in September.
76 It was argued that it was only then that the extent of the Natal unrest
became apparent and a British newspaper reported:
'Reports from country areas of Natal and KwaZulu discloses that violence has been more
widespread than was originally reported. Buildings were set on fire, crops were destroyed
and many farms and animals died in the blazes'. 77
As the report shows there were widespread veld fires in Natal and also in other parts of the
country, which were related to the disturbances.
Although one cannot magnify the extent ofthe revolts in Natal on the basis of the above-mentioned
incidents, it seems that the region did experience disturbances, albeit not on the same scale as the
Transvaal, the Eastern and the Western Cape. It should also be pointed out that Afiikaans-medium
learnirig was not an issue in Nata!' This is interesting in the light of the fact that it has been argued
73 Brooks and Brickhill, Whirlwind before the Storm, p. 30.
74 Ibid., pp. 24-25; The Natal Witness, 19 June 1976 and 11 August 1976.
75 Brooks and Brickhill, Whirlwind before the Storm, (appendix) pp. 307-343.1. Kane-Berrnan, Soweto, p.
2.
76 Brooks and Brickhill, Whirlwind before the Storm, p. 333.
that perhaps the young militants of Soweto got expertise and assistance from older militants who
had received training outside and had created a network of clandestine armed groups largely in
Natal, whose ex-Robben Island veterans had just been released.
78
With all those networks and long
experience of the old activists at its disposal Natal did not erupt like other parts of the country. An
example of the existence of clandestine networks 'was the trial of ten uMkhonto weSizwe members
in Pietennaritzburg in 1976. The accused were alleged to have 'incited, instigated, commanded,
aided, advised, encouraged and/or promised others to undergo military training or political training
outside the borders of the Republic in order thereafter to return and assist in the overthrow of the
government by violence and forcible means' .79 Interestingly, two of the accused, Harry Gwala and
Anton Xaba, were ex-Robben Island prisoners, and they had just been released after serving
between eight and 10 years.
Inspite of some isolated incidents of violence that kept cropping up in Natal, Pietermaritzburg
did not experience any intense upheavals except for the burning of the primary school in
Woodlands. There are no reports of any demonstrations that occurred at any of the local
African High Schools in the townships. Perhaps the point made earlier by Aitchison regarding
the lack of high schools for Africans during the 1960s can explain why Pietermaritzburg
remained calm, as it is likely that during the early 1970s this remained the case.
Socio-economic and political conditions in Pietennaritzburg during the early 1980s.
77 Guardian, 28 July 1976 quoted from Brooks and Br ckhill, Whirlwind before the Storm, p. 311.
78 Brooks and Brickhill, Whirlwind before the Storm, p. 162. -
79 The Natal Witness, 13 July 1976. The ten were Harry Themba Gwala, William Fano Khanyile, John
Vusimuzi Nene, Vusimuzi Truman Magubane, Ndoda Anton Xaba, Mathews Makholeka Meyiwa, Azaria
Ndebele, Zakhele Elphas Mdlalose, Joseph Ntulisiwe Nduli and Cleopas Malayiboni Ndlovu (the latter two
had been taken from Swaziland and were pleading against the jurisdiction ofthe court to try them).
112
Before sketching in some political aspects ofthe 1980s we can address the question of what kind of
a city Pietermaritzburg had become by the 1980s. The Greater Pietermaritzburg area consisted of a
city with separate residential areas for whites, Indlans, coloureds and Africans. This was typical of
South Afiica's segregated cities. Geographically it can be said that on the northern and southern
sides there were mostly white suburbs while the eastern side of the town was dominated by areas
that were demarcated for Indians and coloureds, ~rith only one African township, Sobantu. West of
the city and many kilometres away, the black residential areas stretched up the valley, with the
rigidly planned African township of Imbali giving 'iVay to the more amorphous Edendale.
80
West of
the Edendale complex stretched the rural area of Vulindlela, which consisted of districts ruled by
chiefs and was commonly called NgaPhezulu (see Map 4). It has been pointed out that more than
70% of the Afiican population in Pietermaritzburg townships lived in mud houses, mainly in
Edendale and Vulindlela.
81
In these houses there was neither electricity nor water, and the latter
was only available through communal taps, some of them located two kilometres or more from the
houses.
82
It was this geography of racial separa :ion that was to shape the nature and the co-
ordination ofmass mobilisation strategies in the Pietermaritzburg region during the 1980s.
According to the 1985 census figures the racial breakdown of the population of Pietermaritzburg
was as follows: 60 161 Whites, 57 006 Indians, 13 771 Coloureds, 61 479 Africans and the overall
total was 192 417.
83
Edendale was not included a:; part ofPietermaritzburg and was grouped with
Vuilindlela as an area under homeland administration. The number of Africans was therefore
significantly underestimated. In 1951 there were ~-2 052 Africans in 1960 there were 64 319 in, ,
80 T. Wills, 'The Segregated City', in 1. Laband and R. Haswell (eds), Pietermaritzburg 1838-1988: A New
Portrait ofan African City (pietennaritzburg, Shuter and Shooter, 1988), p. 33.






























Map 4, Pietermaritzburg area - less detailed and showing
Pietermaritzburg during the 1980s (Adapted from P, Forsyth,
O;atarrY'l'.JIrlt7hllrn r'nnfllrt r'hrnnnlnO'u 1001 '\ ~
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1970 they were 47 337, in 1980 they numbered at 67 364 and in 1985 there were 61 479
Afiicans.
84
Gwala, quoting the Development Studies Research Group's (DSRG) 1986 survey,
pointed out that Pietermaritzburg had 400 000 people and more than 80% of this population was
black (Afiican, Coloured and Indian) thus making the city the second largest in Natal. 85 This was
corroborated by Wills, writing in the 1980s, w 0 pointed out that 'over half of the metropolitan
population of approaching 500 000 is housed in the Afiican townships and 'peri-urban' areas'. 86
The difference between the population figures of the government's census report and DSRG was
due to the fact that they were driven by different motives and agendas.
Economic and social conditions in the Greater Pietermaritzburg region need to be considered
as well. There were some industries, situated mostly at Camps Drift, Willowton and
Mkhondeni. This was the result of industrial developments that had been taking place in the
city since the 1950s. By the 1980s Pietermalitzburg had become, after Durban, the second
main centre of commerce and industry in Natal. 87 In 1982 Pietermaritzburg was again declared
an industrial "deconcentration point" in accordance with the Government's industrialisation
policy.88 According to the Labour Monitoring Group, three broad sectors dominated
Pietermaritzburg's industrial life: firstly, metal, engineering and related factories accounted for
approximately 30% of total employment: secondly, the leather and footwear industry
employed a further 25%; finally, timber, wood and paper sector employed 20% of the
83 Wills, 'The Segregated City', p. 42.
84 Ibid.
85 Gwala, 'Inkatha, Political Violence', p. 2.
86 Wills, 'The Segregated City', p. 33.
87 Torino, 'Industrialisation', pp. 144-147.
88 The Natal Witness, 2 April 1982; Labour Monitoring Group (Natal), 'Monitoring the Sanncol
Struggle', in South African Labour Bulletin, Volume 11, Number 2, October - December 1985, p. 90.
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workforce. 89 By 1984 Pietermaritzburg's m, nufacturing sector employed approximately 20
000 workers. 90 However, despite the growth \vhich was a result of this border industry scheme
there was a high level of unemployment, one that varied greatly across population groups,
affecting COloureds and Africans the most.
91
This unemployment was caused by the economic
recession and it became a serious issue particularly in the Vulindlela area.
92
Many firms such as
Feralloys, Dick Whitington Shoes and Sarmcol started to reduce their workforce between
1982 and 1984 leading to the loss of over 2000 jobs. Writing in 1988, Gwala pointed out that
Pietermaritzburg,
'is an area with very high rate of unemployment. The total black unemployment is
estimated at 36%, whilst that of whites is just under 5%. However, unemployment is
lowest in Sobantu, a township that, together with Imbali, has always enjoyed Section
10 rights that gave them, among other things, first preference on employment. ,93
About 80% of the unemployed were under 3:5 years of age; 46% less than 25 years old; and
15% were less than 25 years of age. The 20-24 years age group was higWy represented among
the unemployed.
94
It is therefore in the age of the unemployed that one begins to appreciate
the social basis of political action and why the youth were the most frustrated. That explains
why youth formed a large part of the constituency of political mobilisation during the 1980s.
According to Seekings it was· during this period that the identity of 'youth' began to become
distinct. He argues that:
'The youth re-emerged as a central category in political opposition in the 1980s. The ANC
89 Labour Monitoring Group, 'Monitoring the Samlcol Struggle', p. 90.
90 Ibid.
91 N. Bromberger, 'Unemployment in Pieteffi1aritzburg, 1986', in Laband and Haswell (eds),
Pietermaritzburg 1838-1988, p. 134.
92 For a detailed study of unemployment in the Vulindlela area see l.F. Hofineyer, Labour-market
Participation and Unemployment: An Economic Analysis ofthe Choices made by Black males in a
Peri-urban area near Pietermaritzburg (Pretoria, Human Sciences Research Council, 1985).
93 Gwala 'Inkatha, Political Violence', pp. 2-3.
94 Seethal. 'Civic Organisations', pp. 205-208.
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Youth League had played an important role between the mid-1940s and mid-1950s, but the
category of youth remained largely peripheral to political organisation and discourses
through the 1960s and most of the 1970s. It was only in the aftermath of the Soweto
uprising of 1976-77, and particularly in the years 1980-82, that the youth once again came
to constitute a distinct sector of the population in terms of political mobilisation and
organisation... From 1982 overtly political youth organisations or youth congresses
proliferafed 'across the country. Their concern was with politicisation and political action
outside of the school and the workplace. They involved predominantly young people who
had completed most, ifnot all oftheir secondary schooling, and included students as well as
95
ex-students. '
The word youth began to acquire a revolutionary character. According to Johnson it referred to
age much as it did to attitude of mind, it connoted the most energetic, volatile and impatient
elements ofthe black communities.
96
Bundy points out that:
'Members of this generational unit do not merely coexist in time and space: they become a
so~i~9.peneration when they participate in the common destiny of that historical and social
urut.
A growing youth consciousness cemented cohesion amongst many people as they experienced
social and economic problems that were almost similar. It was the African youth who were
particularly instrumental in the stayaways, protest marches and consumer boycotts of the 1980s.
The youth represented a category of South African society that was pressured by poor education
and economic hardships and was also receptive to radical political ideas. The youth element became
instrumental in resistance politics of the 1980s while the ambiguity of who constituted 'the youth'
continued.
From as early as 1980 the youth were beginning to emerge as a potent political force in the
Pietermaritzburg townships. Their struggles can be traced back to the formation of the D. C. O.
95 Seekings, Heroes or Villains?, pp. 20 and 21.
96 S. Johnson, 'The Soldiers ofLuthuli!: Youth in the Politics of Resistance in South Africa', in S. lohnson
(eel), South Africa: No Turning Back (London, Macmillan, 1988), p. 85.
97 C. Bundy, 'Action Comrades Action!': The Politics of Youth Resistance in the Western Cape, 1985', in
W.G. lames and M. Simons (eds), The Angry Divide: Social and Economic History of the Western Cape
(Cape Town, David Philip, 1989), p. 207.
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Matiwane Youth League in 1980. It was named in honour ofDavid Cecil Oxford Matiwane, who
lived at Willowfountain, and was known for his commitment to the liberation struggle.
98
Matiwane
had been active in Pieternmaritzburg's resistance politics for a long time. He was active in the ANC
during the 1950s, together with Gwala, Gumede and Mabhida.
99
On anniversaries such as the
Sharpeville Massacre on March 21, and the So'weto uprising on June 16, Matiwane used to walk
from his home to the Pietennaritzburg city centre canying a cross and chains to signify the
perpetual oppression ofblack people. 100 The League focused on organising social functions as well
as providing forums for political discussions. It attracted members - mostly students - from
Pietennaritzburg's other townships, and in 1982 some of its members from Sobantu formed the
101
Sobantu Youth League.
Matiwane died in 1984 and prominent leaders f the newly-fonned UDF attended his funeral.
102
After his death the League plunged into chaos due to police harassment. According to Seekings,
the League fell apart because the area had very few political activists who could further the
League's objectives.
103
Its collapse could also be due to the fact that it concentrated on leadership
rather than mobilising the masses. It was viewed as elitist and composed of young people from rich
and educated families. 104 In spite of its shortcomings the League helped to plant the seeds for anti-
apartheid mobilisation in Pietennaritzburg. It also helped to influence people who were to become
important in local popular struggles during the mid-1980s.
98 N. Bhebhe's interview with Khaba Mkhize in Bhebhe, 'Mobilization, Conflict and Repression', p. 29.
99 Author's interviews with Mrs V. Sikhosana, 7 October 1997 and A. S. Chetty, 12 November 1997.
100Ibid.
101 Seekings, Heroes or Villains?, p. 41.
102 Bhebhe's interview with Khaba Mkhize in 'Mobilization, Conflict and Repression', p. 30.
103 Seekings, Heroes or Villains?, p. 44.
104 Author's interview with Sobhuza Dlamini, 18 July 1995.
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In some instances the labour movements were also trying to mobilise the communities to support
their causes. According to Nkosinathi Gwala (Blade Nzimande) the Hulett Aluminium pensioners'
strike of 1981 was one such incident where workers were creating the space for mass
mobilisation.
105
He points out that this was due to the importance ofHuletts as a "visible employer"
and a 11 dream" workplace for people without Section 10 rights, that was, people from Edendale and
the adjacent rural areas.
106
D. Bonnin also regards this strike as laYing the basis for the popular
struggles that followed in Pietermaritzburg during the mid-1980s. 107 It was no coincidence that the
first major event ofmass mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg came out of a workers' struggle in 1985".
Politically, people belonged to organisations across the wider political spectrum of black resistance
organisations. In the African residential areas before the mid-1980s no political organisation could
claim majority support with confidence.
108
Some localised events of mass mobilisation occurred in
Sobantu between 1982 and 1984 when there were rent and bus boycotts as well as
demonstrations.
109
In the period between 1982 ,md 1984 Pietermaritzburg had seen the formation
of youth organisations, most of which affiliated to the UDF. Among those organisations were the
Sobantu Youth Organisation (SOYO), the Imbau Youth Organisation (IYO), the Edendale Youth
Organisation (EDEYO), the Ashdown Youth Organisation (AYO) and the Mpophomeni Youth
Organisation.
11O
The demarcation of political boundaries and the declaration of organisational
strongholds by Inkatha and the UDF were to become a phenomenon only of the late 1980s. As
105 N. Gwala, 'Inkatha, Political Violence and the Struggle for Control in Pietennaritzburg', Paper to
Workshop on Regionalism and Restructuring in Natal, Durban, University of Natal, January 28-31, 1988.
p. 19.
106 Ibid.
107 D. Bonnin's comments during the author's presentation at the History and African Studies Seminar
at the University ofNatal, Durban, 15 October 1997.
108 Gwala, 'Inkatha, Political Violence and the Struggle for Control', p. 18.
109 Seethal, 'Civic Organisations', pp. 205-211.
J 10 Butler, 1mbali, p. 158.
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Gwala has pointed out above, the Hulett strike of 1981 was one such event which showed that
trade unions could mobilise with the help of a variety of community organisations. As the case
studies of some of the events of mass mobilisation will show, trade unions were a force to be
reckoned with in mass mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg from the mid-1980s onwards.
Conclusion
The above discussion attempted to show that the 1960s to the early 1980s were a period of both
isolated incidents of mass mobilisation and of political quiescence in Pietermaritzburg. The socio-
economic and political exploration of the national contexts showed that the 1960s to the early
1970s were periods of economic boom, political repression, armed struggle and the resurgence of
worker militancy. The 1970s began with the economic recession which was followed by the 1973
strikes and the student revolts of 1976.
Pietermaritzburg was not exceptional when cornpared with the counttywide situation during the
1960s. There were some economic developments that took place during the 1960s as part of the
border industry programme. The population of Pietermaritzburg was increasing and during the
same period a new township called Imbali was constructed. At the same time the city
administrators were taking measures to improve housing for Africans. In the sphere of struggle
Pietermaritzburg experienced political repression as well. Many opponents of apartheid were
detained. S2me people were also jailed for activities related to military training during both the
1960s and the 1970s. However, there is no evidence of events of crowd resistance that occurred in
Pietermaritzburg during this period. Even the 1973 strikes and the 1976 student revolts did not take
Pietermaritzburg by storm, as was the case in other parts of South Africa. This therefore, suggests
that there was no lull in resistance in Pietermaritzburg during the 1960s and 1970s because even
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during the 1950s there was not much mass mobilisation on the scale of other cities such as Durban,
Johannesburg and Cape Town, East London and Port Elizabeth. The idea of a lull implies that there
was intense mass mobilisation that was suppressed and subsided. In the case of Pietermaritzburg it
appears that there was no large-scale mobilisation during the 1950s, so one cannot argue that there
was a lull during the 1960s and the 1970s.
During the early 1980s it seems that the situation had changed economically, politically and
demographically from what it was during the 1950s. Politically conscious groups such as the
D. C. O. Matiwane Youth League were formed during the early 1980s. Subsequently, the
UDF was also formed which showed that Pieter:maritzburg's struggle politics was entering the
national resistance scene. What this chapter has shown is that the socio-economic and political
situation in Pietermaritzburg during the 1960s a d 1970s was changing and laying the basis for
the struggles of the 1980s. The next chapter will investigate in detail Pietermaritzburg's
struggles during the mid-1980s, using the 1985 Sarmcol workers' demonstration and stayaway
as a case study to illustrate the pattern and nature of mass mobilisation.
CHAPTEI~ SIX
From Labour Dispute to Strategy of Mass Mobilisation:
The 1985 Sarmcol strikers' Demonstration and Stayaway in
Pietermaritzburg
Striking workers from BTR Sarmcol factory in llowick held a demonstration in Pietermaritzburg at
the end of June 1985 and, in the middle of July, a stayaway was called in support of their struggle.
The main purpose of this chapter is to investigate why the workers marched, how the subsequent
stayaway was organised, and to examine how this action changed the nature and course of mass
mobilisation in the Pietermaritzburg region. This Sarmcol case study has been selected because it
can be regarded as a key event of mass mobilisation in the Pietermaritzburg region in the mid-
1980s, and because it was a precursor of later events. When compared to the earlier struggles in
Pietermaritzburg since the 1950s, when there was not much intensified political activity, this
stayaway seemed to signal a new era in mass mobilisation and the coming of age of resistance
politics in the Pietermaritzburg region. The workers' march and the stayaway left an indelible mark
on the memories ofpeople in the Pietermaritzburg region.
The workers' demonstration and the subsequent stayaway will be analysed against the background
of events of mass mobilisation and resistance that were taking place in South Africa in the mid-
1980s. The actual strike and the reasons for it will be highlighted, but they will not be discussed in
great detail because that is not within the scope of this_dissertation. Due to the dearth of written
sources I have relied heavily on interviews, newspapers and written sources for information. The
problems inherent in each source have been taken into consideration. So far there are three research
theses that have looked at the Sarmcol struggle although only one of them focused specifically on
121
its impact on wider Pietennaritzburg politics.
1
Research and available evidence suggests that the stayaway of 1985 was one of the biggest yet in
the history of the city, and what is of analytical interest is its impact on mass mobilisation in
Pietennaritzburg. The workers effectively extended their zone of struggle from the small town of
Howick to the much larger city ofPietennaritzburg, thirty kilometres away.
The socio-economic and political contexts of Pietennaritzburg in the early 1980s were very
different from those of 1950s. There were now more industries and townships, which meant that
there was a larger constituency for political mobilisation. Mass mobilisation took a distinct
character and the crucial year was 1985, although there had been earlier signs of youth militancy
and heightened political consciousness during the previous two to three years, with school boycotts
and rent boycotts. About 1500 young people organised a highly successful public demonstration in
Imbali in August 1984 against the inauguration of the new community council by Piet Koornhof,
the Minister of Co-operation and Development.2 The 'youth' were be.ginning to emerge as a
distinct stratum in mass mobilisation and resist<Ulce in the area. A relationship began to develop
between the radical youth and some unions, and workers started involving the youth in issues such
J D. R. Bonnin, 'Class, Consciousness and Conflict in the Natal Midlands, 1940-1987: the case of the
BTR Sanncol workers', Unpublished M Soc Sc Thesis, University ofNatal Durbah, 1987); E. 1.
Radford, 'The Psychological Effects of Mass Dismissal', Unpublished PhD Thesis, Pietennaritzburg,
University ofNatal, 1993; S. M. Mkhize, 'Mass Mobilisation and Resistance: A Study of Selected
Stairways and Protest Marches in Pietennaritzburg, 1985-1989-', Unpublished BA (Hon) Thesis,
Pietennaritzburg, University ofNatal, 1995.
2 A. 1. Jeffrey, The Natal Story: 16 Years ofConflict (Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race
Relations, 1997), p. 140; M. Butler et. aI., 1mbali: A Centre for Adult Education Study
(Pietennaritzburg, University ofNatal, 1993), pp. 157-158; N. N. Bhebhe, 'Mobilization, Conflict and
Repression: The United Democratic Front and Popular Struggles in the Pietennaritzburg Region, 1983-
1991', Unpublished MA Thesis, Pietennaritzburg, University ofNatal, 1996, p. 33; Author's
interviews with Dumezweni Zimu, 3 August 1995 and Sobhuza Dlamini, 12 July 1995; The Natal
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as strikes and boycotts.3 This relationship, which was not without problems, was strengthened from
1985 onwards with the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in
December, which came out openly in favour ofcommunity struggles.
4
The socio-economic and political context of Pietermaritzburg during the early 1980s was sketched
in the previous chapter and there is no need to elaborate here. By way of orientating the reader, the
next section will explore briefly the socio-economic context in the Howick area in order to set the
scene for the investigation ofthe workers' strug e of 1985.
Background to the Sarmcol Struggle: BTR Sarmcol, Mpophomeni,
KwaMevana and the surrounding areas
BTR Sarmcol was a factory, situated in Howick, a small town outside the city ofPietermaritzburg.
This factory was owned by a multinational company which had its headquarters in the United
Kingdom. It was established in 1919 and it specialised in the production of rubber products.5 In the
1980s the majority of its African workforce came from the nearby two townships ofMpophomeni
and kwaMevana. (see Maps 5and 6) By 1985 about 39.5% of the workforce lived at
Mpophomeni, which was 15 km from Howick.
6
The rest came from the nearby rural areas.
KwaMevana and Mpophomeni townships had been built during the 1930s and the late 1960s
Witness, 24 August 1984.
3 Author's interview with Moses Ndlovu, Pietennaritzburg,' 11 July 1995. The same point relating to
weak a relationship also came out of the author's interview with Sobhuza Dlamini, 12 July_1995. However,
Mthunzi Makhathini, 12 August 1995, argued that there was cohesion between the UDF affiliated
organisations and the unions like MAWU in the Pietennaritzburg region.
4 Author's interviews with Cassius Lubisi, Pietennaritzburg, 20 September 1995 and Moses Ndlovu, 11
July 1995. Philip Dladla of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), however,
argued (18 July 1995) that there was no workerism as unions were prepared to work with communities on
matters other than those relating to factories.
5 D. Bonnin and A. Sit.as, 'Lessons from the Sarmcol strike', in W. Cobbett and R. Cohen (eds),



















Map 6. The Pietermaritzburg region showing as far as Howick and kwaMevana
(Adapted from Integrated Planning Services, Main Report, Investigation into
Metropolitan and Non-Metr politan Forms ofLocal Government for the
",1 _ A 1("\("\A\
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respectively, specifically to accommodate the employees of BTR Sarmcol, and for people who
were removed from land in the areas around Howick because of the laws of residential
segregation.7 Looking at the geographical distribution of its workforce it is clear that Sarmcol was
the major employer in Howick. Sarmcol was what Scottish Cables and Alkan were to the majority
of people in Pietermaritzburg. The livelihoods of most people in the townships and in the nearby
rural areas depended on Sarmcol.
Since the 1950s BTR Sarmcol had been involved in disagreements with unions, and "it all began
when Harry Gwala was unionising workers at Sarmcol, so as to improve working conditions. In
1974 the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MA\VU) came to Sarmcol and by 1983 it had recruited
almost 90% ofthe factory's workers.
8
But the Sanncol management would not recognise the union
and it continued to retrench workers. MAWU organisers were also suffering from constant
harassment. In 1976, for example, one of its organisers, Moses Ndlovu, was banned for 5 years
and the workers suspected the management of complicity in this. The workers, however, continued
with their struggle. In December 1984 they embarked on a strike over wages.9 In April 1985, after
an impasse in negotiations between Sarmcol and MAWU, the union decided to take the matter to
the workers, and a ballot of almost 1000 workers voted unanimously to start strike action on 30
April 1985. On the 3rd ofMay 1985 all the striking workers were dismissed. 10
6 Bonnin, 'Class, Consciousness and Conflict', p.191.
7 1. Radford and W. Leeb, 'On-going Effects of ~1ass Dismissal on the Community of Mpophomeni',
seminar paper to Workshop on Regionalism and Restrocturing in Natal, Number 33, University of Natal,
Pietennaritzburg, 28-31 July, 1988, pp. 1-25; Bonnin, 'Class, Consciousness and Conflict', pp. 45-106; For
a detailed history ofkwaMevana Township see W. Silaule, 'Established at the Edge, Surviving at the Centre:
A History of kwaMevana Township in Howick with Particular Reference on its Founding in the 1930s',
Unpublished BA Honours Thesis, Pietermaritzzburg, University ofNatal, 1996.
8 Ibid. pp. 181-188; L Mg G, 'Monitoring the Sanncol Struggle', pp. 95-96.
9 P. Dladla in the South African Labour Bulletin, Volume 10 Number 8, July - August 1985, p.31-32.
10 Radford and Leeb, 'On-going Effects ofMass Dismissal', pp.l-3; A. Jeffery, The Natal Story, p. 59
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Following their dismissal from Sanncol, workers began a campaign of publicising their plight by
holding daily meetings at Mpophomeni Township to discuss the way forward and to explain this
situation to community members. 11 After these meetings, which usually took place in the
Community Hall, they commonly marched together with other township residents, most of who
Were relatives of the strikers. One of my infonnants pointed out that the rationale behind these
marches was
'to make sure that the communities of M[pophomeni and KwaMevana were
conscientised about our plight. It was also clear that the dismissal of the strikers
was going to have detrimental repercussions in the townships and in the nearby
rural areas. We also realised that a worker and a community member were
inseparable and that workers need support of the community in their
12
struggles' .
One of these marches, on June 24, ended in a confrontation between police and the marchers; and
police were lambasted by the union officials and local church leaders for their behaviour. 13 These
daily meetings were psychological boosting mechanisms to keep the strikers' morale high. The
campaign of conscientisation and mobilisation was not only confined to Mpophomeni. People were
sent to other areas such as Sweetwaters, Pietelmaritzburg, Hamarsdale, and to the chiefs in the
14
reserves where the scabs labourers came from.
On 9 May 1985 MAWU, in consultation with community structures in the townships, decided to
call for a consumer boycott in Howick. 15 This boycott was going to apply to white-owned
11 Bo~ 'Class, Consciousness and Conflict', p. 138~ Ruth Lundie's interview with Ntombe~ September
1995.
12 Author's interviews with Philip DI~ Pietennaritzburg, 18 July 1995 and Mthunzi Makhathini,
Pietermaritzburg, 12 August 1995.
13 'Mpophomeni march ends in chaos' The Natal Witness, 09 May 1985.
14 Philip Dladla in SALE, Volume 10, Number 8, p. 32.
15 1. Aitchison, 'Numbering the Dead: the Course and Pattern of Political Violence in the Natal Midlands,
1987-1989', Unpublished MA Thesis, Pietermaritzburg, University ofNatal, 1993, p 45; Author's interview
with Mthunzi Makhathini, 12 August 1995.
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businesses and the main aim was to force the Howick Chamber of Commerce to intervene in the
dispute with Sarmcol. The decision to target white businesses was also influenced by the fact that
during the 1984 strike local white shopowners had sided with Sarmcol management by refusing to
open before 7 a.m. in order to give workers a chance to buy food when they were boycotting the
factory canteen. 16 The residents of MpophOlneni, KwaMevana and the surrounding areas
supported the boycott. 17 However, the fact that the people heeded the call for a consumer boycott
does not mean that no coercive measures were taken to enforce it, as strikers went to town
frequently to monitor who was shopping. It is also likely that township youths played a role in
organising and monitoring the boycott, and in exercising coercion if necessary. In writing about
consumer boycotts in the 1980s, Helliker et al. pointed out that:
'There is a strong, but not necessarily predominant feeling in the African
townships that a limited degree of coercion during boycotts is justified.
This does not mean assent to an 'anytrung goes policy'. But it does reflect
a belief that an illegitimate state has no moral claim to monopoly of the
use of coercion, and that if individuals want to do something against the
interests and wishes of the majority in the community, they should be
prevented from doing so, forcibly ifnecessary' .18
The nature ofa boycott is such that it needs monitoring to ensure that people withhold their buying
power. The consumer boycott in Howick was an exercise of power by the union as it was
competing with Sarmcol and it had to show that it had power to paralyse the economy of the town.
One can argue that the consumer boycott in Ho"Wick was a tool of mobilisation and organisation in
the townships as well as a way of showing the strength of MAWU. Furthermore, this action was
not the first that the residents of Mpophomeni had embarked on. By the time of the beginning of
the strike a rent boycott had been going on for years. Alongside rent issues, in 1982 the community
16 Phi1ip Dladla in SALE, Volume 10, Number 8, p.32.
17 Author's interviews with Mthunzi Makhathini, 12 August 1995 and Philip D1adla, 18 July 1995.
18 K. Helliker et al., 'Asithengi! Recent consumer boycotts', in I. Obery (00), South African Review 4,
(Johannesburg: Rav~ 1987), pA2.
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ofMpophomeni decided to boycott buses and walk 30 kilometres daily after a fare increase of 6c
which was introduced without consultation. 19
"We have built the country by fighting,,20: Sarmcol strikers march in
Pietermaritzburg
In view of the fact that Howick and Mpophomeni were small urban areas, the union, after
consultation with the strikers, decided to organise a march in the far larger centre of
Pietermaritzburg. The purpose of the march would be to solicit support and to discourage scab
labourers that were being hired by Sarmcol.21 Many of the scab labourers came from
Pietermaritzburg's African townships. This was not their first march to Pietermaritzburg as they
had gone to the Edendale Lay Ecumenical Centre during May Day of 1985, an event which offered
them an opportunity to publicise their plight.
On 29 June 1985 the strikers boarded a convoy often buses, arid left Mpophomeni Township for
Pietermaritzburg. Their destination was the Edendale Lay Ecumenical Centre where there was
going to be a meeting. Rather than taking the ro te that goes via Sweetwaters, they decided to go
through the city centre. (see maps 5 and 6 and picture 1) The strategic importance of passing
through the town was that they would get a chance of making their plight known in the central
-
business district. The strikers sought to use a spectacular strategy in order to ensure that the
message reached the majority ofthe people in Pietermaritzburg. After a 'breaking down' of one the
buses in front of the Pietermaritzburg City Hall, t e entire fleet stopped and strikers got a chance to
19 LMG, 'Monitoring the Sarmcol Struggle', p. 94.
20 Ibid.; Author's interview with Moses Ndlovu, 11 July 1995.
21 Author's interview with Philip Dladla, 18 July 1995.
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jump off and hand out stickers and pamphlets to passers-by.22 Some of the red stickers carried the
slogan 'Magundane phumani e-Sarmcol ('Rats get out of Sannco!,).23 The 'rats' were those who
were taking the jobs of the strikers. One of my interviewees pointed out that the bus did not really
break down; the stalling of the buses was an orchestrated strategy.24 One interesting aspect of this
demonstration was that the strikers chose Saturday because they knew that many people would be
shopping in the city centre. Mthunzi Makhathini, who was one ofthe strikers, pointed out that:
'We brought the city centre to a standstill not only to get the attention ofthe people
but also the attention ofthe Sanncol boss.es because we knew that most of them do
their shopping in Pietermaritzburg over the weekends' .25
This action by the strikers caught the police unaware and they later escorted the strikers along
Edendale Road to a mass meeting that was going to take place at the Edendale Lay Ecumenical
Centre. One ofmy informants pointed out that the treatment they got from the police from the very
first Friday of their strike was harsh.
26
While in other instances relating to the strike the police
acted harshly, during this protest action in the city, they acted with surprising restraint. On the way
to Edendale, the strikers were singing in their buses and one of their main slogans was; 'Wathinta
uMAWU udakwe yinil" (You must be drunk to play with MAWU!)27, and in that way they drew
people's attention along the road to Edendale.28
Members of youth and community organisations also attended the mass _rp.eeting at the Lay
22 Bonnin, 'Class, Consciousness and Conflict', p.218; 1. Fairb~ Flashes in her Soul- the life ofJabu
Ndlovu (Cape To~ Buchu, 1991), p.49; The Natal Witness, 01 July 1985; Author's interview with Alfred
Ndlovu, Pietennaritzburg, 23 September 1995.
23 WeeklyMail, 5-11 July 1985, p.3.
24 Author's interviews with Philip Dladla, 18 July 1995, Alfred Ndlovu, 03 September 1995 and Mthunzi
Makhathini, 12 August 1995.
25 Author's interview with Mthunzi Makhathini, 12 August 1995.
26 Ibid.
27 Weekly Mail, 2-11 July 1985.
The buses in the city centre.
The Mawu oroteS! procession moves ::-Jrouarl !fT.CJil.
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Ecumenical Centre. They all pledged their support for the Sarmcol workers' struggle. This was the
first signal that the Sarmcol conflict was not going to be a mere factory issue. Thulo points out that:
'Mawu's efforts to win community support succeeded and the Sarmcol workers
gained the support ofmany community organisations ranging from the clergy, civic,
youth and labour' .29
After that meeting, strikers proceeded to the nearby Imbali Township. They marched in Imbali
stages 1 and 2 and held street meetings in order to explain to the residents why they went on strike,
and to plea for support. In their demonstration in Imbali they were joined by groups of youths and
other residents. Some ofthe workers' delegates were also sent to other townships such as Sobantu
and Ashdown. It was said that workers chose to demonstrate in Edendale and Imbali townships
because many ofthe scab labourers at Sarmcol Game from these areas. 30 However, it could also be
argued that they chose Imbali due to the fact that the township had gained a name for itself as a
place of radical political consciousness, and they needed the support of the recently formed and
influential Imbali Youth Organisation. They came to Imbali while there was still that climate of
resistance after the anti-Koornhofdemonstrations of 1984. Working against the strikers' appeals for
solidarity was Pietermaritzburg's high unemployJnent rate, which meant that there was a large pool
of replacement labour for Sarmcol to draw on.
The Sarmcol stayaway in Pietermari1zburg: Its course, pattern and political
repercussions
Following solidarity marches in the city centre, Edendale and Imbali, the Federation of South
African Trade Unions (FOSATU) decided, at its congress on 30 June 1985, to call for a stayaway
28 The Natal Witness, 01 July 1985; Echo, 04 July 1985; Weekly Mail, 2-11 July 1985.
29 T. Thulo, 'Violence in Pietennaritzburg', in F. Meer, Resistance in the Townships (Durban, Madiba,
1989), p.197.
30 The Natal Witness, 01 July 1985; Echo, 04 July 1985; Weekly Mail, 05-11 July 1985.
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in support ofthe dismissed Sarmcol workers. This national conference resolution was to be referred
back to the local shopstewards for deliberations and consultation at shopfloor level, and also to
community organisations. The federation decided to confine the stayaway to Pietennaritzburg and
to build up support activities in the rest of Natal.
31
One could argue that this decision was taken
because this was a local and factory-related issue. A stayaway would be easier to monitor and co-
ordinate if it was localised, and for one day only. Pietermaritzburg was also a strategic choice
because there were many businesses there that would be hurt by the stayaway.
The stayaway was first discussed with community and youth organisations on July 4, and two days
later another mass meeting attended by about 1500 people was held at the Edendale Lay
Ecumenical Centre with different organisations such as the UDF, African People's Democratic
Unions of South Africa (APDUSA) members and church leaders represented
32
Further meetings
were held with student, civic and political organisations. In areas such as Mpophomeni and
KwaMevana, where street and area committees had been formed after the strike, it was easy to let
people know about the daily proceedings and resolutions taken at meetings.33
The UDF was, however, concerned about the fact that it had not been properly consulted. Many of
the activists were members of UDF-affiliated organisations and of trade unions such as MAWO
concurrently. The UDF believed that its own relations~R to the community demanded an earlier
consultation, direct involvement in the planning, and use as the main channel of communication
with the township communities.34 MAWO, on the other hand, viewed the stayaway as representing
31 Bonnin and Sitas, 'Lessons from the Sanncol strike', p.53.
32 L M G, 'Monitoring the Sarmcol Struggle', p. 100.
33 Author's interview with Mthunzi Makhathini, Pietermaritzburg, 12 August 1995.
34 Author's interview with Philip Dladla, 11 July 1995; LMG, 'Monitoring the Sarmcol Struggle', p.
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one stage in the unions' struggle against Sarmcol, and felt that the dispute concerned the union
fundamentally whilst the place of community groups lay in supporting union-based decisions. The
issue was whether the stayaway should be used as an exercise in mobilising and educating people or
whether the action. should focus on factory-based issues.
35
Nevertheless, the UDF ultimately
participated fully in the stayaway. Many of the Front's members, especially youth groups were
active in the organisation of the stayaway, and it was agreed that they work together so that the
state could not take advantage oftheir disagreements. 36
Following these differences amongst organisers it was reported in The Weekly Mail that at a
meeting attended by almost 2000 people, the i ea of a general stayaway was unanimously voted
for. It was als'o reported that MAWU's Geoft' Schreiner had telexed the Pietennaritzburg Chamber
of Industry urging it to intervene, failing which the stayaway was to take place. Not surprisingly,
the Pietennaritzburg Chamber of Industries (PCI), together with the Chamber of Commerce and
the Afrikaanse Sakekamer, issued a joint staternent refusing to be enmeshed in the dispute. They
also called on workers to ignore calls for a stayav/ay from work. Their statement read:
'The policy of the three bodies and its members is to impartially serve the interests
of all workers and management alike and ask that workers present themselves at
their workplaces on Thursday and subsequently'.37
This statement was ambiguous, to say the least, in suggesting that the interests of the workers and
management were compatible and that the Charnbers served worker interests~ it also showed how
business sought to undermine ofthe combination ofunions and community organisations. That was
typical ofthe attitude ofbusiness to matters like stayaways and boycotts.
110.
35 Ibid.
36 Bollll.iI\ 'Class, Consciousness and Conflict', p. .2l9~ The same point also came out of the author's
interview with Sobhuza Dlamini, 12 July 1995.
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The refusal of business to intervene encouraged MAWU to go ahead with the stayaway. After
consultation and negotiation it was decided that the day of the stayaway would be the 18th of July
1985. Many ofthe FOSATU unions and UDF affiliates supported the call by MAWU. Members of
MAWU in other centres planned to stage demonstrations in order to show support for the Sarmcol
struggle. Inkatha did not support the stayaway call. This expanded the problem to a broader
political arena and resulted in strained relations not only between MAWU and Inkatha, but also
between the UDF-affiliated organisations and Inkatha in the Greater Pietermaritzburg area.
38




The stayaway was going to be for one day only. Through union networks, many workers got to
know about the stayaway and why they had to stay at home. The message was mostly disseminated
by word of mouth, no pamphlets were issued, and it only came to wider public awareness when it
was mentioned in the morning newspapers on July 17th when The Natal Witness published a full
page report.
40 It was also reported in the Zulu-medium newspaper Ilanga that the stayaway
organisers went to churches to disseminate the message.
41
The youth were active in publicising the
stayaway and in telling people not to go to work on that day. In Imbali, members ofIYO and other
young people spread the word. On Wednesday 17th July, youth boarded buses and travelled
-
around the township shouting to let people knO\\7 that they should not go to work on the following
day. One of my interviewees said:
37 The Natal Witness, 17 July 1985.
38 RadforcL 'The Psychological Effects ofMass Dismissal', pp. 9-10.
39 AitchisoI\ 'Numbering the Dead', p.42.
40 The Natal Witness, 17 July 1985~ Bonnin, 'Class, Consciousness and Conflict', p.220~ Leeb and
RadforcL 'On-going Effects ofMass Dismissal', p.4.
41
Ilanga, 18-20 July 1985.
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'We travelled around the township and told people about the stayaway. We just
told them and there was no time to ex lain and we were not as careful when it
came to explanation because we knew that buses and taxis were not going to
operate on that day. We also knew that there would be people who were going to
wake up and explain to people who would be seen in bus stops or travelling to
42
town on foot' .
In the light of the above quotation one could argue that the stayaway call was going to be heeded
even by those who were reluctant to do so. The fact that there was no explanation given implied
that people would be scared ofgoing to work as that shouting in itself symbolised coercion of some
kind.
Organisers visited shop and factory owners in both Pietermaritzburg and Howick and asked them
to support the stayaway. Amidst reports of intimidation of workers some factories and businesses
decided to close and advised their black employees not to report to work.43 Youths in the schools
knew about the stayaway and as they were already politicised it was unlikely that they were going
to report for classes on that· day. The city of Pietermaritzburg was being geared up for the
stayaway. Painted slogans appeared in various townships early on Wednesday morning calling for
workers not to go to work.
Many bus drivers were members of the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) and they
were sympathetic to the cause of the strikers and supported the stayaway Ca)!.44 Some factories
negotiated with their workers to sleep on their premises. One of those was BTR Sarmco~ which
reported that production was going to continue as it had its entire staff This was also the case with
42 Author's interview with S. Dlamini from Imbali, 12 July 1985.; P. Dladla, 18 July 1995, pointed out that
their worker education process helped in ensuring that people stayed away. He also pointed out that there
were people who were going to monitor the stayaway and it was also their duty to explain to those who were
standing in bus stops.
43 The Natal Witness, 18 July 1985.
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Hullett AluminiUm, one of the big factories along the Edendale Road, most of whose African
workforce resided in the townships and in the Vulindlela area.
45
Major Pieter Kitching explained
that police would give protection to buses and people who wished to go to work. 46 Furthennore,
the Natal Divisional Commissioner ofthe South African Police, Brigadier Mulder van Eyck, issued
a statement on 17 July saying
'As from today on a 24-hour basis for as long as is necessary, police patrol units
will patrol all bus routes in Edendale, Imbali and Mpophomeni and all black
towns~~s in and around greater Pietennaritzburg to render protection and keep
peace'.
Police statements showed how serious the issue was, revealing perceptions that the stayaway
would be widespread and that it needed to be countered.
On the morning of 18 July 1985, roads in the townships in the Greater Pietennaritzburg area were
full of police and anny vehicles. There was no passenger transport on the main Edendale Road to
the city. No bread and milk deliveries were made to the townships. It was reported that thirty
municipal buses were stoned in Imbali and Sobantu on the eve of the stayaway.48 Thousands of
school children heeded the stayaway call in areas such as Imbali, Edendale, Ashdown, Sobantu and
Mpophomeni. It was expected that schoolchildren would heed the stayaway as there was already a
culture of boycotts in schools, and there was a widely accepted perception that they had nothing to
lose, as their education was poor. Unlike many of the workers, to whom one clay of staying away
carried serious financial implications, young activists clamoured for the prolonging of the stayaway
and they were excited about it.
44 Author's interview with Alfred Ndlovu, 23 September 1995.
45 'Mass stayaway has capital at standstill' The Daiiy News, 19 July 1985.
46 The Natal Witness, 17 July 1985; The Daily News, 18 July 1985.
47 The Natal Witness, 18 July 1985.
48 Butler et al., 1mbali, p.162.
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The day started quietly in many townships with rnost people remaining indoors. Barricades were
put up to block many of the townships' main roads. Probably these had been put up at night in
order to prevent people from going to work and also to hinder police and army vehicles. Fierce
confrontations between the police and crowds of youths which had flocked to the streets in order
to show their political strength and support for the stayaway were reported later in the day. Police
fired teargas and rubber bullets to disperse these crowds. Interestingly, crowds moved out into the
streets to fight the police rather than remaining indoors. Thousands of youths took to the streets,
singing freedom songs that ridiculed and denigrated President P. W. Botha and apartheid, and
others that praised and extolled the banned African National Congress (ANC) and its leaders such
as Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo. They were chanting slogans of resistance, some of which
were anti-police while others conscientised people about the banned organisations and oppression
in South Afiica. They referred to the broader political situation in South Africa, not just the
Sarmcol issue. Incidents of stone throwing, looting and arson were reported in the townships even
though the police were there with their spotter planes.
49
There were conflicting views as to what
actually instigated unrest. Imbali clergymen pointed out in their statement that
'For the greater part of the morning all ",ras peaceful. With the appearance of the
police in the vans and casspirs more people were drawn to the streets and a
noticeable disturbance of the public peace ensued with the police in heavy
50
armour'.
Brigadier van Eyck who contended that the community welcomed the police, denied this.
The stayaway gained a different kind of momentum in the afternoon when crowds in different
townships came out in large numbers to loot and destroy a variety of properties including SYmbols
of oppression in the townships, such as beerhalls and administration ofiic~s. Police reported that a
49 The Natal Witness, 19 July 1985.
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room in the Ashdown Administration office was burnt out and a section of the Ashdown beerhall
was damaged. Some passing vehicles were also toned. The Witness also reported that there was an
attack on Chief Mini's "kraal" at Machibise. A crowd set alight the furnishings of a beerhall at
Machibise. The KwaDaya store in Edendale was looted. In Imbali two beerhalls were gutted by fire
51
and the house of the local Inkatha leader Abdul Awetha was petrol-bombed. In Sobantu a large
crowd of youth gathered to demand the release of four members of the Sobantu Youth
Organisation (SOYO) who had been arrested following a demonstration in the township on the
previous day.(see Maps 4and 5)
At Mpophomeni, where most of the strikers resided, roads were barricaded using old cars covered
with human excrement from the bucket system.52 This action can be viewed as either a way of
registering protest about the sewerage system or of preventing the police from removing the cars.
The beerhall at Mpophomeni was burnt and the some ofthe houses of scab workers were set alight.
The Howick Fire Department ran out of water and the problem was exacerbated by the fact that
the main water pipe to the township was being repaired. Police struggled as four different groups
started fires simultaneously in different parts of the township. 53 One of my infonnants pointed that
the police and the army provoked most of the youth's activities on that day, and that the security
forces were regarded as the iron heel of the state's intention to suppress popular mobilisation. 54 The
possibility of criminal elements taking advantage of the situation by looting some businesses should
50 Echo, 25 July 1985.
51 The Natal Witness, 19 July 1985; J.Aitchison, 'Numbering the Dead', p.45;
52 .
The Natal Witness, 19 August 1985.
53 Bonnin, 'Class, Consciousness and Conflict', pp.220-221; In my interview with Sobhuza Dlamini from
Imbali, 12 July 1995. He pointed out that there appeared to be no co-ordinated action in the burning of
beerhalls. He stated that people themselves identified beerhalls with apartheid as they did in the 1930s and
1950s. Referring to the burning ofImbali beerhall he argued that income from it helped to build Imbali Stage
Two and that Kruger (township manager) could be seen frequenting the Imbali beerhall.
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be taken into consideration when trying to understand what happened in the townships.
Hospital workers were exempted from participating in the stayaway due to the essential nature of
their jobs. However, Grey's Hospital, which was in the city, had 99% of its black workforce absent
from work.55 For many African workers to reach Grey's Hospital they had to use public transport,
which was not available on that day. Surprisingly, no deaths were reported as a result of the
stayaway and there were few injuries. One ofthe major reasons for the success of the stayaway was
the lack of transport. However, even if transport was available the whole climate of that day
showed that the day was for resistance against apartheid and not just the Sarmcol issue. The roles
played by young people, many ofwhom were members ofUDF-affiliated organisations, in ensuring
that many people heeded the stayaway call were significant.
There were mixed reactions to the stayaway as different groups and institutions began to express
their views the following day. MAWU regarded it as an outstanding success. The union's
spokesperson Geoff Schreiner argued that
'The almost 100% stayaway by black workers clearly demonstrates the overall
support for the workers at Sarmcol and their desire to see that they are immediately
. d,56remstate .
He dismissed the view that intimidators were responsible for the stayaway on Thursday. However,
it should be taken into account that Schreiner, as one ofthe organisers, woulcf like to downplay any
kind of coercion that might have taken place. His r~sponse, which denied coercion, was shaped by
his position and it should not be uncritically accepted. It was not, however, only MAWUs view
that the stayaway was well supported~ other sources also rated the stayaway between 80 and 100%
54 Author's interview with Mthunzi Makhathini, 12 August 1995.




The reactions of both the police and the Chambers of Commerce and Industry were very hostile.
Both saw the effective stayaway as the work of intimidators. The Pietennaritzburg Chamber of
Commerce threatened to take legal action if there was a repeat of the stayaway and advised
members ofthe Chamber who had been affected by the stayaway to lodge protests with the unions.
The President of the Pietennaritzburg Chamber of Industries, Mr Louis Sennett, said, 'the PCI
deplores the actions ofMAWU in allowing a single industrial dispute to affect the lives and welfare
of thousands of innocent people'. 58 This type of reaction was also expressed by some of the black
people who had stayed away when they complained about youths that had stoned buses and set up
barricades. 59This reaction by some people fiom the townships was a manifestation of the
complexities involved in the enforcement of the stayaway, and it also puts into question claims by
the organisers that all people willingly stayed away.
Conclusion
Ofmore significance than disagreements about the stayaway was its impact on mass mobilisation in
Pietennaritzburg. There had not been an action that had involved both workers and communities
on such a large scale before in the Pietennaritzburg region. During the 1950s, which have been
-
hailed as a decade of defiance, Pietennaritzburg did not experience large-scale mass mobilisation.
The 1985 stayaway occurred in a city whose townships were beginning to experience revolts that
had become prevalent in other areas for many years. This stayaway transformed political
56 The Natal Witness, 20 July 1985.
57 Leeb and Radford, 'On-going Effects of Mass Dismissal', p.4; Bonnin and Sitas, 'Lessons from the
Sanncol strike', p.53.
58 The Natal Witness, 20 July 1985.
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mobilisation in Pietennaritzburg because the city had not had disturbances during the much-
celebrated Soweto revolts of 1976. Furthennore, the 1973 strikes seemed not to have had any
significant impact on Pietermaritzburg compared to Durban. Many fanner activists and trade
unions regard the ·Sarmcol stayaway as a watershed in mass mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg.
60
The success of this stayaway laid the foundation for other future actions, as political organisations
and trade unions had learnt the lessons from the Sarmcol struggle. The barricades in the streets
were not just a show of solidarity for the strikers but a way of confronting the government
represented by its security forces. The mobilisation of community support by direct union activity
was another major step in mass mobilisation. Furthennore, organising was not left to the leadership
but was taken over by ordinary members. What also made the stayaway a vital factor in mass
mobilisation was that unlike the other incidents, such as the Sobantu boycotts and demonstrations
and the anti-Koornhof demonstrations, here was a common issue that united people from different
townships. Hence it has been argued that 'the Sarmcol issue and the workers' campaigns became
the lever through which mass mobilisation became feasible in Pietennaritzburg. ,61 Even though the
action did not succeed in gaining the reinstatement of sacked workers it became a catalyst for mass
mobilisation in the Pietennaritzburg region and harted the course for future struggles. It is likely
that the stayway was a success in terms of anti-apartheid politics, but some will surely see it
differently considering the fact that the dismissed workers were not victonous over Sarmcol.
Nevertheless, one should point out that mass mobilisation for the subsequent national stayaways in
Pietermarirzburg took a cue from the 1985 in ident. Between 1985 and 1989 stayaways both
59 Echo, 25 July 1985.
60 Author's interviews with Dumezweni Zimu, 03 August 1995, Moses Ndlovu, 11 July 1995 and
Alfred Ndlovu, 23 September 1995.
61 L M G, 'Monitoring the Sarmcol Struggle', p. 109.
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national and local, were well supported in Pietermaritzburg. During the second half of 1989 another
strategy ofmass mobilisation began to be utilised as part ofthe Defiance Campaign.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Taking the Resistance Crowd into the City Centre: The
Defiance Campaign March in Pietermaritzburg, 1989
The main focus of this chapter is the analysis of t e protest march that took place in the city on 21
September 1989. This event has been selected because it required a different organising strategy
from that ofa stayaway and because it signalled the beginning of a new kind of mass mobilisation in
local politics. There will be an attempt to find out why and how the march was organised, and to
offer insights into the nature of crowd behaviour during and after the march. It was the first big
march in the city after the relaxation of the Emergency regulations and it symbolised the taking of
the struggle from the Afiican townships to the central business district. Before discussing this
particular march of September 1989 I will start by giving a brief overview of political mobilisation
in the Pietermaritzburg region after the Sarmcol stayaway of 1985.
Background to the 1989 marches
Since the 1985 Sarmcol stayaway there had been many other stayaways and boycotts, some
national and local, which had been well supported in the Pietermaritzburg region. Some schools in
Imbali, Edendale, Sobantu and Mpophomeni experienced boycotts for few days during August
1985. Reasons for that school boycott included the continuing State of Emergency, detentions,
township violence and the murder of Mrs Victoria Mxenge. 1 About 100 youths began what was
described as a spontaneous demonstration and smashed shops in the city cen!re when they were
returning from Mxenge's memorial service.
2
During this. period a consumer boycott was organised
to protest against the Sarmcol dismissals.
The period beginning from 1986 saw many school boycotts taking place in the Greater
I A. 1. Jeffery, The Natal Story: 16 Years a/Conflict (Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race
Relations, 1997), p. 52.
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Pietermaritzburg area. Towards the end of 1985 independent unions had merged to form the
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), while the pro-Africanist unions formed the
National Azanian Council of Trade Unions (NACTU). From the beginning COSATU worked
closely with the UDF and other progressive community organisations. There was a merger of civic
and worker issues and workers increasingly felt obliged to support the communities to which they
belonged. However, the relationship between the unions and political organisations was not always
smooth as some unions were opposed to the involvement of workers in community issues, while
others believed that a worker and a community member were inseparable.
3
During the same year
the State of Emergency, which had been proclaiJned on 21 July 1985, was renewed in June 1986,
and this time it was extended to cover Natal.
The State ofEmergency severely affected mass rnobilisation, as organisations could not hold rallies
and other outdoor meetings and their leaders could not be quoted in newspapers. Even though
political organisations had flexible strategies that could be adjusted to changing circumstances, the
State of Emergency, nevertheless, still posed a formidable challenge. It was through trade unions
that political organisations could continue mobilising publicly, although some trade union leaders
were victims of police harassment.
4
During 1986, COSATU and the UDF jointly called for nation-
wide stayaways on May Day and June 16, and in early October, these organisations committed
themselves to a joint campaign ofNational United Action against the State ofEmergency. 5
On May 1, a new trade union federation, -the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA),
was launched at Kings Park Stadium in Durban, with Inkatha's ChiefMangosuthu Buthelezi as the
2 The Natal Witness, 10 August 1985.
3 Author's interviews with Moses Ndlovu, Pietermaritzburg, 11 July 1995 and Sobhuza Dlamini,
Pietermaritzburg, 12 July 1995.
4 Author's interview with Alfred Ndlovu, Pietermaritzburg, 23 September 1995.
5 M. Swilling, 'The United Democratic Front and the Township Revolt', in R. Cobbett and R. Cohen
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main speaker. The fonnation of UWUSA was seen as Inkatha's answer to COSATU, whose
president, Elijah Barayi, had openly declared that ChiefButhelezi should be isolated and ostracised.
The launch of this new federation was going to add another dimension to the simmering conflict
between Inkatha and the UDF-COSATU alliance. In December 1986, four Sanncol Workers' Co-
operative members were abducted from Mpophomeni and three of them were shot and set alight at
Lions River near Howick. 6 It was alleged that Inkatha members were responsible for this, as this
happened while Inkatha was having a rally at Mpophomeni Community Hall. It is likely that
Sanncol had a role in exacerbating political polarisation because, early in 1987, the company
recognised UWUSA although it had refused to recognise MAWO after a long period of
negotiations.
7
There were also frictions between the UDF supporting youths and the Black
Consciousness youth. The conflict between the UDF-COSATU alliance and Inkatha began to
escalate in 1987, after the anti-whites-only election stayaway ofMay 5 - 6.
8
COSATU and the UDF had called for a natio al stayaway in May 1987. In Pietennaritzburg the
organisation for the stayaway went well and it had the support of the bus drivers who belonged to
the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU). The Inkatha yeNkululeko yeSizwe came out
openly against the call for the stayaway and Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi prorogued the KwaZulu
(Eds), Popular Struggles in South Africa (London, James Currey, 1988), p. 93.
6 J. Radford and W. Leeb, 'The Sanncol strike and the Effect of Job loss on the Community of
Mpophomeni', paper to Workshop on Regionalism and Restructuring in Natal, Pletennaritzburg,
University ofNatal, 28-31 July 1988, p. 5; Jeffery, The }{qtal Story, p. 60; Author's interview with
Alfred Ndlovu, 23 September 1995. (The victims were Phineas Sibiya, Simeon Ngubane and Flomena
Mnikathi. The fourth, Mika Sibiya, managed to escape). -
7 J. Radford and W. Leeb, 'Sanneal strike', p. 3; J. J. W. Aitchison, 'Numbering the Dead: The Course
and Pattern of Political Violence in the Natal Midlands, 1987-1989', Unpublished MA Thesis,
Pietermaritzburg, university ofNatal, 1993, p. 45.
8 For a detailed analysis of the stayaway in Pietermaritzburg see S. M. Mkhize 'Mass Mobilisation and
Resistance: A Study of selected stayaways and protest marches in Pietennaritzburg, 1985-1989',
Unpublished BA Honours Thesis, Pietermaritzburg, University ofNatal, 1995, pp. 41-56; Y·. Bharnjee,
et aI., 'The May 5 - 6
th
worker stayaway in Pietermaritzhurg, 1987', in Reality, (1987) 19:4, pp. 14-
15, July; M. Kentridge, An UnoffiCial War: Inside the conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town, David
Philip, 1990).
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Legislative Assembly, so that members could go to their 'constituencies' and campaign against the
stayaway. He perceived the stayaway as a "declaration of war" and referred to it as a "grossly
irresponsible action".9 However, despite all these counter-mobilisation measures the stayaway was
a success in the Pietermaritzburg region. It was soon followed by Inkatha's forced recruitment
campaign. It is to these events that many people trace the origins of political violence in the
Pietermaritzburg region. 10
Mass mobilisation against the state after 1987 took place in the context of war in the
Pietermaritzburg region and of the tightening of 'law and order'. Many people were dying as a
result of political violence, and political polarisation between Inkatha and the UDF-COSATU
alliance was continuing. TGWU bus drivers became the main targets of assassinations and these
were related to their support for the stayaways. The UDF youth, popularly known as amaqabane,
were in the forefront of both mass mobilisation and conflict in Pietermaritzburg. It was during this
period of intense conflict that areas townships in Edendale were renamed and given names like
Moscow, Lusaka, Angola, Tanzania, Maputo and Cuba.11 From 1988 onwards there were many
detentions of prominent political figures. In February 1988, the UDF and 17 other anti-apartheid
political organisations were banned. This affected political mobilisation nationally as well as locally.
It was left up to the church groups and trade unions to continue with mass mobilisation. However,
COSATU was able to organise a three-day stayaway in June to protest against the proposed
9 The Natal Witness, 5 May 1987; llanga, 4 May 1987. The Zulu medium newspaper, whicp- had
recently been bought by Inkatha, reported that members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA),
all of whom were Inkatha, unanimously rejected the stayaway and called on the UDF and COSATU not
to use intimidation in order to enforce the stayaway.
10 For more on this see 1. Aitchison, 'Numbering the Dead'; N. N. Bhebhe, 'Mobilization, Conflict and
Repression: The United Democratic Front and Political Struggles in the Pietermaritzburg region, 1983-
1991 " Unpublished MA Thesis, Pietermaritzburg, University ofNatal, 1996; Kentridge, An UnoffiCial
War; A. Jeffery, The Natal Story.
II Jeffrey, The Natal Story, p. 67. (Some of the struggle names are no longer in use but Moscow seems
to have stood the test of changes. It is likely that future generations will forget that the area was once
called Madakaneni).
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Labour Relations Act. The stayaway was well supported in Pietennaritzburg. Even in the context
ofwar, political mobilisation continued and mean and ways ofworking under the constraints of the
State of emergency were devised. A local trade unionist had this to say:
'We continued with mass mobilisation, using different strategies that were appropriate for
that particu~ar context. One strategy was to use football games by coming there and taking
some ofthe boys aside, as ifwe were planning for the match. The other tactic we used was
to attend parents' school meetings or just to hijack the meetings in order to get the older
12people'.
The political conflict took a step further when people began attacking each other in central
Pietermaritzburg. Demarcation of zones of influence by rival organisations, which was a feature in
the townships, began to apply to the city streets as well. People had to be careful which streets they
traversed, as political demarcations had been transported to the city's business district.
The same context of conflict continued to haunt Pietennaritzburg during 1989. The year began with
changes at government level, and in the broader national political context, as the balance of forces
was rapidly moving against the apartheid state. There was also a spiralling of defiant hunger strikes
by political prisoners and this marked the beginning ofa campaign ofdisobedience. 13 In June 1989 a
stayaway was called in the Pietermaritzburg region against the death of Jabu Ndlovu and the on-
going political violence. The aim was not only to mourn Jabu's death, but also to show the South
Afiican government that people could no longer tolerate the violence that was ravaging the Natal
Midlands.
14
That stayaway was related to a local issue and was also confined to Pietermaritzburg,
as was the case with the Sarmcol stayaway. However, due to a plethora of reasons such as the lack
ofproper organisation and consultation, the stayaway failed to mobilise many people and it got little
12 Author's interview with Moses Ndlovu, 12 July 1995.
13 IDAF, Review of1989: Resistance and Repression in South Africa and Namibia (London,
International Defence and Aid fund for Southern Africa, 1990), p. 3.
14 Author's interviews with Philip Dladla, 18 July 1995 and Alfred Ndlovu, 23 September 1995;
Interview with Thami MoWomi of COSATU (Natal) in which he outlined the demands and goals of the
stayaway that took place in Pietermaritzburg from 5-7 June 1989, in South African Labour Bulletin,
(1989), June, 14:2 (1989/90), pp. 67-68.
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support as some factories reported a 100% attendance and buses operated as normal.
15
After the
stayaway, which consisted of two days of "peaceful protest action" the era of protest marches
began, and these marches involved taking resistance crowds into the city centres and these involved
very different strategies to those that were aimed at letting people stay at home.
Later in 1989 year the government eased some restrictions on anti-apartheid political activity, while
political organisations from both inside and outside the country took advantage of the crisis within
the state and accelerated mass mobilisation, adopting new strategies for the situation. The Mass
Democratic Movement (MDM), which had been formed early in the year, committed itself to
mobilise the masses against the state and it revitalised the strategy of protest marches. For the first
time since the 1950s, political organisations could march or hold public demonstrations without fear
of being detained. However, there were instances where people were shot during some of these
marches. The IvIDM was a coalition of progressive movements, including the UDF and COSATU,
and had the advantage that it was an amorphous mass movement and the police could not break it
easily by detaining its leadership or banning it. The IvIDM's Defiance Campaign, inspired by the
principle of non-violent protest action, ridiculed the government's apartheid policy and the State of
16
Emergency.
The Mass Democratic Movement and 1989 Defiance Campaigns: A brief overview
The year 1989 was an important one in mass mobilisation. From the beginning ofthe year the mass
movement regained the initiative and the close working relationship between COSATU and the
UDF took on a more permanent character, and the alliance became known as the IvIDM. 17 To
15 The Natal Witness, 8 June 1989.
16 C. Merretl, 'Introduction', The Emergency ofthe State - A Source Guide to South African Political
Issues (Pietennaritzburg, University ofNatal, 1993), p. 2.
17 IDAF, Apartheid: The Facts (London, International Defence and Aid Fund on Southern Africa,
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avoid being banned, as had happened to the UDF the previous year; the MDM was not constituted
as a formal organisation. The MDM embarked on a campaign of defiance during 1989 during
which many organisations were rebuilt and emerged openly.18 The campaign entailed protest
marches, consumer boycotts, hunger strikes by detainees, calls for the release of political detainees
and the unbanning of organisations, and civil disobedience to challenge segregated public amenities
such as buses, beaches and other government-controlled facilities such as hospitals and schools. 19
Open-air meetings attended by large crowds accompanied the campaign and it involved the taking
--
of thousands o~~eople, acting in largely disciplined and orderly ways, to the streets. 20 In contrast
to the confrontations between youths and the police in the streets ofthe townships, the struggle was
taken into the city centres that were perceived as the domains of white authority. This sustained
pressure by the MDM forced the authorities to modify their repressive tactics, allowing some mass
meetings and demonstrations. This attitude by the authorities signalled a change, as this was
different from the official policies that were p rsued during that time with regard to extra-
parliamentary opposition. During this climate of defiance many organisations and individuals
publicly defied restrictions by declaring themselves unbanned. 21
During the same year there was a dramatic change in governmental politics - P. W. Botha was
replaced by F. W. de Klerk as State President of the Republic of South Afiica.22 There were
modifications in the government's strategy regarding extra-parliamentary opposition. Coercion and
restrictions on protest activities, which had been part of the Botha government strategy, were
1991), p. 109; T. Lodge and B. Nasson, All, Here and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the
1980s (Cape Town, David Philip, 1991), p. Ill.
18 IDAF, Apartheid: The Facts, p. 109.
19 . . .
R. Schrire, Adapt or DIe: The End ofWhite Politics in South Africa (Ford Foundation and Foreign
Policy association, 1991), p. 112; Lodge and Nassou, All, Here and Now, p. Ill; IDAF, Apartheid: the
Facts, p. 109; N. Worden, The Making ofModern South Africa: Conquest, Segregation and Apartheid
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1994), p. 136.
20 IDM, Apartheid: the Facts, p.l09.
21 Ib·d1.,p.ll0.
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relaxed even though most anti-apartheid organisations were still banned and their leaders restricted
or detained. For reasons that are still subject to debate the new government committed itself to
negotiations with the then banned African National Congress. The MDM emerged in that context
and, from August, it unleashed its defiance carnpaign in the form of protest marches and the
symbolic occupation of racially segregated areas.
23
In July 1989 the MDM announced that it would engage in a defiance campaign which would be
organised around 'a peaceful programme of non-violent mass action directed against apartheid
laws and addressing the immediate demands ofthe people' .24 The MDM wanted to show that
'After three years of emergency rule, the apartheid regime had gained a degree of
physical control in which most of South Africa's population lived, but it had clearly
not destroyed the structures of organised resistance nor had it made progress in
establishing legitimacy for itself or its collaborators' .25
The Defiance Campaign marches were aimed at adapting resistance strategies to changing political
circumstances, and they were important in taking the struggle from the townships to the city centres
in order to draw international attention to the plight of the oppressed people in South Africa. The
marches were also a way of conveYing to white voters that the struggles of the oppressed people
were not simply something they watched on their televisions or read about in the newspapers.26
There is some debate as to whose interests these protest marches served. The liberation movements
benefited from these marches as strategies of mass mobilisation while, on the other hand, the state
22 Schrire, Adapt or Die, 111-113.
23 Author's interview with Cassius Lubis~ Pietennaritzburg, 20 September 1995. Cassius pointed out that
the idea of a defiance campaign did not emanate from inside the country but from the ANC in exile. He said
the ANC came up with the idea when some UDF and COSATU leaders went outside the country to report the
situation to the ANC.
24 'Non-Government Initiatives and Protest', Race Relations Survey, 1989/90, (Johannesburg, South
African Institute ofRace Relations, 1990), p. 222.
25
IDAF, Review of 1989, Repression and Resistance in South Africa and Namibia, Fact Paper on
Southern Africa No 18, (London, International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1990), p. 6.
26 Author's interviews with Dumezweni Zimu, Pietennaritzburg, 03 August 1995 and Mthunzi Makhathini,
Pietennaritzburg, 12 August 1995.
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obtained international credibility for allowing these marches.
27
The protest march in Pietermaritzburg took place in this context. There had already been protest
marches in Cape Town, Pretoria and Johannesburg and these had drawn large crowds. There had
also been protest marches against racially segregated amenities such as schools, hospitals and
beaches in different parts of the country, including a highly successful 'occupation' of Durban's
racially segregated beaches.28 The situation in the Greater Pietermaritzburg area was still volatile
and political polarisation had worsened since 1987. The national anti-whites-only election
stayaway, which was called by the .MDM on 5-6 September 1989, had been well supported in
Pietermaritzburg.29 This was the context in which the mid-September defiance campaign march was
planned to take place in the city centre.
Organisation of the defiance campaign march in Pietermaritzburg
Obtaining a detailed picture of strategies that were used to organise the march in Pietermaritzburg
relied heavily on interviews, because ofthe dearth ofwritten documents. This march occurred when
many ofthe key political activists were still detained, while others were under restriction orders and
did not participate in the organisation of the march. This left a gap for certain church leaders and
trade unions to co-ordinate the organisation of the march. This was also the countrywide trend.
The Church as an institution was not openly harassed by the state for fear of tarnishing its own
'Christian' image.
3D
Trade unions, however, suffered as a result of detentions and restrictions
although few of their key officeholders had been detained when compared with township-based
27 Author's interview with Cassius Lubisi, 20 September 1995.
28 The Natal Witness, 4 September 1989; Race Relations Survey, 1989/90, p.223.
29 The Natal Witness, 6 September 1989; 'Natal bears the brunt of widespread stayaway' The Natal
Witness, 7 September 1989; Echo, 7 September 1989.
30 Author's interviews with Mthunzi Makhathini, 12 August 1995, Michael Worsnip, 7 September 1995,
Rod Bulman, 8 September 1995 and Cassius Lubisi, 20 September 1995; Lodge and Nasson, All, Here and
Now, p. 113; Schrire, Adapt or Die, pp. 84-87.
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organisations. This has been attributed to the fact that they were much less vulnerable to
immobilisation through the loss of their leaders, since their organisation was much tighter at the
rank and file level and that their organising functions took place inside factories.
31
A common explanation of mobilisation of the marches from the local political activists that I
interviewed was that they used the same strategies as they did with stayaways and they argued that
people had been mobilised in the previous actions and it was no longer difficult to communicate
with the people 'on the ground' .32 However, with the advantage of hindsight, it can be argued that
tactics for the march were different to those for a stayaway. Mobilising for a march needed different
tactics from those of a stayaways because these two strategies of mass mobilisation were altogether
different. The march required people to go out into the streets; stayaways required people to remain
in their homes.
Certain church groups had been involved in mass mobilisation and community struggles in
Pietennaritzburg before 1989.
33
From 1988, when anti-apartheid organisations were banned, it was
left up to the churches to continue with resistance, seeking to apply the gospel to the lives of
oppressed people, and to use biblical symbols and concepts to challenge apartheid.34 In the Natal
Midlands important centres of this activism included the Federal Theological Seminary (FEDSEM)
at Imbali, the Pietennaritzburg Agency for Cluistian Social Awareness (PACSA) and the South
African Council of Churches (SACC) offices in the city, and the St Joseph's Scholasticate in
Cedara. Certain denominations and groups in the region were represented in the MDM by an
31
Lodge and Nasson, All, Here and Now, p. 112.
32 Authorls interviews with Dumezweni Zimu, 3 August 1995 and Mthunzi Makhathini, 12 August 1995.
33 Author's interview with Michael Worsnip, 7 September 1995.
34 Author's interviews with Michael Worsnip, 7 September 1995, Rod Bulman, 8 September 1995 and
Cassius Lubisi, 20 September 1995.
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organisation called the Standing for the Truth (SFT) Campaign.35
It was within the SFT that most of the co-ordination and orchestration of the protest march took
place. The idea of staging a protest march in Pietennaritzburg was first mooted after a similar event
in Cape Town which had attracted a crowd of 30 000 to 50 000 people.
36
Archbishop Desmond
Tutu, Alan Boesak and the Mayor, Gordon Oliver, led the march in the streets of Cape Town. On
the day of the Cape Town peace march a solidarity service was held at The Cathedral of the Holy
Nativity in Pietennaritzburg. Approximately 700 people attended this service.
37
This can be viewed
as one of the signals that the city was being geared up for crowd gatherings in the centre of the city
itself
After that service there was a meeting ofthe Pietennaritzburg clergy and there the issue of a protest
march was deliberated in detail. Certain clergy had identified the issues around which they could
mobilise the people, and one of the critical issues was the restriction on funerals. Organisations
such as the banned UDF and COSATU supported the idea of a march when they were infonned
about it. 38 It was also decided that churches should be used to disseminate the word about the
protest march, and one ofmy infonnants pointed out that:
'The decision was taken that church structures such as umanyano and amadodana
in the case of the Methodists be used. People in the churches were told that they
were free to come regardless of their political affiliations, as that was not any
political party's march. We told the people that the march was to ~rotesf against the
abrogation of Christian values and principles oftruth and justice'. 9 _
Despite the assertions that political organisations were not invited it can be argued that COSATU
and organisations affiliated to the UDF had preferential treatment, as they were part of the 1\IDM,
35 Author1s interviews with Michael Worsnip, 7 September 1995 and Rod Bu1man, 8 September 1995.
36 The Natal Witness, 14 September 1989.
37 The Natal Witness, 14 September 1989, p.2
38 Author's interview with Rod Bu1man, 8 September 1995.
39 Ibid.
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unlike Inkatha, which was not part ofthe mass movement. Another informant stated that
'It was agreed that COSATU and UDF should mobilise at a political level in order
to ensure that people come to the march. The whole thing had to be done as
clandestinely as possible because we knew that the police would try to stop the
march. When people asked us about why Inkatha was not invited we told them that
there was no formal invitation to either UDF or COSATU' .40
After the programme for the march had been finalised it was
'decided to publicise it through newspapers and radio stations. Following lengthy
deliberations among the organisers it was agreed that other religious institutions should be
'invited to sUpport the march, giVing it a multi-faith dimension' .41
On 19 September, it was reported in the Natal Witness that a protest march was to take place in the
city on Thursday 21 September. The march was being planned jointly by the churches' Standing for
the Truth Campaign and by community organisations.42 Bishop Khoza Mgojo of the Methodist
church, who was on the SFT Executive, said the Inarch would be held in the nation-wide tradition
and was going to start from the Cathedral of the Holy Nativity in Church Street at 12:30 p.m. 43 He
pointed out that the march would proceed through the streets of the city centre to the Loop Street
Police Station, where a memorandum would be presented to the police. (See Map?) In line with the
national pattern of the Defiance Campaign, Bishop Mgojo pointed out that they would not ask for
pennission to march in the city. The organisers ofthe nlarch expected it to cut across organisational
barriers with people from numerous organisations and all walks of life participating, as the march
was open to "all people" opposed to apartheid no matter what their affiliations.44
The churches, community organisations, and the media helped in various ways, directly and
vicariously, to disseminate the message about the protest march. Through communication networks
40 Author's interview with Micbael Worsnip, 7 September 1995.
4\ Author's interview with RodB~ 8 September 1995.
-B 42 'Protest march to be held in city', The Natal Witness, 19 September 1989, p.!.
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Key to Central Area'Ma;l
3 - Capital Towers Hotel
10 - Imperial Hotel
12 - Lionel's Inn
27-Cinemas
32 - First National Bank
33 - First National Bank Branch
34-City Hall
35 - Voortrekker Museum
38 - Colonial Building
39 - Edgar's Store
41 - Main Post Office
47- Old Legislative Assembly
48 - Old Legislative Council
52 - Natal Museum
53 - The Natal Witness
54- Police HQ
58 - Old Presbyterian Church
60 - Tatham Art Gallery
61 - Old YMCA BUilding
63 - Publicity House
64 - Public Swimming Pool
66 - Reid's Building
70 - St. Peter's Church
72 - DUdgeon's Standard Bank
73 - Old Stock Exchanges
76 - Andries Pretorius' House
78 - Widow Retief's House
80 - NPA Headquarters
88 - Carbineer Gardens
89 - Supreme Court Gardens
BLUE - Pedestrian Areas
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and political structures at grassroots level, people were told that buses would travel around different
townships for people who wanted to go to the march.
45
How did the organisers attempt to ensure
that a substantial number of people went to the march? What mechanisms were used to draw
people out to the streets to come and march, rather than scaring them away from the roads by
putting up barricades? The section below seeks to examine the actual march, its course and its
aftermath.
The crowd and collective action in the streets of Pietermaritzburg
On 21 September The Natal Witness reported that the protest march for the city had been given the
go-ahead by the city's chief magistrate, Cecil Dicks, despite the organisers' refusal to apply for
permission. Dicks was concerned that there would be confrontation between the police and
marchers, as the police had warned the organisers that without permission the march would be
deemed illegal. Subsequently, organisers sent facsimiles to the Minister of Justice, the Minister of
Law and Order and President F. W. de Klerk informing them that the march would go ahead.
46
This political wrangling could be viewed from more than one perspective. On the one hand it was a
victory for the organisers who knew that in order to attract the masses they should adopt an anti-
police and anti-state stance, thus galvanising the prevailing attitudes of defiance in the townships.
This action should not be isolated from the context of Pietermaritzburg resistance politics at the
time. On the other hand, the fact that the magistrate gave permission could be viewed as a signal
that the state was still in control, seeking to bring the march within the confines of law and order.
At midday on Thursday 21 September buses went to the townships to collect people for the march
in the city. The crowd gathered at the Cathedral of the Holy Nativity for a short service before the
45 Author's interviews with Sobhuza Dlamini, 12 July 1995 and Dumezweni Zimu, 3 August 1995.
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march began at 1:15 p.m., instead of the previously announced 12:00 p.m. As the Cathedral could
not accommodate all the people, many, mostly youths, had to wait outside. The young people
were gathered in rectangles oftight formation.
47
There were feelings of anticipation, enthusiasm and
elation. The organisers had not expected such a huge crowd and, with the assistance of marshals,
order and discipline 'were maintained.
48
Apart from Christian groups there were also other religious
groups such as the Vheda Dharma Sabha and Muslim bodies represented by Mr S. Satgar and S,
Moola respectively. The Natal Indian Congress and COSATU were also represented, with Chris
Dlamini, vice-president of COSATU, representing the national MDM. These religious groups and
community organisations were going to hand memoranda to the police, outlining their grievances. 49
After the service the crowd ofapproximately 7 000 people, led by black and white religious leaders,
among them Bishop Mgojo and Reverend Victor Africander, marched into Chapel Street and then
turned left into Longmarket Street with the huge banner of the SFT behind the religious leaders
Local university students, who disguised their identity by wearing balac1avas, unfurled the African
National Congress (ANC) and South African Communist Party (SACP) banners. They manoeuvred
their way to the head of the crowd, positioning themselves next to the religious leaders and in front
of the press cameras. 50 There were also other banners, some of which were calling for the
resignation of Law and Order Minister, Adriaan Vlok. Others read "Don't, shoot this is a peaceful
march",51 Trade union banners were also prominent (see pictures). There was ajovial and expectant
mood, for marching in the central business district was a novel experience for many ofthe township
46 'Magistrate sanctions march' The Natal Witness, 21 September 1989.
47 Information supplied by Tim Nuttall.
48 Author's interview with Michael Worsnip, 7 September 1995.
49 The Natal Witness, 22 September 1989.
50 Author's interviews with Michael Worsnip, 7 September 1995 and Cassius Lubisi, 20 September 1995
and information supplied by Tim Nuttall. Worsnip pointed out that unlike in the Durban march where
Christian Bishops felt uncomfortable about the SACP flags and banners, in Pietermaritzburg the press did not
make a big fracas about that. He also argued that Mgojo and Africander had no problems with the SACP and
the other banned organisations.
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dwellers. Writing about the 1989 Defiance Campaign, Yunus Carrim pointed out that the :MDM
had taken over the main streets of the major cities of the country for the first time ever in the long
struggle against apartheid.52 The singing crowd marched slowly down Longmarket Street. As
Carrim puts it,
'The march· in Pietermaritzburg was full of life, colour and energy as were other
marches countrywide. The singing, chanting, rhythmic dancing of the toYi-toYi and
the waving of banners created a carnival-like atmosphere. A stirring image in the
Pietermaritzburg march was of black construction workers smiling triumphantly,
reaching to the sky with Amandla! salutes from the top ofthe building' .53
The songs and slogans were important in mass mobilisation, as they provided people with identity
and assisted in conscientising people about the plight of the ANC in exile and jailed leaders.54
However, not only freedom songs were sung, but also church hYmnS, as people from different
congregations were there. Even before that the youths in the townships had a tendency of turning
church hYmnS into freedom songs by changing words but maintaining the rhythm. There was a
sense of solemnity, excitement, joy; and people were feeling a taste of liberation as well as pride.
55
The composition of the marching crowd reflected a mixture ofyoung people and adults, males and
females. Young people, many in school uniforms, were in the majority, but there were also large
numbers of workers, university students and lecturers, and members of religious congregations.
There were clusters ofwhite people in a largely black crowd. Many white office-workers watched
the march from buildings overlooking Longmarket Street (see pictures). The organisers did not
'expect a large number of whites to participate in this march. To most of them marches were not
51 The Natal Witness, 22 September 1989.
52 Y.c~ 'The Defiance Campaign: Protest politics on the march', in Indicator South Africa, volume
16, number 4, (1989), p.50.
53 Ibid. p.49.
54 Author's interview with Sobhuza Dlamini who pointed out that some people enjoyed singing freedom
songs even if they did not understand their purpose, 12 July 1995. In author's interviews with Meshack
Makhathini, 12 August 1995 and Dumezweni Zimu, 3 August 1995 it came out that in fact freedom songs
combined easily with African cultural heritage as people expressed their joyful and sad moments in songs.
55 Author's interviews with Michael Worsnip, 7 September 1995 and Rod Buhnan, 8 September 1995.
their ways ofregistering protests' .56
En route the marchers were joined by groups of people who had gathered to watc~ and at the
intersection ofLongmarket and Commercial Streets the crowd turned right into Commercial Road.
Then the marchers· turned right again into Loop Street and congregated in front of the police
station. Probably the lengthening of the route of the march was a ploy to ground traffic to a halt, as
Longmarket and Commercial streets were always full of traffic. In that way the march organisers
were drawing maximum attention to their cause. Furthermore, by lengthening the route, additional
bystanders would be able to join the march. There was a sense of being in control of the city as
marchers went through four streets before reaching their destination. In fact, the marchers could
have taken a short route by just marching straight along Chapel Street and then turning left down
Loop Street.
The crowd sat down in front of the police station, while still singing and chanting slogans. The
crowd stretched from the police station down Loop Street to the corner of Commercial Road. The
whole scene was astonishing and spectacular, with police videotaping the crowd from the top of the
nearby museum and the hotel and some police were posted on top ofthe police building. They were
not only videotaping but also strategically positioned in case anything unexpected took place. Some
youths taunted the police, but the marshals managed to control the situation and avert
confrontation. 57 The police had kept a low profile since the start of the march; there was no major
confrontation between the police and the marchers as -had been the case with the march in Cape
Town on 2 September 1989, when police sprayed purple dye from a casspir in a bid to break up the
58crowd.
56 Author's interview with Cassius Lubisi, 20 September 1995.
57 Author's interview with Rod Bulman, 8 September 1995.
58
D. Smuts and S. Westcott (eels), The Purple shall Govern-A South African A to Z ofNonviolent Action
.'\
Photograph 2. Defiance Campaign march, September 1989. The photograph shows
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Photograph 4. Some of the uniformed schoolchildren in the front with leaders of the
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Photograph 5. Two large African National Congress and SACP banners being hoisted
by youths in front of the leaders. The marchers were now at the intersection of
Commercial Road and Longmarket Street. (Courtesy ofDr Aron Mazel)
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At the police station Bishop Mgojo, acting on behalf of community, labour and religious
organisations in the city, handed two memoranda to Captain Adam Barnard of the South Afiican
police. Representatives ofthe Vherda Dharma Sabha, the Muslim community, and the Natal Indian
Congress handed in their separate memoranda. Christian ministers also handed over a memorandum
demanding amongst -other things an end to funeral restrictions.59 Most of the memoranda protested
against the continuing violence, the police failure to prosecute those responsible for it, the
inefficiency of the criminal justice system, the detentions, restrictions and banning orders, and the
continuance of the State of Emergency. The stipulations of these memoranda told much about the
context in which the protest march took place. Chris Dlamini spoke on behalf of the NIDM. He was
quoted in the newspaper as having said
'We want peace where we live, where we work, in our schools, we want peace all
over South Afiica. We are appealing to the authorities that we have reached the
stage where they must listen to the masses, we are saYing that, like it or not, change
. h d!,60IS at an ..
As part of a nation-wide tradition the crowd sang 'Nkosi Sikelel' i Afrika' before returning to the
Cathedral where buses were waiting for the marchers from the townships. Bishop Mgojo then
called on marchers to go home peacefully. It appears that up to this point the march was orderly
and disciplined and neither the police nor the marchers had provoked each other. Considering the
violent and tense political situation in Pietermaritzburg, it was remarkable that the march had
61
proceeded peacefully.
The aftermath of the march: contending perspectives
After the march, there were incidents of the looting of shops in the downtown vicinity of Retief
Street, and damage to some vehicles was also reported. A dispute ensued as to whether these
(Care Town, O.D.P., 1991), p.ll.
5 The Natal Witness, 22 September 1989; Weekly Mail, 22-28 September 1989, p.2.
60 The Natal Witness, 22 September 1989.
61 Author's interview with Rod Bu1man, 8 September 1995.
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incidents were related to the protest march or not. The police view was that the groups of youths
that looted shops and damaged cars were part of the crowd from the protest march. According to
Major Pieter Kitching,
'After the march large groups of youths 'toyi-toyied' down Church Street toward
Boshoff .and Retief Streets. When they reached the lower end of the city they
robbed a number of Indian sho~s, broke windows and robbed and broke down fruit
stalls of a number ofhawkers,6
This was not only a police view, as other sources also emphasised the connection between the
march and the looting that took place later. The Race Relations Survey pointed out that' a march of
about 7 500 people in Pietermaritzburg in September 1989 erupted in violence when groups of
youth broke away and went on a rampage in the Indian business area. ,63 However, it is also possible
to postulate that this publication was based on a newspaper article. Aitchison pointed out that the
march was 'marred by some looting afterwards which may have included a section of the crowd',
while the Weekly Mail described it as 'the only violent incident in a week of march fever'. 64
Interestingly enough Yunus Carrim of the South African Communist Party seemed to suggest that
these violent incidents were related to the march. He wrote that, 'overall the marches were
remarkably disciplined and harmonious. But for the looting of a few shops after the
Pietermaritzburg march they were altogether free ofviolent incidents'. 65
It was in the interest of the organisers to disassociate the violence from the protest march.
Bishop Mgojo stressed that the march had ended peacefully and that any violent incidents
had been'outside the context ofthe march'. He pointed out that 'at the ~nd ofthe march we
insisted that people go home peacefully and most went into buses. ,66 However, it was likely
62 'Youth rampage after peaceful march', The Natal Witness, 22 September 1989, pp.! & 13; Weekly
Mail, 22-28 September 1989, p.2.
63 Race Relations Survey, 1989/90, p.226.
64 Aitchison, 'Numbering the Dead', p. 64; Weekly Mail, 22-28 September 1989, p. 2.
65 Carrim, 'The Defiance Campaign', p. 49.
66 The Natal Witness, 22 September 1989, p.13.
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that not all the people went into the buses. That was understandable in the sense that there
was no mechanism that could be used to ensure that all marchers went back to the
townships immediately after the march.
In addition to the above views a third one could be added which investigates the socio-economic
and political context in order to understand what happened after the march. Possibly the looting
involved both agent provocateurs and also some sections of the crowd from the march. One
researcher's remark that, 'coupled with weak and fragmented communication within the resistance
movement blunders are inevitable' further substantiates this point. ,67 Indeed many anti-apartheid
political organisations at that time were already infiltrated by the state's secret agents whose
intentions were to sabotage mass action.
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Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to investigate how the strategy of protest marches was utilised in
Pietermaritzburg for purposes of mass mobilisation. The leaders of the march asserted that the
crowd showed discipline while on the other side of the spectrum there were critics who capitalised
on looting that took place after the march. Comparing the march with recent stayaways, there was a
reduction in confrontation between police and young people, and no injuries and arson reports. The
protest march was the first very large anti-apartheid political gathering in the city centre. During the
1950s the few protest marches that occurred in the city centre were tiny by comparison. The socio-
political and economic had changed in Pietermaritzburg by the late 1980s. The struggle was now
taken to the city and not confined to the townships, as was the case with stayaways.
67 M. Khwela, 'Criminalising protest - Media view of political protest~, in F. Meer, Resistance in the
townships (Durb~ Madiba, 1989), p.20?
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At a national level, the MDM gave direction and leadership to the defiance campaign marches of
1989. The Movement 'showed with panache and an occasional sense of humour, that South Afiica
under a State of Emergency was anything but a normal society, an idea much touted by the
authorities' .69 Protest marches represented the most visible aspects of the 'new' F. W. de Klerk era
and ironically helped' to boost the state's image at home and abroad.
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The marches were part of the
peaceful protest action, and their adoption as a tool of resistance did not mean that other strategies
such as stayaways and boycotts were going to be abandoned. The Defiance campaigns took the
resistance crowds to the central business districts of the cities and symbolically extended the
struggle beyond the townships into the cities that were the loci ofwhite power.
One can conclude by arguing that the ecclesiastically led protest march in Pietermaritzburg heralded
a new era in mass mobilisation. This march was a strategy of mass mobilisation which required
people to be out in the streets and to occupy the city centre. The march was full of defiance rather
than confrontation, but it served the same purpose as other strategies such as stayaways. The crowd
that participated in the march made it a historical event and it is hard to ignore it when one
investigates the history of mass mobilisation in the Pietermaritzburg region. The march was not only
important for the size of its crowd but also for the fact that it proceeded peacefully despite the
climate of conflict and confrontation in the region. The looting saga, which the media associated
with the march, did not dampen the spirit of the Defiance Campaign in the Pietennaritzburg region.
The march acted as a precedent for other protest- marches that took place in Pietermaritzburg from
1990 onwards. These marches are beyond the scope of this chapter but it-would suffice to mention
just a few significant ones that took place in Pietermaritzburg such as the anti-Gatting march in
February 1990, an Inkatha Freedom Party march in June 1990, the anti-VAT march in September
68 Author's interview with Cassius Lubisi, 20 September 1995.
69
Merretl, The Emergency ofthe State, p.2.
70c~ 'The Defiance Campaign', p. 52.
160
1991, Imbali women's marches in 1992, the rolling mass action marches in May-June 1992, the !FP
march in June 1993, and the ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance march to protest against the killing of
Coos Hani in April 1993.
CONCLUSION
The aIm of this thesis has been to explore and compare aspects of anti-apartheid mass
mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg during the 1950s and the 1980s. The formation of resistance
crowds has been the main focus of this study. This has required exploring the contexts in which
these crowds formed, or did not form. As a way of fleshing out the comparative framework, four
case studies (two from each decade) were selected. However, in order to contextualise the case
studies two chapters dealt specifically with the socio-economic and political contexts of the
periods before and during which those selected events occurred. The key organising chapter
around which the whole thesis was centred was Chapter One. This offered a survey of the
literature that has been written, mostly during the late 1980s and early 1990s, which explicitly or
implicitly, compare the resistance politics of the 1980s with that of the 1950s. Drawing from that
literature I was able to select the organising themes which were the basis for the comparative
analysis.
The historiographical survey showed a tendency, among a wide range of analysts, to compare the
1980s with the 1950s. Many of these authors were writing during the 1980s and it is likely that
they were influenced by the political context of South Africa at that time. For political
organisations in the 1980s, a trajectory of the struggle was the main thing they needed for
inspiration. There was a general assumption among many authors that resistance during the 1950s
was intense in all urban centres. The other important thing about the literature is that there is a
common assertion that the 1960s and the 1970s were years of extreme repression except for a few
uprisings during the 1970s. It is because of these generalisations that I decided to look at the
specific case ofPietermaritzburg.
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Against the background of this literature survey, I explored Pietermaritzburg's socio-economic
and political contexts during the 1950s with the aim being to set the scene for the case studies.
The exploration of the context has shown that Pietermaritzburg was a small and developing city
during the 1950s. There was still the belief among the city authorities and some residents that
Pietermaritzburgshould remain an administrative, agricultural and educational capital city. There
were also serious accommodation problems for Africans as there were few residential areas for
them. By the end of the 1950s there were only two small formal townships, those of Sobantu and
Ashdown. The vast majority of the city's Africans lived in infonnal settlements in Edendale and
in the Vulindlela area. Edendale was excluded from the borough boundaries and so was not
within the Pietermaritzburg City Council's sphere of influence.
My study has revealed that there was little significant mass mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg
during the 1950s. The African National Congress and the Natal Indian Congress were the main
anti-apartheid organisations in Pietermaritzburg at the time. However, there are differences of
opinion from people of diverse political persuasions as to the strength of these two organisations.
Furthermore, the municipal attitude to Africans shaped the nature of resistance in
Pietermaritzburg during the 1950s. The local white authorities seemed to have been sympathetic
to the problems of Africans and they were also concerned about maintaining good race relations,
so as to ensure that local Africans did not participate in the resistance campaigns of the 1950s.
However, some incidents of resistance took place in Pietermaritzburg during the 1950s to the
dismay of the local white authorities.
Two protest marches by women occurred in Pietermaritzburg, one in November 1956 and another
in January 1957. This is my first case study of the 1950s and it has shown that this was the first
instance of anti-apartheid crowd mobilisation to take place in Pietermaritzburg. The majority of
the participants were African women, but it also a significant aspect that women from different
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racial groups and political parties attended the demonstrations which were part of the nation-wide
anti-pass campaigns. The year 1959 saw further women's demonstrations in Pietermaritzburg
during the so-called 'Natal disturbances'. The grievances in the urban areas were about issues
such as passes, influx control, wages and beer brewing. There were similar riots in the rural areas,
with a focus more on issues such as land shortage and dipping tanks. The 'native disturbances' in
Pietermaritzburg reached a high point with the violent revolt which occurred at Sobantu Village
on Saturday 15 August 1959. The Sobantu revolt followed a demonstration by women which had
not involved the destruction of property and loss of lives. This violent incident involved young
people from a small township, which had for many years been regarded as a 'model village'. The
Sobantu revolt, which is my second case study, was a significant event and it was more than a
mere riot instigated by 'agitators'; it was a carefully planned event of anti-apartheid resistance.
Never before had Pietermaritzburg seen a revolt of that nature by African people. There is
evidence from oral accounts that many young people in Sobantu were members of the ANC and
that youth militancy was beginning to develop during this time.
Against that background of heightened political militancy in some of Pietermaritzburg' s African
residential areas, I went on to explore the socio-economic and political contexts of
Pietermaritzburg from the early 1960s to the early 1980s. Over this period Pietermaritzburg
experienced a variety of economic, social and political changes. New firms were being
established as part of the border industry scheme. The provision of accommodation ~or Africans
improved after the establishment of Imbali Township during the 1960s. However, on the anti-
apartheid political scene there were no major developments during this period. One should point
out that this was the nation-wide trend during this time, as the struggle had been militarised after
the banning of the ANC and PAC in 1960. There were incidents of the detaining ofuMkhonto
weSizwe cadres in Pietermaritzburg and in the Natal Midlands as a whole. It was also during this
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period that the government enacted many repreSSIve laws, which further hindered extra-
parliamentary opposition.
Resistance to apartheid began to gain momentum in other parts of South Africa during the early
1970s. My research has shown that Pietermaritzburg was not affected by the worker's strikes of
1973 nor the student revolts of 1976 in any remarkable way. Possible reasons for this have been
given in the chapter. However, in conditions of further industrialisation and urban growth, new
kinds of anti-apartheid resistance politics began to develop in the early 1980s. Pietermaritzburg
became part of the nationwide civil rebellion of the time.
A watershed in the history of mass mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg came with the Sarmcol
stayaway of 1985. This stayaway is my third case study. During this stayaway a factory dispute
was transformed into a weapon of anti-government struggle. It is argued that it charted the course
for future events of mass mobilisation. Although the event did not lead to the reinstatement of the
dismissed workers, it did have an impact on mass mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg. Rather than
stay indoors, crowds took to the streets in the townships to demonstrate not only their support for
the Sarmcol strikers, but also to make this event part of the broader anti-apartheid struggle. Never
before in the history of the struggle in Pietermaritzburg had there been such a successful
stayaway.
In Pietermaritzburg the national stayaways of the later 1980s were well supported. Mass
mobilisation in Pietermaritzburg entered into a new scene when organisations had to operate
under the State of Emergency and, from 1987, in the context of violence between the UDF-
COSATU alliance and the Inkatha. Trade unions and church groups were central in mass
mobilisation, especially after the banning of the UDF and other anti-apartheid organisations in
February 1988. However, towards the end of the decade there were changes in broader national
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politics. The 'newly-formed' Mass Democratic Movement was formed in 1989 to continue with
mass mobilisation. During the middle of the year the MDM announced its mass defiance
campaign which would involve the occupation of racially segregated amenities and the holding of
protest marches in the cities of South Africa. One of those marches took place in Pietermaritzburg
and drew a crowd of around 7000 people. This march was the subject of my fourth case study. It
was arguably the first very big anti-apartheid march in Pietermaritzburg, particularly when
compared to marches in the 1950s. What also made this march significant was that it signalled a
departure from the use of stayaways which had become a common resistance strategy.
Furthermore, this protest march was an act of taking the struggle to the city centre and away from
the townships.
One of the main purposes has been to find out if there was mass mobilisation during the 1950s in
Pietermaritzburg, as was the case in other urban centres of South Africa. With the advantage of
hindsight, one can say that, contrary to common claims, Pietermaritzburg did not experience
heightened mass mobilisation during the 1950s. There were some incidents, which involved
protesting crowds, but they were not as intense as was the case with other urban centres.
Furthermore, during the 1950s Pietermaritzburg had negligible developments in industry and
there were no strong trade unions except for the Howick Rubber Workers Union (HRWU), which
mobilised in a town about 25 kilometres from Pietermaritzburg. Despite the women's marches in
-
1956 and 1957 and the Sobantu incident of 1959, resistance politics in Pietermaritzburg was still
not comparable to other centres of resistance in South Africa.
On the contrary the 1980s saw the rise of substantial anti-apartheid resistance in Pietermaritzburg.
However, mass mobilisation was not similar to that of the 1950s where political organisations
could organise protest marches. During the 1980s resistance occurred in a context where the
government had enacted legislation which made it difficult for organisations to mobilise openly
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as had been the case during the 1950s. By the 1980s, Pietermaritzburg had changed
economically, socially and politically from the town it had been in the 1950s. There were many
industries and there were trade unions, some of which proposed the idea of political unionism.
There was also the large township of Imbali, which had not existed during the 1950s.
Furthermore, during the early 1980s there had been boycotts against community councils, rents
and bus fares. The people in Pietermaritzburg were participating in the broader struggles against
the manifestations of apartheid. A Youth League was formed in 1980 showing the beginnings of
political consciousness and mobilisation. Interestingly, that League was named after a person
who had been active in Pietermaritzburg,s anti-apartheid politics during the 1950s. It was no
longer the case that resistance politics was a domain of the few African middle class families in
African areas, as had been the case during the 1950s. In the 1980s, a wide range of people
participated, irrespective of classes although the young people were in a majority. So one can say
that the events of the 1980s were different from those of the 1950s because they involved
different constituencies, different kinds of leadership and different state and municipal policies.
The key incident, which signalled a break with Pietermaritzburg's lacklustre participation in anti-
apartheid resistance, was a local issue. Many of the campaigns of the 1950s were broader national
campaigns and it is likely that Pietermaritzburg needed a local issue with local resonance in order
to change its history of political mobilisation. In addition, during the 1980s there had developed a
phenomenon where worker and community grievances were merging, something w,hich was not
well developed during the 1950s. For Pietermaritzburg the spark for mass mobilisation only came
during the 1980s with mobilisation around the Sarmcol struggle in 1985. The 1989 Defiance
Campaign march in the city centre was also significant in signalling a new phase of crowd
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John is Director of the Centre for Adult education at the University ofNatal, Pietennaritzburg. He
was an active in student politics at this campus during the 1960s. He once taught as a volunteer
teacher at a night school in Sobantu during the early 1960s. He was a prominent member of the
Liberal Party until it was banned in 1968. He has compiled a database of political violence in the
Natal midlands during the 1980s and the 1990s.
Hassim, Kader
He is a key member ofthe African People's Democratic Union of South Africa (APDUSA). He has
been active in resistance politics in Pietennaritzburg since the 1950s. During the late 1960s he was
arrested for his political activities and was imprisoned in Robben Island. In 1976 he was struck of
the roll ofNatal attorneys until he was readmitted in 1997.
Bulman, Rod
He was a registrar at Federal Theological Seminary at Imbali and was instrumental in the
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organisation of the 1989 Defiance Campaign march in Pietermaritzburg. He is Director of the
Phe1amanga Project.
Chetty, A. S.
Well-known as A. S. he has been involved in the politics of resistance since the 1950s. He was a
member of the Natal Indian Congress during the 1950s and during the 1980s he was the local
Chairperson ofthe United Democratic Front. He is now a member ofthe Pietermaritzburg TLC.
Dladla, Philip
He was one of the Sarmcol strikers who came to march in the Pietermaritzburg townships in June
1985. He is presently working at the National Union of Metal workers of South Africa offices in
Pietermaritzburg.
Dlamini, Sobhuza
He was a youth activist in Imbali Township in the 1980s. He was a member of the Imbali Youth
Organisation (NO).
Gumede, Archie
Archie was in his early 80s when he was interviewed. He is the son of Josia Gumede, who was
President of the African National Congress during the late 1920s. He was active in the
'Pietermaritzburg ANC during the 1950s together with the late Harry Gwala and Moses
Mabhida. He is a lawyer by profession and, during the 1980s he was the co-President of the
.UDF. He was among the people who sat-in at the British Embassy in 1985 and was
subsequently charged Jor treason and the trial took place at the College Road Supreme Court
in Pietermaritzburg in 1985.
Keys, Radley
He was a violence monitor in the Natal Midlands and a member of the Progressive Federal Party
(pFP) during the 1980s. He is a Democratic Party (DP) leader in Pietermaritzburg and is a member
ofthe Pietermaritzburg TLC.
Lubisi, Cassius
He was a member ofthe South African Youth Congress (SAYCO), which was a youth wing ofthe
UDF, in the Natal Midlands. He was involved in the Defiance Campaign march in Pietermaritzburg
in 1989. He was also active in the Release Mandela Campaign (RMC). He is a member of the
South African Communist Party (SACP). He is presently a lecturer at the-University of Natal,
Pietermaritzburg.
Lundie, Ruth
Ruth was active in the Liberal Party during the 1950s. She was based in Pietermaritzburg
working for the Local Health Commission. She later taught in mission schools in Lesotho and
Alice, in Ciskei. She is retired and is one of the interviewers of the Alan Paton Centre's Oral
History Project.
Mabhida, Linah
She is the wife of the late Moses Mabhida who was organising for both ANC and SACTU in
Pietermaritzburg and Durban during the 1950s. Linah was involved in resistance activities such as
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beerhall boycotts during the 1950s. When this interview was conducted she was in her early 70s
and has, since the 1970s, gone blind.
Makhathini, Mthunzi
He was one of the Sanncol strikers who marched in Pietermaritzburg in June 1985. He was a
member ofthe civic association at kwaMevana Township in Howick.
Msimang, Waiter
WaIter was 96 years old at the time of the interview. I was interviewing him on the history of
Edendale, which was not part of this thesis. I ended up getting some points that were relevant
for this study. He was the descendant ofAmakholwa (Christian converts) who came to reside
in Edendale during the mid-19th century. He was a teacher by profession. He passed away in
April this year.
Ndlovu, Alfred
He was deputy-president ofthe Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) and also chairman
of the Southern Natal region of COSATU. He stayed in Imbali and was working for the KwaZulu
Transport Company. He is now a member ofthe Pietermaritzburg TLC.
Ndlovu, Moses
He is a veteran trade unionist and is currently working for the Paper Printing Wood .and Allied
Workers Union (pPWAWU) in the Natal Midlands.
Sikhosana, Vierra
She is a resident of Sobantu Village. She came to live in Sobantu in 1954. Her husband was the late
Mr 1. M. Sikhosana who was a member of the Sobantu Village Advisory Board She was a teacher
and is now retired but she is involved in adult education.
Sithole, Jabulani
He was a UDF activist and was involved in many activities of mass mobilisation. He is currently a
lecturer at the University ofNatal, Pietermaritzburg in the Department ofHistorical Studies.
Worsnip, Michael
Mike was a lecturer at FEDSEM and a convenor ofthe Standing for the Truth Campaign (SFT) in
Pietermaritzburg. He was involved in underground activities ofmass mobilisation in the 1980s and
was instrumental in the organisation of the Defiance Campaign march in Pietermaritzburg in 1989.
At the time ofthis interview he was Director ofAfrican Rural Advancement (AFRA).
Xaba, Anton
Best-known as "Mfenendala", he is a former Robben Island prisoner and-was one of the early
Mkhonto weSizwe guerrillas in Pietermaritzburg. He lives in Sobantu and he was active in
resistance politics during the 1950s. He is currently chairman of the ANC in the Natal
Midlands region.
Zimu, Dumezweni
He was a youth activist in Imbali Township in the 1980s. He argued that he did not have a high
political profile and he preferred to be interviewed as an ordinary community meptber who was
observing things rather than a person who was directly involved in planning for mass'mobilisation.
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